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For most of their history, Australians have seenthemselves as a beleaguered white outpost of the British
Empire, perched precariously between the hordes of Asia
and the edge of the world. They looked north with a
mixture of ignorance, wonder and fear, and always through
the prism of imperial design and racism. But by the middle of
the 20th century the turmoil of the Second World War,
communism and decolonisation had ended any possibility
that the region could be ignored. ‘No nation can escape its
geography’, warned Percy Spender, Australia’s Minister for
External Affairs, in 1950, ‘that is an axiom which should be
written deep in the mind of every Australian’.1 Threats that
seemed to emanate from Asia compelled Australia to take
action and reassess its place in the region: Britain’s ‘Far East’
became Australia’s ‘Near North’. And so, in the early 1950s,
Australia embarked on its most ambitious attempt —
outside of war — to engage with Asia: the Colombo Plan.
Once a conspicuous symbol of Australia’s engagement
with the region, the Colombo Plan has since faded from
popular memory. But many Australians remember the Asian
students who came — first in their hundreds, then in their
thousands — to study at Australian tertiary institutions.
Those students, along with privately-funded Asian scholars,
were among the first people from South and South–East Asia
whom Australians encountered. For those who taught,
befriended, or provided board and lodgings for these students,
the impact on their lives was personal, immediate, and
enduring. But few Australians are aware that the Colombo
Plan extended far beyond the giving of scholarships. They do
not know how and why the Colombo Plan was created, nor
how it served as an instrument of Australian foreign policy in
the fight against communism, or what the political and racial
anxieties were upon which the scheme was built.
Historians of post-war Australia, too, have over-
looked the Colombo Plan. They have considered it, and all
forms of foreign aid, as tangential to the history of
Australia’s foreign policy and relations with Asia. Instead,
attention has been devoted to relations with the Western
world, particularly the desire to cement a military alliance
with the United States, at the expense of Australian efforts
to engage with the region. Another reason for the Colombo
Plan’s minor place in post-war historiography is that it was
an international creation, established by Commonwealth,
and not exclusively Australian, policy-makers. Australia
certainly played a prominent role in the creation of the
Colombo Plan, but it was not ‘our’ aid program. Later
historians have interpreted the seemingly inconsequential
volume of funds spent by Australia as an indicator of
political and cultural insignificance. This book seeks to
address these oversights and explain how giving financial
and technical assistance to Asia — a region hitherto ignored
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or reviled — became an indispensable plank of the Menzies
Government’s policy towards Asia. 
For Percy Spender, the man who pushed the idea of
an aid program for the region through to reality, the
Colombo Plan became a feather in his cap. It was, he wrote
proudly in his memoirs, ‘a dramatic example of how a small
nation … may influence history’.2 Setting aside the egotistical
fervour, his assertion captures the degree of hope and
confidence invested in the plan. Part of the Colombo Plan’s
success came from its longevity (still operating today, it is
the world’s longest-running bilateral aid program), but also
because it crossed deep divides in Australian politics.
Although grounded in Cold War politics, the Colombo
Plan was one of the few post-war creations that achieved
consistent, bipartisan support and allowed the humanitarian
internationalist and the Australian nationalist, fearful of
the outside world, to come together. 
The Colombo Plan reached into almost every aspect
of Australian foreign policy, from strategic planning and
diplomatic initiatives, to economic and cultural engagement.
More generally, it encouraged officials and politicians to
define an Australian approach to the Cold War and the
challenges of decolonisation. This book explores the public
and private agenda behind Australia’s foreign aid diplomacy
and reveals the strategic, political and cultural objectives
that drove the Colombo Plan. It examines the legacy of the
Second World War, how foreign aid was seen as crucial to
the achievement of regional security, and the debates which
led to the establishment of the Colombo Plan in the early
1950s. The book gives particular attention to Spender’s
successor as foreign minister, Richard Casey, and his role as
chief defender and promoter of an Australian aid program.
Other themes touched on include the way the Colombo
Plan was sold to Australian and Asian audiences, the type
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of assistance offered under the program, the limitations and
effectiveness of Australian aid projects, and the changing
nature of Australia’s attitude towards its connections with
the Empire, the British Commonwealth and the United
States. Also considered are questions about sponsored
Asian students: who they were, what they studied, what
community support they received, and what impact they
had on Australia’s reputation as a racist and anti-Asian
country. Encompassing all these issues is the question of
how Australia sought to assert a stronger international
presence and project itself into the region; in effect, how
Asia was introduced into Australian consciousness.
The Colombo Plan was a cultural creation as much as
a political and strategic one. As such, it offers an important
way to investigate Australian hopes and assumptions about
their future next to Asia. Indeed, this book tries to capture
the wide-ranging impact of Australian assistance to Asia and
locate the Colombo Plan not only in national history but in
the lives of those who helped create it. It aims to deepen our
understanding of the relationship between aid and foreign
policy and to illuminate the complex mix of self-interest,
condescension and humanitarianism that characterised
Australia’s early ventures into Asia. Most of all, this book
tells the story of how an insular society, deeply scarred by the
turbulence of war, chose to face its regional future.
Footnotes
1 Commonwealth parliamentary debates: House of Representatives, vol. 6, 9 March
1950, p. 628
2 P. Spender, Exercises in diplomacy: ANZUS and the Colombo Plan, Sydney,
Sydney University Press, 1969, p. 200
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2. THE ROAD 
TO COLOMBO
The decaying gun emplacements dotted aroundAustralia’s coast stand as an epitaph to an idea once
central to Australian civilisation: that freedom and security
were best preserved by building physical barriers and
deterrents against a hostile world. ‘We live in an unstable
era’, warned founding father and future Prime Minister
Alfred Deakin in 1888, ‘from the far east and the far west
alike we behold menaces and contagion’.1 Safe behind their
defences, Australians populated and cultivated their
continent largely unfettered by outsiders who, many
believed, looked rapaciously at an empty, undeveloped
country. Indeed, hard work and the fruitful exploitation of
the land was the linchpin of a vigorous and effective
national defence. As the Sydney Morning Herald claimed in
1907, threats would be prevented ‘by populating our
country, by filling up the waste places, by settling on the
land sturdy men of our own race and our own colour,
who will hold Australia for themselves and for the
Commonwealth’.2 Australians would find, however, that
preserving their security meant stepping beyond the
barricades. 
The issue of security in a hostile — or potentially
hostile — region has been a recurrent theme in Australian
foreign policy. Dreams of an Australian sub-empire in the
Pacific were not articulated with any real conviction until
Billy Hughes became Prime Minister in 1915. Australian
interest in the Pacific, hitherto shaped by economic and
evangelical motives rather than a belief that their destiny
would impinge on Australian sovereignty, was now
animated by fears of European and Japanese expansionism.
Never prone to self-doubt, Hughes was a curious mix of the
sentimental imperialist and aggressive nationalist, dismissive
of any challenge to Australian interests, British or otherwise.
At the conclusion of the First World War, Hughes, like most
Australians, expected to enjoy a portion of the spoils,
namely the annexation of German possessions south of the
equator. En route to the Paris Peace Conference in 1918,
Hughes stopped in New York and called for the creation of
an Australasian Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific, based on
the American principle enacted in 1823 to keep European
powers out of the Western Hemisphere. The idea did not
belong to Hughes and had first been expressed in Australia
during the 1883 inter-colonial convention, when European
colonial acquisitions south of the equator were seen to
jeopardise the security and prosperity of the Empire. But
Hughes’ appeal to American tradition paid off and the local
press lapped up his feisty aphorisms. The New York Times
reported his claim that securing New Guinea was not an act
of imperialist expansion, merely an attempt to ensure
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Australian sovereignty and security, for ‘the possession of
islands within striking distance of us in unfriendly hands
means that our country must always sleep with the sword
half drawn’.3
In Paris, Hughes continued in a similar vein.
Opening the case for annexation, he unrolled a large map
of the region and pointed out to his audience that the
islands to the north ‘encompassed Australia like a fortress’.
Hughes’ colourful performance proved something of a
spectacle during the sombre conference proceedings. But it
was not enough to win the day. With memories of war still
fresh, the idea of forceful acquisition of territory had begun
to lose its moral and legal legitimacy. Instead, the concept
of a territorial ‘mandate’ administered by a single power on
principles laid down by the League of Nations, as opposed
to outright sovereign control, was becoming fashionable.
The concept of self-determination, typically used in
relation to European and Middle-Eastern nationalist
movements, was also beginning to be applied to the
undeveloped regions of the world. Against this trend the
Australian delegation publicly scoffed at the idea of
ascertaining the wishes of a people that ‘had advanced little
beyond the Stone Age’.4 The permissive mandate Hughes
eventually secured required Australia to prohibit slavery,
not to supply liquor to local people, not to raise local armies
or fortify the territory. But, while Hughes undertook to
provide a humane administration, the security benefits were
seen in terms of merely denying territory to potentially
hostile powers, rather than as an opportunity to garner
support from the local inhabitants or bolster their resolve
against subversion. Benevolent treatment of the indigenous
population was merely an unavoidable price of winning the
mandate. Although Hughes failed to annex New Guinea,
he had projected Australia’s authority beyond its continental
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borders. And, for the moment, Japan and the rest of Asia
were kept safely at bay.
Hughes’ suspicion of a future attack emanating from
Asia turned out to be disturbingly prophetic. The first serious
threat to Australian territory came from the Japanese at the
beginning of the Second World War — and it came more
quickly and with more violence than anyone had predicted.
Asia now loomed larger than ever before in the imagination
of all Australians. Japan’s seemingly unstoppable conquest of
South–East Asia shattered the illusion of Australian
inviolability, and confirmed deeply held fears that
South–East Asia would be the route to an invasion of the
mainland. Geographic isolation — for so long assumed to be
a powerful deterrent to invaders — now exacerbated
Australian anxiety. Over the course of the war, Australians
became more intimately and painfully acquainted with
South–East Asia. Australia’s first mass engagement with the
region, when about 22,000 Australians became prisoners of
the Japanese, was as a brutalised and subject people. For the
post-war generation of Australians either holding, or
destined to hold positions of authority and influence, the
mention of Asia evoked a wide range of emotions, from anger
to memories of horrific suffering and loss. Even before the
end of hostilities, Australian politicians and policy-makers
began responding to a new concept of Asia, shaped largely by
decolonisation, the emergence of nationalist movements and
the rising threat of communism. The responsibility for New
Guinea — so hard-won by Hughes — and a shared land
border with Dutch New Guinea, now perhaps to become part
of Indonesia, further projected Australia’s gaze northwards.
Interest in Asian opinion about Australia, particularly over
the consequences of immigration policies, also began to
increase. In general, the cultural, economic and political gulf
between Asia and Australia, once seen as a protection from
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invasion and decay, now needed to be managed, studied —
even narrowed. This readjustment, of course, did not come
easily or without deep apprehension.
Coming to terms with Australia’s isolation from its
strong cultural and military allies was the cause for much
anxiety during the late 1940s when the spectre of
communist expansionism emerged as one of Australia’s
fundamental security concerns. The domestic achievements
of Ben Chifley’s Labor Government (1945–49) were
considerable. But among the conservatives, the perceived
neglect of defence planning and the weakening British
connection aggravated the concern that Australia was
militarily adrift. Specifically, they saw Labor’s foreign policy,
with its faith in the new United Nations (UN) and support
for Asian self-determination, as an attempt to dismantle the
bonds of Empire. Speaking at the First Annual General
Convention of the New South Wales division of the
Liberal Party in 1945, Robert Menzies, then an opposition
backbencher, savaged the logic of Labor’s international
liberalism: ‘the very arguments used for throwing the Dutch
out of the East Indies are the arguments which will be used
to throw the British out of Malaya, to throw the British out
of Burma, India, for throwing the Australians out of New
Guinea’. Labor’s approach to regional affairs, he claimed,
threatened the ‘continued existence of the British Empire’
which was ‘vital to the peace and the future of the world’.5
Some members of the Liberal/Country Party opposition
who, perhaps privately, doubted the strength of the imperial
connection saw the chance to rebuild those ties. In 1949,
Sir Earle Page, the co-founder of the federal Country Party,
berated Labor’s volatile and combative foreign minister,
Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, for his support of the Dutch
withdrawal from Indonesia: 
The Road to Colombo 9
When we find that the present occupants of
territories which concern us have been told that
they should get out of them for the sake of the
original inhabitants, we wonder whether we are
living in a chapter of Alice in Wonderland …
We should ask ourselves who are our real friends?
… Who are those who will support us in our hour
of need? … The only way we can ensure … safety
is to build a new British Empire. That Empire is
held together by the great traditions of the past.6
But for many, the bonds of empire had already begun
to unravel, the fall of Singapore and the reliance on
American forces to defeat the Japanese having been an
object lesson in the irrelevance of Britain to Australia’s
strategic integrity. The Japanese wartime Prime Minister
Tojo Hideki accurately assessed Australia’s vulnerability
and sense of betrayal when, in 1942, he gleefully dubbed
Australia ‘the orphan of the Pacific’.7
The man who brought most of the pressure to bear
on the Chifley government and its apparent failure to
adequately manage Britain’s shifting priorities and prepare
for future threats from South–East Asia was Percy Spender.
As shadow Minister for External Affairs, he dogged Evatt
for three years. With thin lips, a close-cropped moustache
and narrow eyes, Spender appeared every bit as fiery and
relentless as his political opponents knew him to be. His
nickname, the Butcherbird, came from his earlier career in
law and his reputation for merciless cross-examination of
witnesses. Brilliant as a barrister, Spender took silk at the
age of 35 to become one of the country’s youngest King’s
Counsel. He carried his talent for debate and advocacy into
federal politics in 1937, when he won the blue-ribbon seat
of Warringah on Sydney’s north shore. Within 18 months
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of his election, Menzies invited Spender to join the United
Australia Party and take up the position of Acting
Treasurer. He later became Treasurer, Minister for Army in
the wartime Cabinet, and a member of the Australian
Advisory War Council. Among the most travelled members
of Cabinet, Spender had visited Japan, Hong Kong and
the Philippines during the late 1920s and 1930s. The
experience left its mark. On one trip to Asia, he recalled
watching a ship being coaled: ‘it was almost inhuman to see
these people with baskets of coal upon their backs.
Throwing the coal upon their backs, almost like a treadmill,
going up and down, throwing the coal down the hold,
returning, filling their baskets again with coal and going on
and on, an endless chain of humans’.8 The picture of poor,
anonymous and vulnerable labourers stayed with Spender
throughout his life. Indeed, what he saw informed his view
that Labor policy-makers had grossly underestimated the
unstable nature of Asian society and its susceptibility to
communism.
Unlike Evatt, Spender had little faith in the UN, and
he came to believe that the Charter was ‘manifestly unable
to protect Australian interests’ and that, without external
assistance, Australia was unable to guarantee its security.
He attacked Evatt’s commitment to liberal internationalism
and cast aspersions on his patriotism. On one occasion
Spender charged Evatt with addressing the parliament as an
‘internationalist’, not as an Australian. On another,
Spender responded to one of Evatt’s numerous speeches
regarding the UN with a rhetorical question: ‘The speech of
the right honourable gentleman contained not one word
about matters which are of vital interest to this country.
The events which are taking place not only in Europe but
also in Asia … Where, in his speech, was any reference
made to the Pacific and South–East Asia?’ There is little
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doubt that Evatt considered the UN to be the principal
instrument for international conflict prevention and
resolution. Evatt hoped that the UN, as an egalitarian
international forum, would ensure that Australia’s voice
would not be lost amid the din of Cold War posturing
by the great powers. Yet, despite his belief in self-
determination as the ‘best form of security’ and the
criticism levelled at him by the opposition, Evatt’s
‘internationalism’ did not abrogate responsibility for
regional security issues. He acknowledged that the mere
existence of a UN Charter did not ‘dispose of the need for
national defence forces, and [offered] no absolute guarantee
against armed conflicts and aggression’.9 Nor did the
existence of the Charter obviate the need to create policies
designed to foster positive foreign relations and collective
security arrangements.
Evatt was perhaps the first to seek a more organic
security policy, outside of the framework of alliance
diplomacy. In 1944 he attempted to strengthen Australian
and New Zealand strategic and territorial interests in the
Pacific with the formation of the Anzac Pact, Australia’s
first international defence agreement without the United
Kingdom. Among other things, the agreement envisaged a
‘system of world security’ based on a zone of defence
‘stretching through the arc of islands north and north-east
of Australia to Western Samoa and New Zealand’s
possessions in the Cook Islands’. While the defence ‘zone’
never materialised, regional security was now seen to
involve much wider responsibilities. Monroe Doctrine–style
isolationism gave way to a tentative regionalism, based on a
wider understanding of defensive planning to encompass
increased economic and social interaction. A statement
issued in January 1944 by the Department of External
Affairs (DEA) announced the new obligations for those
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with territorial interests in the area: Australia and other
regional powers now had a ‘duty to advance the welfare of
the native people and to promote their social and economic
and political development’. Evatt further developed the
idea that political stability and economic and social
progress were inexorably linked, and in November 1944 he
explained his vision for international peace and regional
stability to the House of Representatives:
There cannot be freedom from fear unless there is
a systematic attempt to achieve the objective of
freedom from want. International order cannot
continue indefinitely unless the conditions of social
unrest are removed. It is urgently necessary to
provide machinery for the promotion of human
welfare in all parts of the world. But we feel a
special responsibility for non-self-governing
territories in the region in which we live and in
neighbouring regions. We feel that great
constructive work can be and should be done by
the Governments responsible for territories in the
South Seas and in the South–East Asia region to
provide for mutual assistance, exchange of
information and collaboration in particular
problems, such as health, transport, economic
development and native welfare.10
The United Kingdom made the first attempt to avert
famine and social upheaval following the Second World
War. Motivated primarily by the looming withdrawal from
India and Burma and the fresh significance this conferred
on her remaining possessions, in 1946 Britain appointed
Lord Killearn (Sir Miles Lampson), former Ambassador to
Egypt, to the new position of Special Commissioner in
South–East Asia. Based in Singapore, his job was to
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coordinate food supply, promote social welfare, organise
conferences on regional issues, strengthen political stability
and secure economic advantages for the United Kingdom.
Through Killearn’s endeavours, the Foreign Office hoped,
Singapore might become a ‘centre for the radiation of British
influence’ and consolidate her strategic and economic
presence.11 The creation of the UN liaison body Economic
Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) in March
1947, however, initially appeared to threaten British
regional hegemony. Although resistant to the idea of a
regional forum where, as Australia’s Commissioner for
Malaya in Singapore, Claude Massey, put it, Britain feared
they would be ‘hopelessly outnumbered by Asiatic
representatives’, the Foreign Office also hoped that
Australia’s membership of ECAFE and Killearn’s work in
Singapore would be sufficiently credible — and conspicuous
— to counteract any anti-western or pro-communist
sentiment. Killearn made Britain’s neo-colonial ambitions
abundantly clear when he confessed to Massey that ‘the big
idea’ was to get ‘all the interested regions here jointly into
consultation with a view to a discussion on the future world
lay-out’.12
With UK officials preoccupied with getting
South–East Asia to look to Britain for ‘spiritual leadership’,
they were surprised when Australia mounted a challenge —
even if it was largely rhetorical — as a regional leader. Evatt
saw his chance to elevate Australia’s regional presence
immediately after Britain announced that India was to
become independent. On 26 February 1947 he told the
parliament that, as Britain’s responsibilities declined,
Australia’s would rise: ‘Just as far as the people of
South–East Asia cease to be dependent upon the decisions
of European Governments, so far do Australia’s interests in
the councils of South–East Asia increase … The time has
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now arrived where there should be formed in South–East
Asia and the Western Pacific an appropriate regional
instrumentality’.13 The expansionist ethos that governed
Australia’s national development was central to the
achievement of international security. Evatt’s plans to set
the South Pacific on the road to progress was, in some ways,
a judicious transference of the same motivations that drove
Australia’s quest to develop: if industrious and rapid
cultivation of the country could protect Australia from
conquest, then surely it could save the backward nations of
Asia and the Pacific.
Evatt’s subsequent proposal for a regional conference on
trade, defence, and cultural relations threatened British hopes
to retain the initiative. The Foreign Office despatched Killearn
to Canberra to discover the details of Evatt’s plan and to
remind the haughty colonial of the United Kingdom’s
existing efforts to foster collaboration via the Special
Commissioner in Singapore. Killearn’s entreaties, combined
with the more pressing question of the Japanese Peace
Treaty, resulted in Evatt abandoning his plan for a
South–East Asian conference. Nevertheless, Evatt’s call for
the rubric of regional security to be expanded to include
welfare and development marked the convergence of the
economic, social and strategic dimensions of Australia’s
approach to national defence and regional affairs. Although
Evatt’s plan for Asia faded away, he, along with senior DEA
officials, successfully created a consultative regional forum
for the Pacific. Australia, France, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States officially
launched the South Pacific Commission on 6 February 1947
to promote development in Pacific Island territories under
their administration. Like the Anglo–American Caribbean
Commission established in 1942, from which its creators
drew considerable inspiration, the veneer of benevolence
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belied the deeper concern that communist ideology might
flow to the islands via the anti-colonial sentiment
spreading across the world.
Evatt received diligent support from the secretary of
the DEA, Dr John Burton, son of the leading Methodist
missionary, the Reverend Dr John Wear Burton. Young,
energetic and radical, Burton cut an impressive figure among
Canberra’s rapidly expanding bureaucratic corps and rose to
become Secretary of the DEA at the age of just 32.
Although he would not survive long as Secretary following
the defeat of the Chifley government, his impact on the
direction of Australian foreign policy was considerable.
Burton was particularly enthusiastic about extending
Australia’s diplomatic presence throughout Asia. A recurring
theme in DEA discussions on Australia’s regional influence
was the lack of expert knowledge about Asia and the need
for increased diplomatic representation. One of Burton’s
initiatives to boost Australian awareness of South–East Asia
and exert a positive influence on Asia’s political elite was
the 1948 Macmahon Ball Goodwill Mission to South–East
Asia. William Macmahon Ball, a political scientist from the
University of Melbourne who had served as the
Commonwealth delegate to the Allied Council for Japan
between 1946 and 1948, had developed an extensive
knowledge of Asia. Charged with investigating the region’s
aid requirements while making contact with senior Asian
diplomats, the six-week tour included 13 major cities in
Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, China, Indo-China,
Singapore and the Philippines. But the timing of the mission
was poor, taking place just a few months after 14 Indonesian
and Malayan seamen were expelled from Australia in
February 1948. On arrival, Macmahon Ball faced a ‘storm of
protest’ against Australian immigration laws and he felt the
press interpreted the entire mission as a tawdry effort
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to make up for Australia’s ‘insult’ to the people of Asia. To
make matters worse, Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner-
General for the United Kingdom in South–East Asia, during
an informal dinner party with Asian community leaders put
Macmahon Ball on the spot by asking him to explain the
reasons for the government’s actions. With Macmahon Ball
clearly under pressure, MacDonald, perhaps seeking political
advantage at Australia’s expense, added that he thought the
incident had done ‘irreparable harm’ to British and European
interests in the region. Macmahon Ball sarcastically thanked
MacDonald for expressing himself so bluntly, skipped
dessert, and left. 
These setbacks certainly damaged Macmahon Ball’s
higher purpose of exerting a positive and independent
influence over Asia’s new political elites. But they did not
stop him from making constructive observations about the
development of Australia’s foreign policy towards South–East
Asia. ‘Burdened by their newfound independence’,
Macmahon Ball wrote, ‘Asian leaders recognised their need
for outside economic and technical assistance’. Setting aside
Asia’s antipathy towards immigration restrictions, its lack of
resentment or fear of Australia opened up a unique
opportunity to provide ‘aid and intellectual leadership’.
Asians, he said, did not feel that engagement with Australia
would compromise their political or economic independence.
The key to cultivating such goodwill lay not necessarily in
going through standard diplomatic channels, but in targeting
Asia’s youth: ‘To win the friendship and goodwill of the
students and technicians is to win the goodwill of people
with great political influence’, he reported. ‘Goodwill
towards these people must become a national habit, built on
respect for the racial sensibilities and national aims of our
neighbours’.14 Francis Stuart, the astute political secretary to
the Australian Commissioner in Singapore, told Burton that
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Australia had misjudged the depth of Asian antipathy to the
white Australia policy and that he hoped the goodwill
mission finally proved the folly inherent in pretending that
foreign relations and immigration policy could be kept
apart.15 Stuart’s observations were prescient, for the tension
he identified would shape Australia’s approach to the region
for the next two decades.
A more determined strategy intended to redirect
Australia’s foreign policy towards Asia took shape in late
1948 when Chifley, as acting Minister for External Affairs,
sent a ‘Political Appreciation’ of the region to the Minister
for Defence, John Dedman.16 Developed by DEA
bureaucrats under John Burton, the appreciation outlined a
broad long-term plan of strategic and political engagement
with South–East Asia. The main features of this strategy
were to develop financial and industrial policies to help
meet the development needs of the area, to encourage the
development of Northern Australia by increasing its
population and use of resources, to develop Radio Australia
in order to encourage ‘genuine nationalist developments’,
to extend diplomatic ties with the region, to encourage
Australian businessmen and other officials to establish
commercial links with Asia, and to consult with the United
States and stimulate their interest in the problems
of South–East Asia.17 The broad thrust of the DEA’s
recommendations was that, while these suggestions varied
in importance and practicality, they all had an ‘important
long-term defence aspect [that would be] best considered
(though not executed) in a defence context’.18 Taking up
ideas generated by the Macmahon Ball mission, a handful
of scholarships were soon offered to foreign students under
the South–East Asian Scholarship Scheme, supplementing
another small offering made in 1947 through a United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
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(UNESCO) program.19 By the end of 1948 the major part
of a one-off allocation of £A500,000 of clothing, x-ray
equipment and medical supplies (taken from £A4 million
offered to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration [UNRRA]) had left Australian shores. But
this supply of war surplus was something of a windfall. In
the future the provision of aid would not be so painless
because it would be necessary to give away goods destined
for Australia’s domestic markets. The agricultural supplies,
steel, timber, locomotives, tractors and construction
equipment desperately needed in Asia were also in strong
demand in Australia, the DEA lamented.20
While bureaucrats embarked on the onerous task of
challenging Australia’s history of regional passivity,
diplomatic activity in Europe and Asia threatened to
overtake Australian planning. Since the formation of
ECAFE, regional governments had cautiously inquired
about the prospect of a Marshall Plan aid program for Asia.
But it was not until October 1948, when Britain’s Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin privately suggested the idea to his
department, that a Western government appeared willing
to take the idea seriously. However, the Foreign Office did
not embrace Bevin’s audacious suggestion. Not only might
such a plan burden Britain with providing the lion’s share of
financial aid, it also threatened to upset the complex
financial and trading arrangements which had developed
since the end of the war. Australia, New Zealand, Malaya,
India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the United Kingdom belonged
to what became known as the Sterling Area, a fiscal
arrangement which served to strengthen the pound and
Britain’s balance of trade. In order to fund the war effort
and purchase desperately needed US supplies, Britain
purchased the hard currency from the area in exchange for
sterling credits. After the war, countries could then draw on
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their balances in order to finance their own trade deficits.
And at this time, retaining control of Malaya’s dollar-
earning rubber plantations took on an important economic
significance. The prospect of a foreign aid–funded Asian
trading bloc threatened to disrupt the trade relations
between Britain, Malaya and the United States, and
jeopardise Britain’s capacity to earn dollars.21
Bevin soon came to see that fostering economic
growth, girding the region from communists, and protecting
British financial and strategic interests required a more
robust and inclusive organisation rather than Killearn’s
piecemeal endeavours, especially at the time when the
region appeared increasingly unstable. In 1948 alone,
Britain saw communist activity in Burma turn violent, and
a state of emergency arose in Malaya after repeated attacks
by communist guerrillas on British-owned enterprises and
police outposts. Even more worrying for British interests in
northern Asia, notably Hong Kong, were the spectacular
military advances by Mao Tse-tung’s army over Chiang Kai-
shek’s nationalists. The inevitability of a communist China
posed an indirect threat, though no less intimidating, to
neighbouring India and Pakistan. But at the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Conference in October 1948, it was India,
not Britain, that reinvigorated its interest in building a
non-communist regional association. In a similar vein to
his speech at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New
Delhi — the first meeting of its kind — where he stated
that India was the ‘natural centre and focal point of the
many forces at work in Asia’, India’s Prime Minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru, made only veiled references about the
creation of an Asian alliance dedicated to bringing aid into
the region.22 He assured the meeting that Asians had little
sympathy for communist ideology: the fortunes of
communism would rise or fall on the strength of indigenous
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political and cultural fortitude, he said, and as long as other
forces championed nationalism and the betterment of
living standards ‘the ground would be cut from under the
feet of the communists’. And by flagging the more specific
problem of obtaining capital goods and specialist
equipment, the lack of which hampered Asia’s economic
progress, Nehru tactfully prepared the way for future
requests of technical and financial aid. Britain was still
nervous about Asia’s need for financial support and the
likely resistance to suggestions that France and the
Netherlands join a regional body. In this context, Bevin
merely proposed that South–East Asian and Western
governments meet periodically to discuss ways of stabilising
the political and economic climate. But the prospects for
Bevin’s recommendation did not look promising, and once
again the plan seemed destined to flounder in the fractious
regional climate. First, his recommendation was diluted to a
proposal for regular discussions on international affairs in
general, and not necessarily the affairs of South–East Asia.
Second, the unresolved Dutch–Indonesian dispute meant
that Indonesia would be unrepresented, a prospect that
Killearn’s replacement, Malcolm MacDonald, likened to a
performance of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.23 In
fact, regional instability resulted in the proposed discussions
being postponed until the Colombo conference of January
1950 — a time when the affairs of Asia could no longer be
ignored. From such an inauspicious beginning, the planned
meeting turned out to be the kernel from which a regional
organisation would grow.
Nascent plans for building a means of providing aid
to the developing world gained fresh momentum when the
American president, Harry Truman, devoted his inaugural
address on 20 January 1949 entirely to foreign policy. He
vowed to support the UN, to continue to fund the Marshall
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Plan for the reconstruction of Western Europe, to support
the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) in order to resist communist aggression, and to
bring American scientific and industrial technology to bear
on the economic problems of the developing world. With
the final proposition, henceforth known as ‘Point Four’,
Truman was careful to offer only limited technical
assistance for agricultural expansion, public health and
education; it was not a promise to underwrite capital
formation in the third world. ‘Democracy alone can supply
the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into
triumphant action’, he said, ‘not only against their human
oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies —
hunger, misery, and despair’.24 Truman’s evangelical fervour
and apparent willingness to support economic growth in
developing countries set the imagination of the world
running. But Truman’s sonorous mission statement concealed
a deeper reluctance to take up the affairs of Asia. In part,
those concerns were economic (the burden of aid to Europe
was considerable and Asia was, at this point, of secondary
strategic importance), but American policy-makers were
also unwilling to risk initiating any regional arrangements
that might be interpreted as covert economic imperialism.
At the same time that Truman reaped the rewards
of his stirring address, Nehru brought together 18 nations in
New Delhi to discuss a range of regional issues, including the
means to help Indonesia achieve stable independence.
Australia, the only Western country to be fully represented,
provided some ballast to the proceedings, but most delegates
took the opportunity to attack colonialism, demanding that
the Dutch transfer power to the Indonesian Republic by
1 January 1950. In a calmer moment, Nehru recommended
that delegations ‘consult among themselves in order to
explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery,
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having regard to the areas concerned, of promoting
consultation and cooperation within the framework of the
United Nations’.25 Australian–Indian relations were cordial,
in part enhanced by Australian facilitation of India’s entrance
into the international cricketing fraternity. But that did not
divert Nehru from his purpose of building an exclusively
Asian regional alliance. With a keen eye for the telling
symbolic gesture, Nehru postponed the discussion of this
resolution until after the Western attendees had returned
home. The suggestions adopted by the remaining delegates
stopped short of calling for a program of international aid, but
a range of activities which could bring Asian governments
closer together were proposed. Among other things, the
meeting called for a greater exchange of information between
Asian governments, periodic meetings to discuss matters of
common interest, and increased emphasis on cultural
relations, including the exchange of teachers, students and
technical advisers. The DEA told Indian officials that,
although the plan was ‘broadly in accord with the conception
of regional association’ proposed by Evatt, there was no need
to encroach on the UN mandate. Yet the real reason for
Australia’s ambivalence, however, was fear of interference
from the communist powers. Equally cool responses from
Burma, Thailand and Indonesia saw the Indian proposal
shelved. But India’s attempt alerted British and Australian
policy-makers to the prospect of a regional initiative created
and led by Asians, a prospect that did not bode well for the
achievement of Western strategic and economic ambitions. A
shared distain for post-colonial domination did not
necessarily translate into shared political or economic
aspirations. Indeed, in the wake of decolonisation, smaller
Asian states grew even more suspicious of the motives of their
larger neighbours. A wise assessment came from Australia’s
High Commissioner in New Delhi, Herbert Gollan. ‘In this
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period of flux’, he wrote, ‘no Asian country will take the risk
of keeping entirely aloof from any proposal for an Asian
grouping’, but there was no ‘great cohesion in the present
show of union’.26 Asia’s smaller states rejected Nehru’s
proposed forum, with most reluctant to become associated
with an overtly Western or anti-communist bloc, and
especially one that promised little in the way of aid or
technical assistance. And the blatant anti-colonialism that
underpinned the Delhi conference dashed British hopes for a
regional forum involving the Netherlands or France.
Australian involvement in the creation of a new
regional forum intensified two months after the New Delhi
meetings, when the Australian ambassador to China,
Keith Officer, met with the Indian, US and UK
ambassadors to discuss the consequences of a communist
victory. The Indian ambassador, K.M. Panikkar, claims to
have revived the spirit of the New Delhi conference, by
presenting a paper calling for the establishment of
consultative machinery bringing together Asia and the
West. He argued that ‘without immediate and adequate
help in the economic field, the political structure of
South–East Asia would provide no more than a frail barrier
to the expansion of Communism’.27 The group then
modified Panikkar’s proposals and eventually reached, in
the US ambassador’s words, ‘a tentative consensus of
opinion’.28 On 7 March 1949 Officer sent Evatt a copy of
the joint memorandum and urged him to take ‘more than a
defensive stand’ against the advance of communism. The
memorandum synthesised many of the ideas about the
economic and political future of the Asian region
circulating since the Second World War. The achievement
of independence, it claimed, could not solve the problems
at the heart of the pre-modern, underdeveloped economy
and merely paying lip service to Asian self-determination
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was not enough to guarantee the emergence of non-
communist government. The problem was that
transforming an ‘oriental’ society based on ‘anachronistic
social bonds and … a starvation economy’ into a modern
society based on the ‘principles of social justice and
economic freedom’ was inherently revolutionary. The
underlying assumption was that a homogenous and generic
Asian economy had been denied the slow process of
economic evolution which typified European civilisation.
Such destabilising forces, therefore, exposed the people to
‘new and destructive’ ideas.29
What then was the solution to the ‘immense appeal’
of communism, feeding as it did off the turmoil induced by
the social and economic transition? The memo was, in fact,
far more ambitious than earlier proposals for regional
collaboration and suggested the creation of a permanent
consultative council, a confederation with ‘a planned and
integrated economy, which would increase food production
through the application of modern technology, embark on a
program of industrial expansion, build intra-regional trade
networks, develop a ‘common system’ of liberal-democratic
education, and build medical and sanitary facilities to
counter the ‘enervating effects’ of South–East Asia’s tropical
climate. More than a proposal for the simple correction of
Asia’s apparent economic stagnation, it called for a cultural
and social conversion and the formulation of principles
upon which the ‘New Society in South–East Asia should be
fashioned’.30 Overlooking the Soviet-style emphasis on
planned and integrated economic systems, the Nanking
model was reminiscent of the Marshall Plan and
underscored the necessity of Western finance. Risking the
ire of anti-colonial Asia, the authors suggested that, in order
to ensure that development programs were of an anti-
communist nature, contributing powers should retain some
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discretion over the funding and management of aid projects.
In Canberra, the Nanking proposals met with a cool
response. Burton, although sympathetic to both the thrust of
the memorandum and Officer’s observations, did not see any
value in merely duplicating the UN-managed organisations
already in existence, such as ECAFE and the Food and
Agricultural Organisation.31 Officer countered Burton’s
response by suggesting that the communist influence within
these organisations rendered them impotent, mere producers
of propaganda and endless discussion. In case his secretary
had missed the point, Officer repeated himself: ‘What I want
is a small very informal machine confined to those who are
really prepared to fight Communism of the Soviet variety in
the proper way, namely by improving conditions and so
providing no field for it’.32
The Nanking proposals were never formally
implemented, but they at least brought many of the ideas that
had been circulating in secret into the open. Commonwealth
officials moved closer together on significant issues: the
communist strategy had far-reaching regional (perhaps global)
consequences; any measures to counter communist expansion
required substantial external finance; and, most importantly,
Asian governments needed to have considerable discretion
and control over that assistance.
Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office made a series
of valiant, but unsuccessful, attempts to persuade the US
State Department that they should consider providing
financial aid to the region. The rhetorical power of
Truman’s address was not enough to overcome Congressional
reluctance to underwrite the reform of the economies of
South and South–East Asia. In talks with Britain, the State
Department played down the likelihood of American
support, dismissed suggestions of a Marshall Plan for Asia as
impractical, and hoped that Asian states would tackle the
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communist problem themselves.33 American resources were
already stretched to cover the Cold War in Europe, and no
funds could be spared for Asia. Needless to say, the billions
of dollars wasted bolstering Chiang Kai-shek dampened
American enthusiasm to embark on another mission to
save Asia from communist revolution. These halting
attempts to build a regional group faltered also because
Western powers, hoping for a tacitly non-communist forum,
were still reluctant to enter into a deeper dialogue that
inevitably would expose the extent of Asia’s technical and
capital needs. And without the prospect of aid, there was
little incentive for Asian nations to suspend their misgivings
about joining a union with their former colonial masters.
Unbeknown to British and Australian officials,
American policy-makers were secretly considering the
strategic ramifications of a communist Asia and the potential
role Western countries such as Australia and New Zealand
might serve. An important analysis commissioned by the US
State Department proposed that Congressional support for
any regional initiative, economic or otherwise, required the
dramatisation of the communist threat and the alternative
offered by regional collaboration. In order to foster a bulwark
against Soviet imperialism, the report recommended US
policy should aim to coordinate the discussion of economic
and political problems, promote the economic integration of
Japan, and facilitate a program of economic and cultural
assistance. Significantly, the report suggested that the United
States should endeavour to draw regional powers such as
‘India, Australia and New Zealand into more direct
responsibility for the welfare and stability of the area as a
whole’.34 While British policy-makers concluded that the
Commonwealth remained the preferred instrument for
achieving regional unity, they too envisaged a pivotal role for
the dominions. After conducting investigations into food
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supply and other counter-measures to communist
disturbance, the Foreign Office determined that ‘not only are
we in the best position to interest the United States in active
participation in maintaining the stability of the area, but our
relations with the Commonwealth provide a means of
influencing and coordinating the policies not only of the
Asiatic Dominions, but of Australia and New Zealand,
whose strategic interests in the area are, in fact, equal to our
own’.35 Throughout the year bureaucrats on both sides of the
Atlantic produced papers and continued negotiations, but
the opportunity for the Commonwealth to take the lead
went begging.
The British–American talks only recognised Australia
to the extent that she supported a much broader vision of
regional economic and political hegemony. Men like John
Burton, however, envisaged a more active Australian
presence — particularly in regard to Indonesia — working in
concert with the United States and other international
agencies.36 Aside from disputes between the DEA and the
Department of Defence over the emphasis on defence
preparations, the notion that development promoted
stability was widely endorsed. By seeing poverty as the major
cause of socio-political instability in South–East Asia, the
Defence Department conceded Burton’s main proposition
that ‘appropriate political and economic measures’ should
supplement military preparations.37 In April 1949, just before
Mao’s troops captured the Chinese capital, the Minister for
Defence, John Dedman, threw his department’s weight
behind the DEA and endorsed the creation of a ‘programme
of political and economic action’ intended to remove the
possibility of a ‘political and military vacuum’ and arrest the
spread of communism throughout Asia.38
To this end, the DEA recalled its representatives in
Japan, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya and India to
Canberra in November 1949 for an informal exchange of
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views with departmental heads. Also invited to the first two
days of the meeting were M.E. Dening, Assistant Under-
Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs at the Foreign Office, and
Alister McIntosh, Secretary of New Zealand’s Department of
External Affairs. With Evatt in the chair, discussions focused
largely on recent political developments and the ‘threat of
communism through Asia and the possibility of armed
conflict’ involving Australia, while a cooperative arrangement
with South–East Asia ‘through some form of regional pact or
association’ was formally, although inconclusively, debated.
Delegates discussed the apparent show of unity at New Delhi
earlier in the year and yet another attempt to establish an anti-
communist league, this time from the President of the
Philippines, Elpidio Quirino. All remained concerned that
‘mutual suspicion among countries of the region were deep-
seated and must be eradicated before much real political
cooperation could be expected’ and New Zealand signaled its
reluctance to become involved in the affairs of Asia.39
When the representatives from the United Kingdom
and New Zealand departed, the conference turned to the
specific economic, political and diplomatic challenges to
Australian interests: namely, the lack of awareness among
Australian officials of potential dangers from Asia; the
limited number of skilled diplomats able to represent
Australian interests; the language barrier; Australia’s ‘bad
reputation’ in Japan; the economic problems faced by
South–East Asia; Australia’s commercial policy and tariff
restrictions; supply shortages in Australia; and, not least,
the need for greater American assistance.40 Capturing the
general tenor of the group, Burton’s working paper for these
meetings, entitled ‘Australia and South–East Asia’, stated
that Australia was ‘no longer in a position to assume that its
future security and progress [were] assured within the
framework of the British Commonwealth alone’. Building
the ‘weak states’ of South–East Asia into a ‘buffer region
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between us and the Asian mainland’ required ‘a substantial
re-orientation of Australian thought and practice’ and a
movement away from the tendency to form alliances with
Western powers.41
Burton’s ideas reached the highest level in the form
of a tightly argued Cabinet paper, submitted after the
November conference and just before the December 1949
federal election. Evoking the memory of Australia’s
vulnerability during the Second World War, the paper
stated that the Japanese advance southwards had ‘brought
home to us the extent of our geographical relationship with
Asia and of our geographic isolation from our traditional
points of cultural and economic contact in Europe and
America’. Although active military intervention was
thought unnecessary to prevent the spread of communism,
Burton conceded that an armed response might become
necessary should events change rapidly. But the substantive
changes he proposed were of a deeper and more far-
reaching character. Asia’s movement towards autonomy
was ‘inevitable and natural’, and the changing international
environment demanded nothing less than a ‘permanent re-
orientation of Australian outlook and policy’. The Cabinet
paper recommended that Australia’s national interests
would be best served by fostering the technological,
economic and social advancement of the region through
increased diplomatic representation, a greater emphasis on
local language and customs, trade promotion, the
relaxation of trade restrictions, closer relations with the
Indonesian military, and an extensive program of technical
education. He also acknowledged that, owing to material
shortages in Australia, any attempt to distribute aid equally
among South–East Asian nations would be counter-
productive. Rather, it would be better to concentrate on
countries, such as Indonesia, where Australia would
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achieve the most benefit. The Australian people also
needed to ready themselves for Japan’s industrial resurgence
as a supplier of manufactured goods and importer of raw
materials. Significantly, official and public attitudes towards
Japan had the potential to nullify Australia’s broader policy
of increased commercial, political and cultural engagement
with South–East Asia. The government, therefore, was
obliged to follow a ‘conscious policy of educating the public
to a greater awareness of the growing interdependence of
Australia and South–East Asia’. Burton’s appraisal was
perhaps the most sharply observed and radical to have been
presented before Cabinet. But not everyone was ready to
embrace the DEA’s recommendations. Indeed, Chifley had
only recently denied a British request to provide aid to
Burma — the region’s greatest food exporter – because he
feared the money would be wasted and that it would be
impossible to garner popular support for such a decision.
Yet, despite this early resistance, the basic thrust of Burton’s
analysis would go on to form the central pillar of Australia’s
international aid policy.42
The defeat of the Chifley Labor government by the
Liberal–Country Party coalition in December 1949
appeared to end the independent trend in Australian
foreign policy mapped out by Evatt and Burton. Labor and
the Coalition may have shared a deep interest in Australian
security, but there was no doubt that a new era in
Australian foreign relations had begun. The Cold War
polarised world politics into two diametrically opposed
camps. For the Menzies government, the spectre of
international communism posed the most serious threat to
the nation. The United Nations was seen to be manifestly
unable to protect Australia from this threat, and
establishing an alliance with a great power became a
fundamental objective. Australia aligned its foreign policy
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with the United States by withholding recognition of
China, working to keep both China and India out of the
Soviet orbit, and seeing that Japan remained militarily
weak although industrially strong. Significantly, as the
DEA noted, Australia would support the aspirations of
independent Asian nations provided they were ‘capable of
contributing to the economic, political and military
strength of the West’.43 But there was some continuity
between Spender’s approach to regional affairs and that of
his predecessors. They each shared a conviction that
Australia needed to guard against its isolation, not just by
retreating to the secure embrace of powerful Western allies,
but also by helping poor nations to develop and by actively
projecting political and cultural influence outside
Australia’s borders. They each shared the faith that
technological, economic and cultural advancement was the
natural antidote to the instability that seemed to be
creeping across the region.
————
The proclamation of the People’s Republic of China on
1 October 1949 quickened Britain’s desire to hold
a conference to discuss Asian economic and political affairs.
On 3 November 1949, British Prime Minister Clement
Attlee asked his opposite number in Ceylon, Don Stephen
Senanayake, to prepare for a meeting of Commonwealth
foreign ministers in January the following year. The
conference was, at least superficially, simply another in a
series of discussions between Commonwealth representatives
that had been taking place since 1944. However, this
meeting differed in three significant ways. First, in addition
to the issues of European reconstruction and the Japanese
Peace Treaty, delegates were to consider the ramifications of
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the victory of the Chinese Communist Party. Secondly, this
was the first time that representatives from the newly
independent countries — Pakistan, India and Ceylon —were
included on the council and given the opportunity to discuss
their views on regional issues. Thirdly, this was the first
Commonwealth ministers’ meeting convened on Asian soil.
For Australia, the decision to hold the meeting in
the Ceylonese capital, Colombo, confirmed a shift in the
epicentre of world affairs. Commonwealth forces had been
called upon to fight communist insurgents in Malaya,
Dutch troops had only recently stopped fighting Indonesian
nationalists, and the French were struggling to retain
control of Indochina. Most agreed that events in Asia were
set to further impinge on Australia’s regional future and, as
one parliamentarian said, Australia had a ‘duty to the
awakening giant of Asia that is seeking a place in the
world.’44 But there was still no immediate or obvious means
of fulfilling this duty. No forum, political or economic,
united Asia, save for the sporadic efforts of UN agencies
such as ECAFE, UNESCO, the United Nations
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). In fact, the Commonwealth remained the main
organisational and political link that joined Asia and the
West, and that link was tainted with the history of
colonialism. If Western powers hoped to foster an
independent, stable and non-communist Asia, a new
system of cooperation had to be devised. Expectations for
the Colombo conference were high. After all, a meeting of
this kind had been four years in the making. But exactly
how Asia and the West could be brought together remained
to be seen. What role Australia might play at this historic
conference was similarly unclear.
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3. BUILDING A
BRIDGE TO ASIA
In Colombo, on the morning of 9 January 1950, a smallcrowd gathered to catch a glimpse of representatives
arriving for the conference. Delegates posed for a publicity
photograph in the gardens opposite the Senate building,
unperturbed by a recent theft of explosives and threats to
disrupt the meeting. Ceylon’s first Prime Minister and
conference chairman, the affable Don Stephen
Senanayake, moved proudly among the representatives
from eight nations and smiled through his magnificent
drooping moustache. He knew that the Colombo
conference would make headlines and that Ceylon would,
at least briefly, be in the world spotlight. To ensure
maximum publicity, the British provided confidential daily
reports to the US State Department and granted American
journalists access to the daily background briefings typically
only open to Commonwealth reporters. The popular press
in Australia celebrated the ‘frank get-together’ as a triumph
of the egalitarian nature of the Commonwealth with ‘all
members … now equal, irrespective of their size, race or
creed’.1 Australia’s Percy Spender, who had only been
foreign minister for two weeks since the Menzies
government’s sweeping victory, also mingled among the
delegates from Britain, Canada, Ceylon, India, New
Zealand, Pakistan, and South Africa. Following the photo
session, Senanayake ushered the delegates and their
entourages inside. The sixty-year-old Prime Minister of
India, Jawaharlal Nehru, jauntily trotted up the stairs,
demonstrating his energy to everyone. By contrast, the
infirm British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, his strength
sapped further by the tropical heat, was carried from the
street to the meeting room atop a palanquin (a chair carried
on the shoulders of four men). The image served as an apt
metaphor for the end of British imperialism and the rise of
Asian nationalism. Indeed, although not officially
attending, the Americans saw the conference as something
of a last hoorah for the British Empire: ‘the dying glow of a
setting sun’, as one US congressman put it.2
Once assembled, proceedings moved quickly. In the
hot conditions, the congenial opening speeches and
discussion were disturbed only by the Senate building’s
resident crows, who called raucously through the open
windows. At regular intervals, Senanayake brought
proceedings to a halt with a clap of his hands. Almost
immediately, barefooted servants dressed in white sarongs
and red sashes padded among the delegates bearing trays of
iced water and sweet tea.3 In welcoming delegates,
Senanayake signalled the central purpose of the historic
meeting. The obstacles to regional stability, he said, were
economic — not political — and nothing less than the
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peace and future of the world depended on helping Asia
support her increasing population.
No one knew quite what to expect from the
Australian delegation. Spender’s wife, Jean, always said that
her husband had a knack for attracting public attention. By
virtue of his temperament and professional experience, few
men were better qualified to raise international interest in
Australia’s concerns about the political future of Asia.4 For
Spender, the British Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’
Meeting presented a tantalising opportunity to establish
Australia as a force in regional affairs; and he made no
attempt to disguise the anti-communist sentiment which
drove his determination to launch an aid program for South
and South–East Asia. Before he left Colombo, Spender told
a reporter that he hoped to find a way to support Asians in
their bid to ‘develop their own democratic institutions and
their own economies and thus protect them against those
opportunists and subversive elements which take advantage
of changing political situations and low living standards’.5
In his opening address, he returned to one of his favorite
themes and told of the ‘inescapable fact’ of Australia’s
geographical proximity and the increasingly active role in
regional affairs she wanted to play. Delegates, he said, had a
responsibility to determine a clear course of action to help
stabilise the region and they must not squander the
opportunity. ‘Could not the old Commonwealth countries
contribute part of their resources for the economic
development of this area?’ Spender asked, gently preparing
delegates for his own prescription for regional development,
due to be presented the following day.
According to Spender’s own recollection, he began
formulating a strategy for bringing Western finance to bear
on Asia’s seemingly intractable economic problems during
the long flight from Sydney to Ceylon. Although the
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comment is characteristic of Spender’s brusque style, this
was, in fact, probably the first time he had a chance to
examine his briefing papers in detail. Of course, they were
rich with documents on Asian affairs written by some of the
sharpest minds in the Department of External Affairs,
which would have been unavailable to him while in
opposition. Nevertheless, the ‘wide authority’ Menzies had
granted Spender over how to approach the conference
undoubtedly enhanced his sense of propriety.6 Spender,
however, was in for a surprise.
On the afternoon of the second day, Ceylon’s
unassuming Finance Minister, Junius Richard Jayewardene,
stunned everyone, most of all the Australians, when he
foreshadowed his own proposal for regional economic
development. The essence of Jayewardene’s proposal was for
Asian governments to draw up ten-year development
programs and for the Commonwealth to consider what
technical and financial assistance it could provide and
guarantee a fixed price for primary exports. A committee of
experts would then tour Asia and make recommendations
based on what the Commonwealth had made available.
Incensed that another delegation appeared to have pipped the
Australians, Spender later accused Jayewardene of
‘deliberately jumping the gun’.7 Spender need not have
worried. Delegates responded unenthusiastically to
Jayewardene’s overly ambitious vision. Moreover, the idea of a
regulated Commonwealth trading bloc raised more political
and economic complexities than it claimed to solve. That
evening, Spender and his advisers from the DEA, Arthur
Tange and Laurence McIntyre, retired to the colonial
splendor of the Galle Face Hotel to finalise the memorandum
they had begun writing on the plane. Around this time, it
would seem, they also took advice from senior British officials,
who were keen for Australia to take the lead and thus deflect
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any expectation that the United Kingdom was about to offer a
more substantial financial contribution. On the morning of
11 January the Australians tabled their freshly-completed
document ahead of the Ceylonese delegation, thus ensuring
that theirs would be considered first.
Like his Commonwealth colleagues, Spender knew
that, without a massive injection of funds, talk of an
economic bulwark against communism was futile.8 As he
told Menzies in a telegram from Colombo, his principal
objective was to ‘show a genuine willingness to meet the
serious drift in the political and economic situation in
South East Asia, as a basis for an immediate approach to
the United States with a view of enlisting their active
participation’.9 The Australian memorandum was structured
around the speedy delivery of financial and technical
assistance in order to demonstrate the Commonwealth’s
resolve to fight communism. Drawing heavily on the work
of John Burton, the Australian plan located the provision
of aid as an international response to the rise of Asian
communism: through economic and social development
the ‘ideological attractions which communism exerts will
lose their force’.10 It called on the Commonwealth to
contribute to the UN’s Technical Assistance Program, to
provide aid to Asia on a bilateral basis, to coordinate the
aid delivery with other Commonwealth governments, and
for Asian nations to make submissions detailing their
development needs, and for the conference to establish a
consultative committee to oversee the logistics of
delivering aid to the region. The recipients would be
Ceylon, India and Pakistan, with non-Commonwealth Asia
to be included as soon as possible.
Central to Spender’s tactics at Colombo was his
conviction that an expensive and open-ended scheme, such
as Jayewardene’s ‘somewhat grandiose proposal’ for an
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Asian Marshall Plan, would repel the United States.
Although delegates had politely dismissed Jayewardene’s
ideas as unworkable, Spender feared that any obvious lack
of consensus among the delegates would jeopardise the
entire conference: the Commonwealth would appear
fractured and ill-prepared to meet the task of Asian
development with conviction. In private, Spender persuaded
Jayewardene to support a joint memorandum based
primarily on the ideas circulated by Australia. The British,
anxious to avoid accusations of post-colonial domination,
were content to let Australia take the lead. For his part,
Spender tactfully dampened suspicion of economic
imperialism by including a clause suggesting that the form
of development ‘is for Asian countries themselves to
determine’.11 New Zealand agreed to sponsor the proposal,
despite private misgivings about Spender, whom the
Secretary for the Department of External Affairs, Alister
McIntosh, thought ‘an absolute little tick’, and their doubts
about the very idea of an aid program for Asia. ‘It is
perfectly ridiculous to think that we of the British
Commonwealth countries, even with the aid of the United
States, can with economic aid effectively stem the tide of
Communism’, wrote McIntosh; ‘for one thing we can’t do
enough quickly, and for another, what we do is going to
be swallowed up and lost in ineffective administration.
We haven’t a hope in the world’.12
Throughout the conference, Spender emphasised the
utmost importance of a rapid and enthusiastic response
from Western powers. As if on cue, Spender’s entreaties
about the impending threat of communism and the need
for the Commonwealth to move quickly received a timely
illustration on the very days delegates were considering his
proposals. On 13 January 1950, the Soviet Union’s walkout
of the UN Security Council, in protest at the failure of the
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Security Council to recognise the Chinese communist
regime’s right to take China’s seat on the council,
demonstrated Sino–Soviet rapport. However, rising
international tension and Spender’s determination were
not enough to guarantee uncritical support for the
proposals. India wanted further research to be conducted
before committing to any specific development programs.
The British were the most reticent of all, reminding
delegates of their government’s responsibilities in Africa
and the Middle East and of the money already given for the
post-war reconstruction in South–East Asia. Nevertheless,
publicly, each delegation agreed that communism posed a
threat to the region and that economic and social
improvement was vital to regional stability. The joint
memorandum captured the broad scope of this idea, and
showed the right blend of flexibility and precision, which
the Ceylonese proposal lacked. Further, the memorandum
stressed that the restoration of Asia as an economically
productive region would also have commercial benefits for
the West. Towards the end of proceedings, representatives
voted unanimously in favour of what they now called the
‘Spender resolution’ — and some even began talking of a
‘Spender Plan’ for Asia. All agreed to meet for the inaugural
meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee in
Sydney in four months time. The Ceylonese government
capped off the conference by showering upon the delegates a
‘glittering series of entertainments’, including a rare showing
of the sacred relic of Buddha’s tooth during an excursion to
Kandy, the capital of the hill country — an experience
which seemed to fortify the ailing Bevin!13
Spender was certainly pleased with the outcome of
the Colombo conference, but there was little exuberance.
He knew how far he had to go. Upon his return to Canberra,
he began a campaign to raise domestic and international
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support for an Asian aid program. Specifically, he continued
to woo the United States, hoping to win them over to the
Colombo proposals and involve them more explicitly in
Australia’s regional security. Indeed, giving aid to Asia
served the dual purpose of building relations with Asia, but
also with the United States. It was a policy validated by
Australia’s ambassador to the United States, Norman
Makin, who, in December 1949, told his newly-elected
Minister that efforts should be directed towards making
Australia indispensable to America’s strategic and economic
planning. Although sacrifices would have to be made,
rendering ‘technical and material assistance to the countries
of South–East Asia … would receive the warm approval and
goodwill of the US’.14 Now a decision on the magnitude of
Australia’s contribution had to be reached quickly in order
to demonstrate Australia’s commitment to sharing the
burden of combating communism in alliance with the
Americans.15 Privately, Spender lobbied Cabinet. Publicly,
he adopted a broader strategy that emphasised the growing
threat of international communism, regional instability, the
inadequacy of the UN, Australian vulnerability, and the
necessity of US financial support for Asia. 
On 9 March 1950, Spender delivered one of the
clearest articulations of conservative foreign policy to the
House of Representatives. He told of the growing force of
communism and Australia’s vulnerability in post-colonial
Asia — with Australia drifting within the grasp of
communism, without the stability of a resolute and strong
ally. The Soviet Union and communist China were to
blame for throwing Asia into disarray, casting it and the
world into a ‘trance of uncertainty, doubt and fear’. Should
communism prevail, Spender said, ‘and Vietnam come
under the heel of Communist China, Malaya is in danger of
being out-flanked and it, together with Thailand, Burma
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and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of further
Communist activities’. The burden of regional security now
fell to Australia because Britain and America had ‘not yet
completed their adjustments to the new situation’. Spender
deftly juxtaposed another image of Australia as a purposeful
and strong Pacific power which, assuming appropriate and
resolute action, could assert a stabilising presence in Asia:
‘We live side by side with the countries of South and
South–East Asia, and we desire to be on good-neighbour
terms with them. Above all, it is in our interest to foster
commercial and other contacts with them and give them
what help we can in maintaining stable and democratic
governments in power’. By developing the proposals
endorsed at the Colombo conference, Australia would give
to the maximum extent of its capacity ‘those resources
which will help consolidate the governments of South–East
Asia on such a basis that no extremism can flourish’.16
Unlike Evatt and Burton, Spender had grave doubts
about the ability of the UN to protect Australian
interests, especially considering that it included
representatives from those who were ‘working to disrupt
the order we believe in’. Instead, to avert the communist
threat he hoped to create two mutually supportive
instruments of Australian foreign policy: economic
diplomacy (encompassing a ‘policy of good-neighbourly
assistance’) and a military alliance with the United States.
Using the same sentimental tone employed by Menzies to
draw Australia closer to Britain, Spender regularly spoke
of the United States as sharing a ‘common heritage and
way of life’. Importantly, he held little hope for a British
‘adjustment in Australia’s favour’ and he considered the
United States to be the natural substitute to help
Australia secure both the economic and military aspects of
its foreign policy objectives:
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I am sure our friends of the United States will not
misunderstand me when I say that their great
eminence in world affairs to-day not only imposes
corresponding obligations upon them, which it
should be recorded they have most generously been
willing to accept, but it also makes impossible the
solution of such problems as we are discussing
without their active co-operation.17
Few would have missed the point: the era of the
Evatt/Burton analysis of world affairs was over and the
United States, not the UN, was to be the mainstay of
Australia’s future survival in South–East Asia and the
Pacific. But the prospect of an Asian aid program served the
left-wing political agenda equally well. Leslie Haylen — a
radical Laborite who led a parliamentary delegation to
Japan in 1948 and caused a furore in Australia by shaking
hands with Emperor Hirohito — thought an aid program
might even realise a new sense of belonging:
We must cast our eyes on the Asian scene and
endeavour to understand what the Asian is seeking.
We must assist him as far as we can with goods and
services, and cease … this ridiculous habit of looking
continually to Atlantic Charters, Atlantic pacts, and
other similar regional agreements for our
preservation. On the evidence before us we are on
our own in the Pacific. Asian nation or Pacific
power, what does it matter? We are an outpost of
8,000,000 people dedicated to the task of being good
neighbours to the millions of people to our north. We
can, here and now, build up goodwill and strengthen
the feeling that we are part of the great southern
lands of Asia; that we do ‘belong’; that we are not
antagonistic; and that we are not a handful of white
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people who have come to this country to exploit it
and then to get out. Our interests are those of Asia.
An insistent sense of cultural and racial vulnerability,
combined with a desire to engage constructively with the
region, prompted both sides of the house to support the
Spender Plan as one way of maintaining ‘democracy in
Asia’ and ‘the future of every Australian man, woman and
child’.18
While Spender’s efforts were sufficient to convince
cabinet to allocate £A13 million for Asian development
projects, they were not enough to move the US State
Department, which remained equivocal but not dismissive.
Acting Secretary of State, James Webb, told his Canberra
representative to convey the message that, although they
declined to attend the Sydney meeting, America’s non-
attendance did not imply a ‘lack of interest in or sympathy
… with the purposes and objectives’ of the Colombo
proposals.19 Even better than diplomatic assurances, the
DEA took solace in the United States’ expanding,
if ‘imperfectly formulated’ policy towards Asia, notably
Truman’s announcement of substantial economic aid for
Indonesia and the French in Indochina.20 At this point,
however, Spender’s biggest problem was the caution
displayed by the British government.
On Monday 15 May 1950, delegates met at Admiralty
House, the Governor-General’s Sydney residence, for the
first meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee.
Before the opening session, delegates had a chance to take
in the view across the water, perfectly framed by the Sydney
Harbour Bridge, an emblem of Australian industrial and
technological prowess. This modern, thriving metropolis
was a ready example to the delegates of what ‘free men and
women’ could accomplish, Spender was later to write.21
Days earlier, delegates had been treated to much of what
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Sydney had to offer: sight-seeing, lavish dinners, and a day
at the Randwick races. The largest function was a formal
reception at the Australia Hotel. Spender put his cares aside,
turned on the charm, and together with his wife welcomed
more than 300 guests. At one point Spender cheekily
suggested to a Ceylonese delegate and his pregnant wife that
if their baby was a boy they should name him ‘Sydney’, if a
girl, ‘Canberra’.22 Outside, the atmosphere was less frivolous
and police clashed with communist demonstrators,
protesting Commonwealth military action in Malaya. In the
confusion, Eleanor Hinder of the British delegation (the
only female delegate) was mistaken for a demonstrator and
was about to be apprehended when another delegate
protested her innocence.
Spender’s resolve to launch an aid program for Asia
had intensified since the Colombo meeting. By the time of
the Sydney meeting, he had become consumed with its
importance, no doubt helped along by the press, which
urged representatives towards more than ‘a circumspect
elaboration’ of the Colombo proposals.23 By the time of the
Sydney meeting, differences between the Australian and
British approach to regional collaboration that emerged in
Colombo had deepened, in large part owing to their
uncoordinated strategies. Indeed, with the Foreign Office
concerned not to ‘frighten the United States Administration
away from cooperation by loose talk of American aid in
staggering amounts’, they advised their representatives to
assiduously ‘avoid exchanging ideas with the Australian,
United States or other representatives’.24 As delegates
arrived, Spender wrote to Bevin and explained his concern
that ‘the UK government might not be in a position during
the Sydney discussions to accept proposals’ that he had in
mind. ‘Quite frankly’, Spender threatened, if Britain
hesitated to commit funds, he would be ‘compelled to
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acknowledge publicly that the conference had failed and
the Australian Government, for its part, be obliged to
indicate that it would now seek to implement a programme
of its own in conjunction with whatever other Governments
might wish to assist’.25 All this before the conference had
even begun! A stoush between Australia and Britain
seemed unavoidable.
Over the weekend Spender suggested to his fellow
delegates that they should open the first session to the
public to generate maximum interest in the meeting.
Reluctantly they agreed, on condition that the speech be
non-controversial, and they be given a chance to see an
advance copy. Delegates were soon astonished to see that
Spender intended to use the open session to publicly reveal
the most contentious of his proposals. Protest from the
other delegations, particularly the British, saw Spender
back down. Nevertheless, the open session went ahead and
delegates cordially exchanged the usual platitudes. In
contrast to Spender’s boiling energy, the British arrived in
more sombre and cautious mood. Still reeling from the cost
of war, Britain saw the Colombo proposals as an opportunity
to address their own economic ills and revitalise the United
Kingdom as a force in Asian affairs. A desire to use
American finance to offset the massive debts owed to India
and Pakistan underpinned the British position: for them
there was simply ‘no prospect of a satisfactory settlement of
the sterling balance problem consistent with a continuous
economic development in South and South East Asia
unless new money can be found for development … from
the United States’. Although the Australians did not see
this document, they knew well that Britain had her ‘eyes
very much on the dollars to be obtained’ from the
Americans and later dismissed her as being inspired ‘more
by economic interests than foreign policy’.26 The DEA
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never considered the release of sterling debt to India and
Pakistan a genuine contribution to regional development,
merely an action that they would have taken regardless of
the Colombo proposals.27
Convinced that the best way to persuade the United
States to join was to show an immediate commitment to
putting money into Asia, Spender proposed the immediate
formation of a technical assistance scheme and an
emergency aid pool, which both Commonwealth and non-
Commonwealth Asian countries could draw upon. The
Australian delegation intended these two schemes to
supplement a much longer-term capital aid program. The
British opposed both proposals because more planning was
required and they would not extend further finance on top
of their already heavy debt. Worse still, their arguments
helped persuade Asian representatives — initially
attracted to the concept — to reject the idea. The
argument that long-term economic planning would be
more likely to attract a greater portion of American aid
impressed the Indian and Ceylonese representatives. The
Canadian delegation, also under instructions to avoid
extended commitments, simply did not see the value in
building an interim program. By the close of the meeting
‘the Australian band wagon’, reflected the Canadians,
‘seemed considerably less crowded than it had been earlier
in the afternoon’. Only Pakistan stood by the Australian
delegation, primarily because it needed immediate finance
to resettle eight million refugees from India.28
As self-appointed taskmaster, nothing infuriated
Spender more than the apparent lack of commitment on the
part of delegates towards the meeting’s high purpose. By the
afternoon of the first day of the meeting, he could no longer
disguise his contempt for Britain’s lack of commitment.
During a secret session, Spender lambasted those who
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criticised his proposals and then, according to a British report,
‘made a slashing attack on the United Kingdom attitude
which he suggested had no regard to the Colombo resolution’.
Spender then warned delegates ‘that if the Australian
resolution was not adopted he would have to report the full
facts to his Parliament’. Stunned, the Canadian delegate felt
the display was ‘more intemperate than any [he had] ever
heard except at conferences where Soviets were present’.
Another wondered if the Australian minister had somehow
imbibed the spirit of his predecessor, Doc Evatt.29
For his outburst, Spender earned the tag the
‘cocksparrow’. The Australians parried by nicknaming Lord
MacDonald, the leader of British party, ‘No Commitment
Mac’. And before long both delegations were invoking
national stereotypes in their now public dispute. Australia
played the role of cajoling dominion — the Empire’s enfant
terrible — while Britain played the reprimanding parent.
Australia accused Britain of timidity, stand-offishness, and
following a ‘typically narrow Treasury approach’. The
British followed up by suggesting that Australia was
‘betraying signs of youthful impatience’.30 Ted Williams,
the British High Commissioner in Canberra, delivered
a scathing report card:
The most disappointing delegation was the
Australian. It was their misfortune … to feel
compelled to take the initiative to a degree for which
they were inadequately equipped, and it was still
more unfortunate that the proposals which they
advanced so vigorously … should be revealed on
examination as shallow and lacking in substance.
Worst of all, these proposals seem to be regarded by
the Australian Delegation themselves as closely
linked with Mr. Spender’s personal prestige … Less
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happily it must be added that Mr. Spender’s hopes
that his reputation as an international statesman
would be firmly established by the Sydney meeting
have been completely disappointed. It is to be
expected that other Delegations will in reporting to
their Governments not fail to comment not only on
his arrogant and willful conduct and undignified
withdrawals, but also on his patent failure in the
ordinary duties of a chairman.31
But a crisis in Commonwealth relations was averted
when delegates reached an easy consensus over the proposal
to provide long-term capital aid. Delegates agreed that each
recipient country should produce comprehensive six-year
development plans for consideration at the second meeting of
the Consultative Committee, scheduled for September 1950.
As it stood, the principal donor nations were Australia, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada. Recipient nations
included India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Non-Commonwealth
Asian countries were soon encouraged to join the program.
But the issue of supplying technical assistance would not go
away. Later, Spender dropped the original proposal in favour
of a fresh memorandum. The Australian delegation suggested
a technical assistance program running for three years from
1 July 1950. At a cost of £8 million, Australia, Canada, and
the United Kingdom would each contribute one third. After a
number of amendments, delegates finally agreed and the
British and Canadian delegations reported that they were
authorised to contribute. However, that same evening,
Spender revived the emergency credit proposal, thereby
throwing the conference into disarray. Afterwards, Lord
MacDonald explained privately the British objections to the
new proposals.32 Not to be dissuaded, a relentless Spender
submitted yet another paper on emergency credits. This time
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Robert Mayhew of the Canadian delegation told Spender
that there was insufficient time to discuss his proposals
and they must wait until the September meeting of the
Consultative Committee in London. Before the close of the
conference, Spender withdrew.
In his memoirs, the cocksparrow admitted that he
had not been ‘the easiest, nor perhaps the most urbane, of
chairmen’. His greatest sin, however, was to have upset
Washington, who thought Spender was ‘heavy-handed and
tactless’, intent on establishing ‘a foreign policy independent
not only of the UK but of the entire Commonwealth in
those areas where it cannot obtain general agreement’. By
casting aside the ‘soft language of diplomacy’, as Spender
called it, he almost destroyed the collaborative atmosphere
he thought so crucial to getting the United States involved.
And at the conclusion of the meeting a solid commitment
from the Americans remained outstanding. 
The stress of the Sydney conference inflamed
Spender’s duodenal ulcer and forced him to convalesce in
Bowral, in the southern highlands of New South Wales.33
Given his tenacious approach, Spender may have thought
it entirely appropriate that the program bear his name.
But when the Consultative Committee convened for
the second time, in London between 25 September and
4 October 1950, the ‘Colombo Plan’ emerged as the
preferred label; talk of the ‘Spender Plan’ was quietly
forgotten by all but a few.
Before the London meeting, a standing committee
convened in Colombo to establish a Council for Technical
Cooperation and discuss the technical aid bound for India,
Pakistan and Ceylon. On the more difficult issue of the
capital aid program, Commonwealth officials had to reach
important and politically complex decisions about the way
donor nations would provide and coordinate their aid
programs. Although the Commonwealth unceremoniously
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rejected Jayewardene’s dream of an Asian Marshall Plan,
they might have forgiven him for drawing the parallel. After
all, as the first major multilateral program of foreign
assistance after the Second World War, the Marshall Plan
initially appeared to offer a practical model for the delivery of
aid to the region. Through the Organisation for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the United States spent
billions on reconstruction in order to foster economic and
spiritual resistance to the attractions of communist
ideology.34 The OEEC had a decentralised governing agency
with power residing with national delegations, and it
promoted international cooperation, but not economic and
political integration. It also had a weak secretariat and a
secretary-general with limited authority.35 Of course, the
situation in Asia was radically different. In Sydney, Spender
acknowledged the ‘great divergence’ in economic and social
development within Asia and recognised that the physical
and human infrastructures of Europe did not exist on the
same scale in Asia, and that there was no pre-war precedent
against which to measure the goals of reconstruction. In what
can best be described as a profound understatement, Spender
summed up by saying that ‘economic planning for a region so
diverse as South and South–East Asia will not be easy. There
are no ready-made guidelines’.36 To make the Consultative
Committee mechanism flexible and robust enough to tackle
such a task, Commonwealth policy-makers faced numerous
obstacles. Not only did the Consultative Committee have to
remain a tacitly non-communist avenue for regional
cooperation, it had to be free from political qualifications in
order to attract Asian countries, and represent nations of
varying political persuasions that were at substantially
different stages of economic development. Overlay the
political and strategic goals Western policy-makers hoped to
achieve through the provision of aid, and the challenges
facing the Consultative Committee were immense.
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In the first flush of excitement to attract additional
donors, the DEA planned to persuade Asian governments
not to ‘raise obstacles to the inclusion of France and the
Netherlands’.37 But the endeavour proved ill-conceived,
and France and the Netherlands were quietly sidelined from
the Colombo Plan negotiations. In such a sensitive climate,
Australia dropped the idea, regarding it as ‘premature and
impolitic’. With French troops still engaged in Indo-China
and the imbroglio over West New Guinea far from over, the
inclusion of these powers had the potential to jeopardise
the entire program. Later, the DEA determined that the
inclusion of France and the Netherlands would alienate
Burma, Indonesia and Thailand, leaving a scheme
‘preponderantly for Commonwealth–Asian and “Western”
governments, which was not and is not the intention of the
Plan’. Further, pressure for their admission would ‘provide
ammunition for communist propaganda (“new form of
colonialism”) against the Plan’.38
In Sydney the Consultative Committee had proved
itself a robust, if somewhat unwieldy, forum for discussing
regional issues. But why was it necessary to duplicate
established UN mechanisms, such as ECAFE, which already
funded Asian development programs? Or, as Canada’s
Minister for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, explained
when he returned home after the Colombo meeting to
address parliament: did the world need a new committee to
bring aid to Asia ‘merely because it looks like an attractive
piece of international furniture for an already cluttered-up
home’?39 While the exact nature of the Consultative
Committee was determined in private discussions between
Australian, British, and American officials, parliamentary
discussion presented Spender with an opportunity to garner
government and opposition support for the new venture.
Spender used the debate to reinforce his conviction that the
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communist threat required a rapid response, and, once
again, he attacked the excesses and inefficiencies of the UN
multilateral aid agencies. More to the point, he deemed
ECAFE an inappropriate mechanism for the delivery of aid
because the Soviet Union and China were both members
and Canada and Ceylon were not — a clear violation of the
Commonwealth’s anti-communist agenda.40 With the
Consultative Committee framed as an independent (i.e.
non-UN) and tacitly non-communist development forum,
Australia had a more direct aid relationship with Asia. The
informal structure established a congenial and non-
threatening forum outside the communist gaze and, as
Spender suggested, filled a ‘conspicuous gap in an area of
profound interest to Australia’.41 Most importantly,
Australia’s limited aid budget would not be subsumed under
the mantle of another UN program, thus giving Australia
the freedom to use aid for specific political, strategic, and
diplomatic objectives. British thinking ran on similar lines.
Not only did the forum give Western powers the chance to
bring ‘discrete [sic] pressure to bear on the underdeveloped
countries to tackle the problems of development planning in
a realistic and energetic way’, it provided a venue where
Asian countries could discuss development issues ‘frankly
and without publicity (or polemical interference from the
Russians, who are members of ECAFE)’.42 Although
communist powers expressed little interest in joining the
Colombo Plan, which they considered an imperialist ruse, in
1952 the Consultative Committee invited ECAFE
representatives to observe the annual conference. The
decision amounted to a tactful compromise because Western
powers considered it decidedly easier to manage the
Russians and Chinese within the confines of ECAFE, than
risk having them joining the Colombo Plan and
compromise its non-communist exclusivity.43
Building a Bridge to Asia 55
Australian parliamentarians and bureaucrats hoped
that the United States would broaden its cold war
economic and military strategies to include Asia. The
outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, by amplifying
fears of a wider regional conflict, lent greater urgency to
Commonwealth plans to apply financial and technical
assistance as a containment strategy. And Australia’s speedy
despatch of force to the Korean peninsula served as a
tangible expression of the commitment to fighting
communism and its support for US foreign policy, as did
withholding recognition of communist China, and
granting recognition of Vietnam’s anti-communist leader,
Bao Dai. These decisions would eventually help secure the
second arm of Spender’s regional security strategy, namely
the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and United States)
Treaty, officially endorsed in February 1951. But Spender
also hoped that the United States would now be far more
predisposed to joining the new aid program. Behind the
scenes, US officials began talking more freely about the
possibility and implications of funding: that US foreign
policy should rely on something more than military might
in order to contain Asian communism, and that
cooperation would build a link between east and west ‘more
powerful than guns and more precious than gold’.44
Washington’s decision to appoint a liaison officer to
the London meeting of the Consultative Committee was
the clearest indication yet of America’s changed attitude
towards Asian development. Yet, British and Australian
representatives knew there was no guarantee of US
endorsement and that the results of this meeting would be
more important than those of the previous two.45 The first
job faced by delegates was to assess the development
questionnaires (similar to those used by the OEEC)
distributed after the Sydney conference on the suggestion of
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan56
the British official Robert ‘Otto’ Clark.46 The economic
and technical blueprints submitted to the meeting,
however, proved to be little more than an attempt to give
the impression that donor nations were making a genuine
attempt to quantify Asia’s economic needs, while providing
a convenient means of arriving at a total figure with which
to approach the United States. Revealing attitudes
underwritten by no small amount of paternalistic
condescension, most thought Asian governments ill-
equipped to assess their own developmental needs. In
August 1950, James Plimsoll, Australia’s representative to
the UN, reported to Burton’s replacement at the DEA,
Alan Watt. A senior official from the Economic
Cooperation Administration explained that he had little
‘faith in questionnaires’ because ‘most under-developed
countries [were] unfitted to estimate their needs accurately
or sensibly’. He also suggested that the Commonwealth and
the United States should determine the total amount of
assistance to be allocated to Asia and leave decisions on
‘the nature of that assistance’ to their representatives ‘on
the spot’.47 The fact that the Commonwealth had to
postpone the London meeting by two weeks after it became
obvious that Asian non-Commonwealth governments were
struggling to complete the questionnaires on time
reinforced the apparent ineptitude of aid recipients. In any
event, the simple attendance of non-Commonwealth Asia
was more important than completion of the six-year
development plans and, regardless of what they specified,
there was no time for ‘substantial modification’ of the
programs already planned by the UK Government.48
Malcolm MacDonald, the UK Commissioner-General in
Singapore, reasoned that by at least appearing to be
responsive to these blueprints, even if they proved
irrelevant, donor nations avoided ‘the psychological error of
Building a Bridge to Asia 57
arousing suspicion amongst these sensitive peoples’.49
Despite the extension of time, the first report of the
Consultative Committee included Commonwealth Asia
only. Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam each
attended the London meeting without lodging formal
requests for assistance. Burma and Indonesia, still wary of
post-colonial domination, attended as observers only.
The economic blueprints served a more useful tactical
purpose in persuading the United States that joining the
Colombo Plan would not bind them indefinitely to
underwriting Asia’s journey to modernity. During an
informal meeting between Treasury, the Foreign Office and
the US Department of State, Clarke reported that in
drawing up their economic blueprints since the Sydney
meeting, Asian governments had ‘scaled down the size of
the development programs to a point considerably below
what we would originally have desired to undertake … [and]
they have recognised that the limiting factor is the amount
of external financial assistance likely to be available’.50 By
suggesting that Asian governments had exercised restraint
and did not see the offer of aid as an opportunity to profiteer,
British officials sought to allay American fears of an
expensive, politically-charged and long-term assistance
program. Nevertheless, Commonwealth donor nations
could only provide £362 million of the £1,085 million
required and now waited, as Spender put it, for the United
States to ‘fill the political and economic gap.’51
The major concern for the Commonwealth was that
any public presumption of American finance might offend
Washington and jeopardise the entire program. Indeed,
Spender feared the United States saw the entire conference
as a ham-fisted attempt by the Commonwealth to ‘impose a
commitment upon the United States in the form of a report
already prepared for publication’.52 The Americans suggested
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that the Commonwealth aid scheme should not appear to
be dependent on US aid; that it should emphasise discrete
‘project based’ development rather than continuous
financial support; that it not imply the US aid would be
used to solve the United Kingdom’s currency difficulties;
and, finally, that the report should not mention a ‘gap’ to be
filled by a third party. Tiptoeing around the US sensitivity
to ‘the gap’ prompted the plain-speaking Tange to report
that ‘[n]evertheless the fact of the matter is that there is
such a gap and, unless it is filled the plan could not be
implemented without drastic modification’.53 With US aid
integral to the successful launch of the program, the
London meeting was intended to suit an American vision
for Asian economic development. The report concluded
with the inevitably ambiguous statement that the
Consultative Committee ‘could review progress … draw up
periodic reports, and … serve as a forum for the discussion
of developmental problems’; yet the precise ‘form of such an
organisation cannot be determined until it is clear what the
sources of external finance will be’.54
Just as Commonwealth policy-makers worked to get
the United States involved, they nevertheless worried that
the sheer volume of US aid, in addition to the concessions
made to secure that aid, had the potential to distort the
Colombo Plan’s economic and developmental objectives. In
particular, concerns were raised about American insistence
on tying the bulk of their aid contribution to the purchase of
US supplies, which would effectively stem the expected flow
of dollars that might otherwise be spent on British and
Australian goods. Project aid of this kind would not meet
India’s need for food imports that could be sold on to finance
their own development plans with minimal inflation. Large-
scale infrastructure projects, and the inevitable bevy of
Western expertise that came with them, were also more
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liable to bring accusations of post-colonial interference.
Compromise was reached on most of these issues; in
operation, the Colombo Plan involved a range of aid
programs, from externally-funded ‘tied’ infrastructure
projects and ‘locally-funded’ development, through the sale
of donated commodities, to collaborative projects between
local technicians and workers, and international staff. In
general, American policy-makers insisted on a large measure
of independence from the Commonwealth organisation in
order to meet their own strategic and economic objectives,
and maintain congressional approval. The United States
eventually agreed to join the Colombo Plan in November
1950 (they were officially admitted in February 1951), on
condition the scheme remained informal, exploratory,
advisory and consultative.55 It was indicative of the control
the Americans hoped to retain over their aid allocations
that they demanded that word ‘Commonwealth’ be omitted
from the Consultative Committee’s official title — the final
price of US involvement.56
It is important not to overstate the degree to which
Australian (and British) leaders danced to Washington’s
tune. At all times, Australia pursued an aggressively self-
interested policy, based on a distinctly realist interpretation
of its own political and strategic imperatives. Indeed,
subservience to the United States sharpened Spender’s
sense of what the Colombo Plan meant for Australia’s own
political, military and social objectives. He had a strong
sense of the Colombo Plan’s significance beyond its role in
securing American finance. In addition to helping cement
the ANZUS Treaty, the scheme was to have the wide-
reaching — if ambiguous — goal of neutralising
anti-Western sentiment directed towards Australia. He
cabled Menzies from London, explaining that Australia
should use the influence of the Commonwealth ‘as a
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cohesive force progressively to bind Asia to the West in a
way which has so far been impossible by direct political
pressure in a region whose rationalism is founded on
reaction against the West’. Where the United Kingdom was
anxious to ‘be quit of responsibilities’ in Asia, Australia
should be ready to take charge: ‘deliberate Australian
isolation from Asia while we are achieving our small
population increases seems to me to lose us the opportunity
of using foreign policy effectively in our long term defence’.
Again, the vulnerable outpost mentality, which dominated
so much of Australian foreign policy, reared its head. At
this stage, Spender prescribed very little in the way of a
constructive engagement strategy for Australia. Rather, he
saw the Colombo Plan as an instrument deployed as ‘part of
a foreign policy designed to deny this important part of the
world to Soviet Russian influence’.57
With his plan for emergency credits and a technical
aid pool subsumed beneath the Colombo Plan’s twin prongs
of a capital and technical aid program, Spender was forced
to revise the total amount of Australia’s contribution to the
plan. Of course, he took the opportunity to try to secure
even more. The stakes could not have been higher, he told
Menzies from London, with an early indication of Australia’s
generous support ‘essential if we are to carry to success the
initiative we have taken’. He suggested that wool export
earnings supported an initial contribution of around £A10
million. Although he did not spell it out, the implication
was that this level of funding would be sustained over the
six-year life of the scheme. This £A60 million ambit claim
was sternly rebuffed, first by Menzies, who thought the idea
‘quite impracticable’ in view of Australia’s heavy defence
commitments and the future rehabilitation of Korea, and
later by Cabinet. Instead, Menzies restricted Spender to a
total of less than £A25 million and advised that the grand
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gesture of £A10 million in the first year set a dangerously
unrealistic precedent. Although conciliatory in defeat,
Spender said that a first contribution of just £A3 or 4
million would be ‘conspicuous in its inadequacy’, and he
pressed for permission to make a much higher first offer,
with the proviso that subsequent allocations would be
considerably reduced. Nevertheless, just as Australia
rebuked the tight-fisted British, other delegates looked
askance at Australia’s lack of charity. The Canadians, for
example, privately suspected that Australia overstated the
financial hardships she would incur through her
involvement with the aid scheme. In late 1950, the
economies of Asia and Australia received a sudden, if short-
lived, boost from US spending and stockpiling programs
induced by the Korean War. With good prices for wool and
rising sterling levels, Lester Pearson explained to his
finance minister , ‘the Australians are not going to have to
pull in their belts this year in order to meet their
contributions to the Colombo Plan’. In December, with
America having just agreed to join the Colombo Plan,
Cabinet approved Spender’s recommendations, adding that
the terms in which the formal announcement would be
expressed would first need approval from the Prime Minister
and that ‘care must be taken to avoid raising the
expectations on the part of the proposed recipients’.58
In the estimation of the British Chancellor of the
Exchequer and conference chairman, Hugh Gaitskell, the
London meeting of the Consultative Committee was
characterised by a ‘striking sense of common purpose’,
assisted by the fact that Spender adopted a lower profile and
was in a ‘much more constructive mood than at Sydney’.59
Some of the enmity present in Sydney re-emerged in
London, albeit in muted form, when the Australian
delegation chided the United Kingdom for rushing
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discussions which did not concern British interests and for
their otherwise ‘lukewarm’ attitude towards the inclusion of
non-Commonwealth Asia. Australia ‘found it necessary to
insist on more emphasis on the “humanitarian” approach’ in
order to make it easier to bring other Asian countries into
the program. Gaitskell conceded the point, but saved his
disapproval with the Australian delegation — and, of
course, its leader — for his diary. Spender, he wrote, was ‘like
a little terrier, self-important, talks a good deal … He has no
inhibitions about raising awkward subjects and is what you
call fairly crude … but then so are most Australians’.60
Since 1945, Australian policy-makers and politicians
knew that many Asian governments feared that a
commitment to a Western aid program entailed strategic
and military entanglements with the anti-communist bloc.
Nevertheless, some Australian politicians leapt on the
emerging mechanism as an opportunity to restore the
prestige and ‘historic destiny’ of the English-speaking world.
The conservative Alexander Downer, for example,
suggested that the Consultative Committee would blossom
forth into a ‘permanent Empire Secretariat’ responsible for
law and order, and offered the chance to ‘adopt a more
forthright attitude’ over territorial disputes, such as
Indonesian designs for West New Guinea. ‘In our desire to
help the peoples of South and South–East Asia’, he
continued, ‘we should set out not only to feed them but also
to lead them’.61 Downer’s muscular approach was, in fact, a
neat caricature of what Australia hoped its aid program
might achieve under the best possible conditions. However,
the Australians would need to exercise a little more tact
and diplomacy, even by Spender’s standards, in their efforts
to entice Asian leaders into the Colombo Plan.
Australian and British policy-makers were concerned
to expand the Consultative Committee beyond a kind of
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confederacy of Commonwealth nations, but without
appearing to dominate or compromise Asian economic and
political sovereignty. Spender told Menzies during the
Sydney conference that, with Asian leaders wary of
economic imperialism, it was crucial ‘not to appear to
infringe the sovereign rights of states which had acquired
their independence’.62 For should independent Asia fail to
join the scheme, the Consultative Committee’s symbolic
role as a unifying bridge between post-colonial Asia and the
West would be jeopardised, and in the DEA’s estimation, it
might then be ‘regarded as a purely British or
Commonwealth “show”’.63 Fear of offending Indonesia’s
sensibilities and thus pushing them away from Western
influence, for example, tempered Australia’s impatience
with the tortuous negotiation process. Australian officials
juggled their rising frustration with Indonesia’s neutral
foreign policy — which Hugh Gilchrist, the First Secretary
of the embassy in Djakarta, derided as a position of
‘superficial neutrality between the Soviet and anti-Soviet
blocs’ — and their unease at forcing Indonesia to make a
commitment to the Colombo Plan.64 Asian assertiveness
had direct ramifications for Australian efforts to engage
with the region, and the increasingly assertive behaviour of
many Asian governments, with their apparent solidarity
against the Western and Eastern political blocs, made
Australian and British representatives nervous. John Hood,
Australia’s Ambassador to Indonesia, told Casey that the
‘sense of solidarity which appears to be growing among
South–East Asian peoples’ meant that ‘any attempt to
bustle them into an anti-communist camp may well have
the effect of uniting them in an angry reaction against all
Western influence’.65 After much diplomatic wrangling,
Indonesia’s decision to join the Consultative Committee in
late 1952 proved an important step in the development of
Australian–Indonesian relations. In the estimation of the
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan64
British Ambassador to Indonesia, Derwent Kermode, the
Colombo Plan’s mantra of ‘aid without strings’ proved to be
‘a useful weapon in the prime task of breaking down the
walls of suspicion and distrust of the West with which many
Indonesians still surround themselves’.66
The very nature of the Consultative Committee as a
malleable and non-coercive forum helped reassure tentative
governments that joining the new confederation came
without strings, military or otherwise.67 Other regional
development forums oriented toward bilateral cooperation,
such as the South Pacific Commission (SPC) — which had no
formal connection to the UN and was mandated only to
correlate and disseminate information concerning Pacific
countries, to make recommendations for the promotion of
economic and social development, and to facilitate the
discussion of problems of mutual concern — provided a useful
template.68 Publicly, the Consultative Committee echoed the
spirit of the SPC. Like the SPC, the Consultative Committee
had no supra-national powers, took no collective decisions
save for voting in new members and deciding the location of
the annual meeting, and only made recommendations to
participating governments. As donors and recipients
negotiated their aid projects on a bilateral basis through
standard diplomatic channels, the Consultative Committee
simply became a public discussion forum and clearing-house
for the admission of new members and the consolidation of
national development reviews in the annual report. Not only
was this an appropriate and workable forum considering the
various agenda the committee was forced to bear, but it proved
sufficiently benign to attract most of South–East Asia over the
next four years: Indo-China (1951), Burma and Nepal (1952),
Indonesia (1953), Thailand and the Philippines (1954). Japan
also joined in 1954, but as an aid donor.
————
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Throughout the Commonwealth in the 1950s, the words
‘Colombo Plan’ became synonymous with aid initiatives for
South and South–East Asia. The diverse nature of projects
financed under the scheme and their wide geographic
distribution lent credence to the image of the plan as a
systematic and integrated approach to regional
development and cooperation. Donor governments used
the relaxed nature of the proceedings to further political
and economic ends. On one level, the annual meeting
offered an ideal opportunity for the promotion of Western
political objectives. As one Foreign Office appraisal
claimed, ‘the meeting of the Consultative Committee is the
major event of the year so far as the Colombo Plan is
concerned. It is an occasion of worldwide interest and the
fullest possible use should be made of the publicity
opportunities’.69 The Colombo Plan forum also provided an
attractive package for Australian generosity and helped
disguise the limited nature of the early donations. The DEA
quietly confessed that Australia’s early effort, which
consisted primarily of a donation of wheat and flour to
India and Ceylon, would have been sent ‘whether there had
been a Colombo Plan or not’.70 These contributions were
sold to pay for major infrastructure programs, such as
railways, roads, dams and hydro-electric power plants.
Beyond this, Australia typically directed its capital aid
contributions towards the creation of more efficient,
mechanised agricultural production. For example, of the
£A10 million in capital assistance provided by Australia to
Pakistan between 1950 and 1957, 62 per cent went towards
irrigation projects, and a further 13 per cent was devoted to
the supply of tractors and refrigeration plants. Just 2 per
cent went to increasing power generation capacity.71 But
the Colombo Plan was not a coherent program for regional
development. It featured no centralised or multilateral
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institutions, no blueprint for integrated economic
regionalism, and it had no substantive decision-making
power. The ‘whole enterprise’, wrote Canadian academic
William Harrison, ‘was something of a misnomer … a co-
operative and co-ordinated study of a number of economic
situations, too varying as to stages and patterns of growth,
and too immense in the aggregate, to be considered
amenable to any centrally planned and directed scheme of
development’.72
Talk of a military defence strategy was taboo during
the formation of the Colombo Plan. Spender and other
Commonwealth officials tactfully avoided the thorny issue
of collective military defence by proposing a course towards
regional integration through economic cooperation.73 It is
hardly surprising the Colombo Plan emerged as a nebulous
and relatively benign regional forum. Arguably,
Commonwealth policy-makers could not have achieved
these complex, intertwined objectives within multilateral
agencies under UN control. Yet, loaded as it was with
political and military objectives, the welfare of Asian
people now assumed a greater significance than ever before.
This occurred, not because of a groundswell of humanitarian
sentiment, but because their well-being was now seen to
impinge on the post-war order imagined by Western powers. 
To some extent, the Colombo Plan was a façade, a
device intended to lure independent Asia into an alliance
with the Western bloc. Its congenial unity was calculated to
entice non-Commonwealth Asia, secure the material might
of the United States, and marginalise the Soviet Union. On
1 July 1951, the Colombo Plan finally lurched into existence
with its public symbolism intact. As Tange’s appraisal
confirmed, the result was tantamount to a diplomatic
sleight-of-hand. The Colombo Conference, he wrote,
‘proved an opportunity for creating a piece of Commonwealth
Building a Bridge to Asia 67
machinery devoted specifically to a purpose which, in the
minds of the public in the Commonwealth, was straight-
forward and uncomplicated by any doubtful political
motives’.74 From Australia’s perspective, Asia’s economic
progress, cold war anxiety, and a deep concern about the
consequences of decolonisation for political stability, all
coalesced beneath a malleable regional forum, ostensibly
dedicated to economic progress. The Menzies government
hoped that relations augmented under the Colombo Plan
would rejuvenate the Commonwealth bond between
Australia and the governments of South Asia and help to
install Australia as a regional authority free to pursue its
interests alongside a compliant Asian elite.
Although Spender offended the sensibilities of
Western allies, he infused the right degree of urgency and
desperation into the proceedings in order to get Australia
— and otherwise unenthusiastic Commonwealth powers —
to commit finance and technical resources to the struggle
against communism. By virtue of his rumbustious diplomacy,
Spender galvanised Australia’s role in the formation of the
Colombo Plan and as a force in regional affairs. Yet early
reports from among Australia’s more idealistic diplomats
revealed a degree of doubt about the capacity of an aid
program to stabilise the region and bolster Australia’s
regional profile. In 1950 Francis Stuart, now Official
Secretary at the Australian High Commission in New
Delhi, wrote of a widespread ‘public curiosity’ about
Australia and the ‘remarkable extent to which Australia’s
existence as something of a power in the world is known
and accepted’. However, in the longer term he was less sure:
the ‘conduct of South East Asian relations with Australia is
likely to present something of a continuing dilemma to
South East Asia’s leaders; events compel them to co-
operate with us, but we must not believe that their hearts
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are really in it.’75 But for now — with the question of just
how the Colombo Plan might achieve its breathtakingly
ambitious goals still unanswered — the optimists could
ignore the doubters.
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4. THE SEED 
OF FREEDOM
‘Hungry people are dangerous people’, exclaimed theMelbourne correspondent for the Eastern World
journal, ‘the East keeps clamouring for rice and more rice
and the bullock cart and the wooden plough are poor
instruments in breaking up virgin land quickly enough to
supply the need — only the bulldozer and the tractor
plough can hope to win in this race for food’.1 The remedy
for socio-political instability in Asia seemed profoundly
simple: if the people were hungry and restive then feed
them, or at least provide the technology for them to do so
themselves. ‘The key to the political problem of South–East
Asia is food’, said Kim Beazley (Snr) during a parliamentary
debate.2 But how could an aid program such as the
Colombo Plan remedy a problem of such magnitude? And
what exactly was Australia’s obligation to the starving
millions to the north? 
Humanitarian duty to poor Asians was a relatively
minor feature of Spender’s effort to garner support for the
Colombo Plan. His preoccupation with geo-political
security meant that, if anything, he deflected suggestions
that charity formed the basis of Australia’s aid program.
The provision of aid, he said in parliament, is ‘not a policy
of mere humanitarianism; it is also a policy of serious self-
interest’.3 Striking a harder line, Department of External
Affairs officials did not consider ‘appalling poverty …
sufficient grounds for a government program’.4
The earlier concern with establishing the Colombo
Plan and attracting the interest of the United States also
precluded any serious political analysis. Only after the
program had been in operation for a year did the DEA
begin to appraise the various objectives Australia’s foreign
aid program was to achieve. Working in secret, DEA
officials determined basic policy objectives that were
animated by a deep unease about living beside a region they
saw as poverty-stricken, unstable, vulnerable to communist
takeover, and lacking the steadying hand of colonial rule.
Through the Colombo Plan, they aimed to influence Asia’s
economic and political future and secure Australia’s place
in the region.
By 1950, the idea that aid would buttress South–East
Asia against communist ideology thus strengthening the
‘spine of resistance from Delhi to Djakarta’, as one
parliamentarian put it, was already widely publicised by the
Australian media.5 In the minds of DEA policy-makers, this
was the Colombo Plan’s fundamental raison d’être. The aid
program, they wrote: 
may be justified as a counter to communism in
fairly simple terms. On the assumption that low
living standards — or even more so, declining
living standards — provide communism’s most
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fertile ground, effective action to raise living
standards or at least prevent present standards
from falling, will weaken the appeal which
communist agitators are able to make.
Equal to these anti-communist ambitions was a more
secretive agenda to use aid to ‘modify any resentment arising
from differences between Australian and Asian living
standards’ and ‘strengthen or develop amicable political
relations’ by using economic and social instruments to assert
political and cultural pressure on Asian people and their
leaders. Specifically, aid should ‘not interfere with the
established governments or existing constitutions or political
institutions and procedures’, and while there was ‘a tacit
understanding that no assistance will be given to communist
governments’, potential aid recipients have been ‘encouraged
to believe that they need no political qualification for
assistance’. Furthermore, the DEA, like most people at the
time, felt uneasy about the existence of great poverty next to
great wealth. In a politically unstable climate, they believed
that the ‘proximity between Australia, with its high living
standards, and Asia, with its extreme poverty, easily arouses
resentment’. Economic aid was one way in which Australia
could make a gesture towards Asia and take the ‘edge off
Asian resentment’. In order to achieve these covert
objectives while maintaining the Colombo Plan as a symbol
of non-political union between Asia and the West, a public
image distinct from private understandings became essential.
‘In any public discussion’, Tange recommended, ‘it is
desirable to avoid any reference to the political and strategic
objectives of the plan, or at least to make references only in
the most cautious terms’.6
A cohort of DEA staffers, however, expressed a
moderate and less interventionist approach. W.T. Doig from
the Economic and Technical Branch, which managed the
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Colombo Plan, explained his views directly to Spender.
Australians, he said, ignored the history and culture of Asia:
We understand them possibly as much as they
understand us — only a little. The political
objectives therefore of our policy should be not to
secure complete and full understanding
immediately or quickly; not to expect in return for
economic and technical aid, an identity of
viewpoint with our own on all current and
international issues.
Doig suggested that the Colombo Plan would better
serve Australia’s long-term regional interests if it played a more
organic role by providing a framework for continuing relations,
as opposed to the mere provision of assistance, which would
facilitate further regional cooperation and develop ‘greater
understandings of attitudes, prejudices, fears, motives, customs,
etc, between East and West’. Specifically, the Plan should not
take a coercive approach but aim to ‘convince Asian countries
that we do not expect them to adopt our systems, our ways of
life, our customs, or our religion, and that we are on their side
against Soviet imperialism’.7 Only later would the DEA
incorporate Doig’s idea into the Colombo Plan and, more
broadly, into Australian foreign policy. In the early 1950s, the
urgency of the international situation called for a more
forthright approach.
However, the ability of Western aid to increase
agricultural and industrial production and thus affect the
political future of Asia was always questionable. Both the
government and the DEA knew that the Colombo Plan’s
failure to deliver quantifiable change would contradict the
basic principle on which the program rested. ‘The ordinary
Asian is likely to suffer considerable disillusionment, if he
has heard about the plan, when he sees what little it
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achieves, in terms of Asian needs, and how thin the chances
are that it will bring about … real development and capital
investment, as opposed to an occasional first aid operation’.
The DEA advocated caution. If no tangible evidence of
progress could be identified then ‘emphasis on developmental
aspects for propaganda purposes [was] likely therefore to
return to plague the inventor’. Of course, simply establishing
contact and providing financial aid did not guarantee a
positive rapport with a recipient nation. Indeed, if the funds
were misdirected or mismanaged, aid might have little
impact or contribute to a deterioration of relations. By the
same token, the domestic political arena of a recipient
nation had to be examined closely. Contrary to public
assurances, certain ‘political qualifications’ were required:
It would be logical to increase economic aid to
those countries where the threat of communist
disruption was especially acute. [However]
without any control of the domestic policy of
recipient governments, the benefit of any external
aid could be completely offset if the recipient
government’s domestic policies were reactionary or
unimaginative. Even though ‘average’ per capita
income in the underdeveloped countries may be
rising, with national income increasing at a greater
rate than population, effective internal policies of
income distribution are essential to ensure that the
benefit is passed on to those sections of the
population most susceptible to communist
propaganda.8
Goods entering Asian countries under the Colombo
Plan certainly raised the prospect of securing longer-term
commercial markets for Australian exports, but over the
decade it became more important not to ‘supply foodstuffs
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where the effect of the gift would be to replace normal
commercial sales’.9 Rather, the DEA hoped that economic
cooperation would help to ameliorate any political
animosity that may have developed towards Asian
countries, especially non-Commonwealth nations. Even
more ambitiously, it was asserted that cooperation and aid
might transform an attitude of ‘virtual neutrality … into
something more positive’, reducing the strategic significance
of certain countries.10 For example, the ambivalence of
Indonesian officials towards the Colombo Plan would have
been less of a concern to DEA officials if Australia
established links with countries north of Indonesia. At the
time, the department considered Indonesia, Indo-China,
Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma the most likely to be
drawn into closer diplomatic relations through an
economic alliance. Over the decade, while Australian
diplomats warned that relations with the region would be
determined by much weightier issues than foreign aid, some
recognised the Colombo Plan’s capacity to preserve ‘latent
goodwill’ and serve as ‘an antidote to unfavourable
publicity’, particularly over difficult issues such as West
New Guinea and immigration policy.11
The primary weakness of the Colombo Plan lay in the
untested assumption that economic assistance and
development would ‘moderate political conflict’.
Consequently, the DEA followed a careful — if crude —
process to distribute aid to maximise the short-term political
and social benefits for Australia. The development plans
drawn up by member nations at the Consultative
Committee’s request had limited bearing on this process.
Australia allocated aid according to four criteria: political
objectives, commercial interest, relative needs based on per
capita income, and the amount of aid provided by other
countries. The DEA then divided aid recipients into three
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categories, based on their potential for sustaining a positive
political rapport with Australia. The first category comprised
those countries with close political associations with
Australia, ‘where economic aid is expected only to confirm
and improve the existing position, rather than help build a
new political relationship’. This category included India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, and British territories in South–East Asia.
The second group comprised countries considered ‘neutral’
who might develop into ‘allies’ through economic aid; it
included Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma. The final
group comprised nations where the political situation had
‘passed beyond the stage of forestalling unrest through
extension of economic aid’, and required military
intervention. This was the case for Indo-China, where the
extension of assistance was likely to be ‘almost wholly wasted’
and any token offering would make only a ‘fleeting political
impression’.12 It was futile, as one diplomat put it, to ‘fatten a
country which will soon pass into Communist hands’.13
However, this assessment altered as the strategic importance
of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam became apparent.
Just as the US State Department considered South
Asia of ‘determinative importance’ to its military plans,
Australian strategic assessments drew attention to the
significance of the sub-continent.14 Congenial relations
with both India and Ceylon were important components of
defence planning, with access to Ceylon’s naval and air
bases of particular significance. Ceylon’s primary military
value was as an ‘air funnel’, which allowed more effective
protection of Indian Ocean sea lanes than bases in Malaya
or on the east coast of Africa could offer. Also, in the event
of nuclear conflict, Ceylon might operate as a guidance
station for Polaris nuclear missiles launched from submarines
in the Indian Ocean.15 By and large, the government still
endorsed Secretary of Defence Frederick Shedden’s view
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that one of Australia’s strategic objectives in South Asia was
to establish ‘satisfactory political relations with the future
independent Government of Ceylon with a view to
retain Ceylon as a co-operative member of the British
Commonwealth’.16 Of the initial bounty of £A31.25
million, Australia gave over £A19 million to Ceylon, India,
and Pakistan; setting aside the remainder in anticipation
that non-Commonwealth Asia would sign on.17 Not only
did this reinforce Commonwealth relations and enhance
Australia’s status as a good neighbour, it signalled to the rest
of Asia the benefits they might gain once they elected to
join the Consultative Committee. 
By the mid- to late-1950s, as Australia’s strategic
interests shifted to South–East Asia, so too did the emphasis
of overseas aid. Although the government’s intention to
bring most of Asia into the Colombo Plan ‘family’ tended to
disperse Australia’s already limited aid budget, by the 1960s
South–East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia,
Laos, Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, and Singapore) had
received over 60 per cent of all Australia’s Colombo Plan
allocations.18 At the same time, as the region started to
show signs of economic growth, aid to Malaya increased
from approximately 10 per cent of the total budget in 1956
to around 30 per cent in 1970.19 During the Plan’s first
twenty years, Malaya and Indonesia consistently received
the highest amounts of educational and technical assistance.
The number of Australian staff responsible for the
administration of Colombo Plan projects also reflected the
significance of Malaya. By 1965, three officers in Kuala
Lumpur and one in Singapore oversaw Australia’s aid
projects, as opposed to India and Pakistan, where only one
officer was responsible for administering the Colombo Plan.
Notwithstanding the DEA’s admission that
Australian aid contributions to Asia were ‘little better than
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trifling’, the Colombo Plan represented a revolution in the
pattern of Australian overseas aid spending.20 The
Australian government had regularly supported aid
organisations run by the UN, such as UNRRA, IRO,
UNKRA, UNICEF, UNRWAPR, UNEPTA and IBRD,21
but an ongoing bilateral aid relationship with Asia did not
exist. From 1950 on, Australia shifted the focus of its aid
contributions towards the Colombo Plan and gradually
reduced its multilateral commitments to the UN. Of course,
assistance to Papua New Guinea remained the government’s
overriding aid priority. In 1950, when Spender managed to
wrest around £A5 million a year from Treasury for the
Colombo Plan, Australia was already spending over £A10
million per year in Papua New Guinea. Further, in contrast
to Colombo Plan allocations, which remained relatively
stable, aid to Papua New Guinea increased rapidly from the
mid-1950s, from £A10 million per annum in 1956/57 to
over £A36 million in 1965/66.22 Australia’s aid program
alone was clearly unable to remedy the major economic
problems endemic to many of the recipient nations. The
total amount of aid provided by other donor nations was
substantial, boosted massively by over $US1.4 billion from
America under its Mutual Security Program.23 Even so, the
Colombo Plan’s six-year total budget of $US2 billion paled
in comparison with the $US13 billion channelled into
Europe through the Marshall Plan between 1947 and 1952.
At face value, the Commonwealth’s reluctance to
make a greater commitment to the Colombo Plan
illustrated a lack of faith in the ability of aid to effect real
change in Asia. In Australia, for example, the Colombo
Plan’s annual budget of around £A5 million stood in stark
contrast to the yearly expenditure on defence which
exceeded £A170 million for most of the 1950s.23 However,
like all foreign-aid programs of the post-war era, the
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Colombo Plan was predicated on a series of assumptions
central to Western concepts of economic growth. In
Western thought the concept of development has been
(and is) so deeply ingrained that it is assumed to act as a law
of nature, and during the 1950s, the term ‘development’
was used interchangeably with ‘progress’, ‘evolution’,
‘change’, and ‘growth’. Following the Second World War,
European and American economic theorists turned their
attention to the problems of the underdeveloped world.
Key individuals who contributed towards a modernist
development theory based on the application of Keynesian
principles included P. Rodan-Rodenstein, Roy Harrod,
William Arthur Lewis, Ragnar Nurkse, and Walt Rostow.26
Driven by a tremendous sense of optimism, these
planners — along with their devotees around the world —
hoped that the application of advances in technology and
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Table 1: Colombo Plan Assistance provided by major donor nations
between 1950 and 1964/6524
Capital Technical Number Number of 
assistance assistance of students experts sent on 
(£A ‘000) (£A ‘000) accepted assignments
Australia 38,476.6 17,290.5 5,908 679
United Kingdom* 520,206.7 17,876.0 6,256 731
Canada 269,647.1 9,479.4 2,997 427
New Zealand 9,389.3 5,057.0 1,763 244
United States 8,292,273.2 220,048.2 15,709 3,567
Japan 71,011.9 3,842.5 1,887 610
TOTAL 9,201,004.8 273,593.6 34,520 6,258
* UK figures exclude the release of sterling balances up to 1958 under
arrangements with India, Pakistan, and Ceylon (£Str252 million)
 
the social sciences to the developing world would rapidly
bridge the gap between rich and poor countries. ‘Backward
economies’, later known by the more polite synonym
‘underdeveloped’, were characterised by rural overpopulation,
inefficient agricultural practices, inadequate technical
equipment, lack of scientific knowledge, and an inability to
generate capital. The path to modernity, they argued,
involved a number of common factors, including the
accumulation of capital, increased use of technology,
industrialisation, sophisticated administrative structures,
large-scale development projects, and external aid.
Extensive state intervention was initially required to
overcome the long years of stagnation, but once started,
future growth would be self-sustaining. As W. Lewis put it
in 1950: ‘Once the snowball starts to move downhill, it will
move of its own momentum, and will get bigger and bigger
as it goes along … You have … to begin by rolling your
snowball up the mountain. Once you get there, the rest is
easy’.27 In another incarnation, Western technology was
believed to yield almost magical results. New Zealand’s
Minister for External Affairs, Frederick Doidge, claimed
dramatically: ‘We could almost wipe out hunger overnight
if we could only get the people of these primitive lands to
use scythes instead of sickles, and steel ploughs instead
of wooden ploughs’.28 The point to note is that the idea
of self-sustaining economic development was not a
convenient rationalisation for offering limited assistance.
The quantity and type of aid provided, while important,
was less significant than the process it was intended to start.
The idea that development was an unstoppable,
linear process was popularised in 1960 in economic
historian Walt Rostow’s classic text Stages of economic
growth. Rostow argued that every economy passed through
a sequence of stages leading from ‘traditional society’ to
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‘high mass consumption’. The critical phase, he suggested,
was the one that achieved ‘preconditions for take-off ’,
where a massive mobilisation of capital would stimulate
structural reform and then launch a process of self-
sustaining investment and growth. In a passage replete with
Darwinian overtones, Rostow envisaged a state of affairs
where ‘traditional’ culture would disappear beneath the
advance of modern civilization, with a ‘modern alternative
… constructed out of the old culture’. Supplementing the
economic revival would be the formation of a new elite,
driven by an entrepreneurial spirit.29 The power of Rostow’s
book lay in its simplicity and in the way he pushed his
analysis as a practical alternative to Marxism. The subtitle,
a non-communist manifesto, left no doubt as to his political
proclivities. Economists debated the merits of Rostow’s
model for decades, but the basic tenets of his theory and
those of this contemporaries, particularly the emphasis on
industrialisation, the necessity for state-initiated
development planning, and a development model based on
Western experience, remained influential well beyond the
1950s.30 Cold war anxiety and the need to show no
weakness in the face of communism also encouraged the
suppression of more critical or even pessimistic analyses.
In this context, these theories soon became more
than the fruits of benign intellectual pursuit. Development
was an opportunity to carry Asia towards an idealised notion
of industrial civilisation. Theorists deemed the archetypal
modern society to be composed of key economic, social, and
psychological ingredients, such as mass consumerism, high
savings and investment, urbanization, high literacy, and a
strong work ethic. Successful development required a
holistic approach to reforming the underdeveloped
economy. H. Laugier, Assistant Secretary General of the
UN’s Department of Social Affairs, put it succinctly when
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he wrote that ‘human progress depends on the development
and application to the greatest possible extent of scientific
research’ and where a country’s ‘physical, intellectual, and
moral development lags behind the general pace of
civilisation, immediate concrete measures’ must be taken to
‘help them along the path of human progress’.31 An
assessment of the Colombo Plan written in Australian
Outlook explained that to achieve such progress ‘required
grafting onto Asian societies … the best in capitalist
thinking and attitudes, as well as techniques’.32 For this
reason, the proponents of development emphasised the
importance of education and the mass media in helping to
disseminate the Western cultural and attitudinal qualities
they thought essential to the achievement of modernity. For
example, in December 1952, when Indonesia finally yielded
to entreaties to join the Colombo Plan, Australia agreed to
provide six mobile cinema vans, textbooks, educational
films and equipment for two vocational training centres, in
addition to over £A1 million worth of buses, marine engines
and agricultural vehicles.33 Notably, by the mid-1950s
Australia had offered over a quarter (500) of its Colombo
Plan scholarships to Indonesia. 
Before Rostow’s ideas achieved prominence, the
National Security Council (the American President’s high-
powered forum for considering national security and foreign
policy issues) articulated a similar, although less colourful,
development philosophy. Its view was that the Colombo
Plan would not ‘of itself bring about significant increases in
living standards.’ Rather, they hoped that after a few years
recipient countries ‘would have established an environment
that would encourage a maximum utilization of domestic
savings and a reasonable flow of outside investment capital
for further development activities’.34 Development
theorists like Rostow confirmed the basic thrust of Western
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economic diplomacy and lent it academic credibility. For
this reason, their ideas achieved rare prominence among
bureaucrats and politicians responsible for foreign affairs
decision-making. Rostow himself went on to become
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs for President
John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon Johnson.
Australian planners embraced modernisation theory
in the post-war years, not least because Australia saw itself
as a developing nation, requiring external capital and
economic stimulation. Under the guidance of the
Department of Postwar Reconstruction (DPR) and its
influential head, Herbert (‘Nugget’) Coombs, Keynesian
economics reigned supreme and few doubted the active role
the state should play in governing economic growth.
Coombs’ vision for Australia embodied the same faith in
science and technology as the ‘take-off ’–styled boosters.35
‘Modern technology’, he wrote in his memoirs, ‘could be
placed at the disposal of communities — not as a framework
constraining and determining their lifestyles but as a force
capable of liberating their imagination and giving scope to
their creative energies’.36 Here, Coombs was referring to
Australia’s rapid industrial expansion, but the same
interventionist ethos he espoused applied equally to the less
developed economies in Asia. Australia, of course, had
practical experience in stimulating economic growth in
undeveloped countries. Paul Hasluck, Minister for
Territories between 1951 and 1963, saw Papua New Guinea
as a ‘society still awaiting the full effects both of the
techniques and mechanical strength of Western
civilisation, the blessings of Western medicine and society,
the ferment of ideas of civilised man’. Australia, he said,
had a duty to create both a ‘community and an economy’
whereby ‘primitive beliefs and codes’ gradually gave way to
a ‘new order’.37 Rostow himself could not have been clearer.
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More directly, Australian experts working in Asia
under the Colombo Plan often reinforced the key
assumptions about Asian society which underpinned the
program, namely that apathy, conservatism, and laziness left
them destined to languish as a poor and vulnerable race.
Agricultural economist T.B. Paltridge, for example,
undertook a two-year assignment in Ceylon in the mid-
1950s to establish a Division of Agronomy at the Coconut
Research Institute and locate pasture suitable for coconut
plantations. Paltridge received full cooperation from local
Ceylonese staff, the equipment he ordered arrived from
Australia promptly, and he successfully helped establish the
facilities to undertake soil analysis; nevertheless, he
devoted most of his report to the Ceylonese attitude to
Colombo Plan aid and the nature of Ceylonese society. He
encountered a curious resistance to change and a ‘peculiar
lack of incentive’ at all levels of society. The people, he
wrote, believed that ‘international aid is their right; rather
than a gesture of goodwill’. Over time, Paltridge mused, ‘the
Ceylonese have gradually become a subservient and
ineffective people’. He wondered if this was because of a
lack of leadership, malnutrition, climatic conditions,
disease, or even genetics. Paltridge proposed that Australia
launch an investigation into the factors causing the loss of
vigour and initiative, although he warranted that such a
study would be difficult to implement. ‘On the other hand’,
he concluded, ‘if we could pinpoint some real and basic
problem of that nature and if we could remove the
fundamental cause of lassitude among these peoples, then it
might be possible to encourage the greatest revival and
development in human history’.38
The London report of the Consultative Committee,
which set out the Colombo Plan’s basic aid philosophy,
encapsulated the very essence of modernist development
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theory, which was sweeping the world. The report stated
that the particular strength of the program was its ability to
lay ‘sound foundations for further development’ and thus
promote a domestic economy able to ‘sustain its own
investment programme’. The Colombo Plan would ‘involve
the application of modern technology and skills to the
under-developed and traditional economies of the countries
of South and South–East Asia’. Administrators, scientists,
and technicians from overseas can help Asians ‘equipping
themselves to use the recent advances in science and
technology which, applied to the tasks of peace, can bring
incalculable material benefits to all in South and
South–East Asia’. Furthermore, rising standards of living
would increase the ‘vigour and productivity’ of the people
and ‘eventually exercise a steadying influence’ on
population growth, seen by many as the fundamental
reason for Asian poverty.39 The Consultative Committee
report rang with evangelical fervour: ‘they must be liberated
so that they can contribute towards the self-realisation of
individuals, towards the fulfilment of national aspirations’.
Development ‘by its own momentum [would] ultimately
bring about a solution’ and lead the poor nations of Asia —
phoenix-like — out of the ashes of underdevelopment.40
Significantly, administrators from recipient nations
themselves agreed with this logic and recognised that
although the funds made available were low, a cohesive
basis for growth had been set in place.41
At its heart, then, the Colombo Plan aimed to oversee
Asia’s embrace of Westernisation and build the foundations
for a self-sustaining, modern economy. It presented Asian
underdevelopment as a problem requiring a non-political,
scientific solution that encompassed social reform.
Discussion of fiscal policy, health reform, and lack of
technology and expertise, however, masked the overarching
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assumption that cultural and social factors, not just economic
ones, had retarded development and exposed these nations
to the lure of revolution. In official circles, Asians were
considered psychologically susceptible, by virtue of their
physical poverty, to communist blandishments. Poverty, as
the Consultative Committee put it, had circumscribed their
bodies and their minds. The cock-sure Percy Spender seized
the opportunity to step into the breach. Rejecting any
suggestion that a non-interventionist approach would foster
greater appreciation from the people of Asia, Spender
believed it was insufficient for the West to present passively
the advantages of liberalism, individualism, and democracy.
In a long article for the respected US journal Foreign Affairs
in January 1951, he made the point that communism was an
idea ‘foreign’ to Asian people and acted as an instrument of
‘internal intervention’, working ‘with and among the people
… on the minds and political life of the community’. Aid
donors needed to look beyond the ‘realm of material welfare’
towards ‘abstract ideas’ if they were to confront communist
subversion. The West, he said was ‘entering the struggle for
the purpose of winning the mind of Asia’. Australia’s
religious fraternity also joined the fray. In 1953, the
distinguished Archbishop Howard Mowll claimed that
undernourishment had left the Asian mind as a kind of tabula
rasa, open and willing to receive. The solution was a ‘spiritual
Colombo Plan’, because the people of Asia were like ‘soft
wax, ready to receive impressions which, if imparted before
the wax got cold, would be retained as their future
character’.42
Asia’s apparent vulnerability and the regenerative
power of development reinforced the Colombo Plan as the
natural and necessary interface between the problem of
Asian underdevelopment and the arrest of communist
subversion. By feeding the belief that communism could
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not take hold in the face of unbridled economic expansion,
development programs such as the Colombo Plan became
instruments of international relations and legitimised
Western intervention in the underdeveloped world.
Bolstering Asia through economic support represented only
one facet of the Colombo Plan’s underlying political
strategy. Competing directly for intellectual and ideological
influence also became an increasingly prominent feature of
Australia’s aid initiative. The first wave of Colombo Plan
scholars presented an exciting chance to directly engage
Asians and instil in them the virtues of Australian culture
and democracy. To this end, the DEA also considered the
scholarship program to have long-term and ‘self-sustaining’
political benefits: it created ‘the body of people in Asian
countries which is gradually built up with an intimate
knowledge of Australia and, it may be hoped, some
affection for this country’, but also provided a ‘balm’ to
those who resented Australia’s immigration restrictions.
Similarly, the DEA reasoned that the scholarship program
and supply of expert personnel and technical equipment
would encourage understanding and acceptance of Western
values more effectively than capital aid. Officials thought
the personal interaction between Australian technicians
and Asians would provide some compensation for the fact
that their reports would be quickly superseded if, in fact,
they did not ‘gather dust from the start’, and that Asians
would soon forget where the technical equipment had come
from.43 Reflecting these priorities, the DEA initially
devoted 70 per cent of the technical aid budget to training
and scholarships, 20 per cent to equipment, and just 10 per
cent to the supply of technicians.
By the second year of operation, the DEA’s concerns
about the effectiveness of the program began to materialise.
In what would become a depressingly familiar formula, the
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Consultative Committee’s annual report stated that
economic advances were slight and outpaced by increases
in population. When the afterglow of Korean War
stockpiling faded and the price of primary commodities
tumbled, the Consultative Committee could only lament
Asia’s vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the world
market.44 While Colombo Plan donors now reported Asia’s
economic future in ‘less airy and less optimistic terms’, they
offset their pessimistic assessments with the promise of
future growth, lest they quash the hopes of the
underdeveloped world or the spirit of the Colombo Plan.
The publicity wing of the Colombo Plan Bureau, opened in
1954, was particularly careful not to raise the hopes for an
economic miracle in spite of any Herculean efforts from
Asian workers: the hard road was inevitable, one
promotional pamphlet told, because ‘the process of
economic development is slow and must go on for years as
it did in the West’.45 In an Orwellian twist, as genuine
economic improvement seemed unlikely, the Australian
government began to emphasise more forcefully the
humanitarian dimensions of the Colombo Plan and its
capacity to foster international goodwill.
The man charged with the task of incorporating the
Colombo Plan into the wider ambit of Australian foreign
policy was Spender’s successor as foreign minister, Richard
Casey. Spender had resigned after the signing of the
ANZUS treaty in early 1951 to take up the distinguished
position of ambassador to the United States. (Gossip
suggested that Menzies saw Spender as a potential rival and
so made him the handsome offer.46) Nevertheless, Casey’s
appointment to the portfolio, which he would hold until
1960, marked an important change in the tenor and scope
of Australia’s diplomatic relations. No less hawkish than his
predecessor, Casey was, however, a more measured and
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congenial character — far more adept at building
diplomatic rapport with regional neighbours. His dapper
dress-sense, impeccable deportment, and legendary dislike
of economics confirmed the opinion of his detractors that
he lacked depth, but his outstanding personal relationships
with influential people throughout the world proved
adequate compensation. To his friends he was an urbane,
well-travelled and well-read gentleman with a ‘modulated
resonant voice’.47 To others, this impeccably dressed
engineer-cum-politician, with literary pretensions and a
passion for flying his own aircraft, stood aloof from the
Australian political scene. The UK Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, found him ‘curiously English
and un-Australian’.48 Certainly, Asian leaders came to
prefer his urbane and quiet manner to Spender’s brash
effervescence.49
Few Cabinet members rivalled the diversity and
breadth of 61-year-old Casey’s career. An engineer by
training, he came from a wealthy and well-connected
family. During the First World War he served in Egypt, at
Gallipoli, and on the Somme, earning the Distinguished
Service Order and the Military Cross. In 1924, Prime
Minister Stanley Bruce appointed him Commonwealth
Liaison Officer in London. Returning to Australia in 1931,
he joined the United Australia Party and won the federal
seat of Corio. A dutiful and diligent parliamentarian, Casey
served in a variety of ministerial positions, but his
ambitions of becoming Prime Minister were thwarted in
1939 following a failed leadership challenge. A humbled
Casey accepted Menzies’s offer to head the Australian
Legation in Washington. In America, he was quietly
impressive, enhancing his reputation and gaining important
experience in the ways of diplomacy. His reputation as a
capable diplomat reached Winston Churchill, who offered
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him the position of British Minister of State resident in the
Middle East. In 1943 he accepted another imperial posting,
this time the governorship of Bengal. Three years in this
difficult position brought him into close contact with Asian
leaders and, importantly, anti-colonial feeling. In 1949 he
re-entered parliament, but with Menzies now firmly at the
helm of the Liberal Party, any lingering hopes Casey had of
leading the party were dashed.50
Casey’s interest in the region grew rapidly from the
time he took over the External Affairs portfolio in April 1951
and made his first overseas trip to Asia as minister. He opened
new diplomatic posts in Saigon and Rangoon, and raised the
consulate-general post in Bangkok to legation status.
Throughout his career, Casey extolled the virtues of cultural
exchange facilitated by the Colombo Plan’s scholarship
program. He was also among the first to identify the scheme’s
potential to change the way Australians thought about
themselves, as well as the way they thought about Asia. ‘We
need to understand and be understood by the countries of
South and South–East Asia’, he told the Australian Institute
of International Affairs on 25 September 1952. For Asian
students ‘to see Australia at an impressionable stage of their
lives and to exchange views at our universities and with our
officials should do a great deal to break down prejudices and
misunderstandings on both sides’.51
Casey prided himself on his belief in the importance
of personal diplomacy. His addiction to the press release,
and what he called the ‘human and personal element’ of
inter-governmental exchange, naturally spilled over into
his approach to the Colombo Plan. Casey pushed the idea
of aggressively promoting public awareness of Australia’s
aid programs, telling his Cabinet colleagues that Australia
must seek to generate ‘intensive publicity’.52 He made a
particular point of using Colombo Plan funds on short-
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term, identifiably Australian projects. In 1953, he directed
the Assistant Secretary of the DEA, James Plimsoll, to pay
close attention to publicity and avoid having Australia’s
contributions ‘sunk’, or become unidentifiable, in large
projects. Casey requested that attention ‘be given to a series
of plaques of different sizes and applicable to various types
of equipment … If this is done in a not too obtrusive way, it
would go some way towards having a permanent record that
they [Asians] would be aware of, of the fact that Australia
had provided equipment’.53 Here Casey set an enduring
precedent. His goal was to give Australia a visible presence
in Asia and secure long-lasting political dividends;
the effectiveness of the projects themselves were only
important to the extent they served this objective.
Cooperation with the media also helped ensure popular
support for the plan, which in turn, helped Casey generate
interest from an indifferent Cabinet. Rather than vague
forecasts of economic development, he could point to
improvements in Australia’s international reputation,
something of more immediate concern to his worried
colleagues.
Sober appreciations about the effectiveness of
development projects, the need to obtain political benefits
(both domestic and international), and a desire to promote
Western values — all meant that publicity and propaganda
would never be tangential to the Colombo Plan. All the
major donors shared these concerns. The British Foreign
Office reasoned that publicity would help disguise the low
levels of assistance and convince left-wing detractors that the
‘development of South and South–East Asia has not been
sacrificed to the rearmament drive’.54 For the US State
Department, the publicity attached to aid projects should
foster an ‘understanding of the nature of Soviet Communism
and encourage attitudes hostile to it’.55 Of course, donors
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attempted to counter accusations that the Colombo Plan
amounted to little more than a public relations exercise —
ironically, with more publicity. Indeed, Spender wrote in the
introduction to New hope for Asia (1951), the first major
publication designed to promote and popularise the
Colombo Plan, that the scheme was ‘a concrete, material
answer’ to Asia’s development problems; ‘it gives new hope
for Asian peoples, not the faint hope inspired by shallow
propaganda’.56 Another underlying message was that
Western aid was an expression of genuine and dispassionate
concern for Asian progress, and in no way like the empty
promises made by Soviet and Chinese communists.
In the bilateral climate, so integral to the Colombo
Plan philosophy, the Australian government soon
discovered that the political and publicity value of an aid
project depended on a host of other factors, such as aid
relationships with other donors, the attitude of the recipient
government, and the general economic conditions. For
example, the main factor influencing Indonesia’s decision to
eventually accept aid under the Colombo Plan was the
country’s rapidly deteriorating economy. As US aid priorities
shifted towards India and Indo-China — regions the US
State Department considered strategically more significant
and vulnerable to communism — non-military aid to
Indonesia fell from $US13 million per annum in 1951 to
just $US3 million in 1953. Large quantities of US aid,
which had hitherto deflected interest in the more limited
Colombo Plan, were now being offered to India and Indo-
China. Indonesia’s misfortune favoured Australia. Australia
was poised to assume the role of magnanimous aid donor as
economic conditions worsened and goodwill toward the
United States evaporated.57 Australia’s Minister and Chargé
d’Affaires in Djakarta, John Kevin, explained the benefits of
this ‘flying start’: 
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One would suppose that there are few countries in
Asia where the volume of Australian aid has a
prospect of approximating that currently granted
by the United States; and it is more valuable from
our viewpoint that the exception should be
Indonesia, where we have so important a political,
economic and strategic interest and where the
injection of Australian help comes at so opportune
a time.58
Differentiating Australian aid from the American
largesse became increasingly important, not merely to
attract the attention of Indonesia and other non-
Commonwealth nations, but also to improve Australia’s
nascent regional profile. A persistent problem for Australia,
Casey told Menzies in 1954, was that of ‘combating the
belief that is held in some quarters that we are an American
“satellite”’.59 The pursuit of US military protection and
support, especially over West New Guinea, may have been
central to foreign policy, but it was not to come at the
expense of Australia’s regional identity. In April 1953,
Australia stymied an Indonesian attempt to reshape the
Colombo Plan’s technical cooperation committee by
having monthly instead of annual meetings. Australian
representatives in Djakarta thought the idea sound and
likely to facilitate contact between individuals interested in
making aid projects more efficient, but they determined it
was ‘undesirable for any other body to develop too
prominent a local role in relation to the Colombo Plan in
which we feel our special identity should be obscured’.60
Projecting Australia’s identity into the region had become a
defining feature of the Colombo Plan and was already
having important consequences for the political and
economic goals the scheme was intended to fulfil. This was
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also the case in Indo-China. Following the visit of Jean
Letourneau, the French Minister in charge of relations with
Indo-China, in March 1953, the Menzies Government
reassessed its position on assistance to the associated states,
offering over £A1.5 million in capital and technical
assistance.61 John Rowland, Chargé d’Affaires in Saigon,
suggested that Australia was in a prime position to take
advantage of increasing tension between US and French
authorities by showing a real ‘interest in the future of the
three countries’. Local discontent towards the French and
the US presence also heightened the potential political
mileage which might be obtained from a speedy supply of
assistance. For these reasons, Rowland felt that Australia’s
Colombo Plan contributions, ‘relatively small though they
may be, have a political importance that they possess
nowhere else’.62
In the years after the Second World War, the
economic, political, and psychological vacuum left by
decolonisation concerned policy-makers across the
Commonwealth. Australian politicians and bureaucrats
hoped that Colombo Plan aid would help to transfer not
only the practical tools for material progress, but also the
moral, cultural and spiritual virtues necessary to transform
Asia into an economically self-sustaining, non-communist
region. The Colombo Plan rationale — that economic
progress would act as an ideological bulwark against
communism — was nurtured by intertwined ideas. Fear
about Australia’s future in the Asian region combined with
a seductively simple understanding of economic
advancement to produce the Colombo Plan’s raison d’être.
Yet the rigidity of realist, Cold War ideology precluded
other interpretations. The desire to develop Asia along
non-communist lines through the application of Western
ideas and technology, and the tendency to see aid as an
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oblique instrument of economic and cultural control,
reinforced Australian preconceptions about the region:
Asia was poor, weak, malleable — always at risk of quick
conversion by communists or capitalists. 
What was already apparent was that the Colombo
Plan was going to have a greater impact on Australian
perceptions of the region than on the economic
advancement of member states. Casey’s attention to public
relations and personal diplomacy would be a defining mark
of his tenure as foreign minister. It marked a critical shift
away from using aid to catapult the ailing economies of Asia
(although he continued to speak publicly of the catalytic
potential of Australia’s contributions) and it would soon
take the Colombo Plan into areas not considered at the
program’s inception. The distinction between prosecuting a
war against communist insurgency and building Australia’s
economic, cultural and diplomatic links through foreign aid
was to become increasingly blurred.
A ‘new deal’ for Japan
Early in 1950, Colonel William Hodgson, head of the
Australian mission in Tokyo, wrote to Percy Spender to
explain the political and commercial benefits that would
accrue should Asia spend its foreign aid on capital goods
from industrialised nations such as Japan. He claimed that
not only would this foster a more dynamic regional
economy, the creation of Japan as a South–East Asian
trading hub would then help the United States gradually
relinquish its role as regional financier. Japan’s ‘progress
towards self-sufficiency would be assisted and the need for
American aid funds reduced, while the Asian countries
concerned would be provided with the means to obtain,
mostly from Japan, supplies needed in developmental and
rehabilitation projects’.63 Hodgson was not proposing that
Japan join the embryonic Colombo Plan. Nor did he
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan98
identify a clear role for Australia, possibly because the mere
suggestion of Japanese commercial expansion would arouse
anxiety. But he did say that Australia would have to chart a
careful diplomatic course because preventing Japan from
‘playing an essential part in world recovery, would not only
be damaging from an international point of view but also
would arouse the hostility of both America and Japan’.64
By 1950, the Truman administration had determined
that the regional integration of a highly-developed
Japanese economy remained essential to ensure progress
and stability across Asia. American objectives for Japan
shifted from reform to reconstruction, with the long-term
goal of preventing Soviet control of industrial and military
activity in the region.65 Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,
told the British in December 1949: if ‘Japan [were to be]
added to the Communist Bloc, the Soviets would acquire
skilled manpower and industrial potential capable of
significantly altering the balance of world power’.66 The
key to this policy of containment lay in the economic links
between Japan and the Asian hinterland. The National
Security Council decided that Japan would only be able to
maintain present living standards if it could ‘secure a
greater proportion of its needed food and raw material
(principally cotton) imports from the Asiatic area, in which
its natural markets lie’ and expand intra-regional trade.67
Japan was willing to oblige. Fearful of further
alienating the region, Japan’s Prime Minister, Shigeru
Yoshida, resolved to pursue a policy of ‘economic diplomacy’,
structured around strengthening export and trade links with
South–East Asia, the provision of technical and capital
assistance, and membership of international associations
such as ECAFE and the Colombo Plan.68
Not until the Colombo Plan had achieved some
stability did Australia begin to contemplate Japan’s
admission. Australia had offered tentative support for Japan’s
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gradual return to the international economic community via
membership of the UN, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), but inviting a former enemy into the
congenial Colombo Plan fraternity was likely to be more
problematic. In March 1952, senior officials at the DEA
swapped ideas on the issue. Joining the program, they
suggested, would be a means of ‘binding Japan to the
democratic camp’, and offer some protection against
communist states. As Casey explained publicly, the major
threat to Australia’s regional security came from communist
expansion, not Japanese aggression. ‘The immediate problem
we have to consider is the security of Japan, even more than
security against Japan’.69 Japan’s resurgence as an economic
leader also reflected the nationalist aspirations of many other
nations in the area; Asian governments might even demand
compensation should Australia deny them easy access to the
aid Japan was so eager to give.70 Importantly, some in the
Department of External Affairs (DEA) felt that conceding
Japan’s entry into the fold represented an ideal opportunity
to impress the Americans, for any effort Australia took which
made the integration of the Japanese economy easier would
‘have US blessing’.71
The legacy of the Pacific War deeply affected Japan’s
relations with the region. For Australia, there were
sensitive economic and political matters, including
Japanese rearmament, pearl fishing in Australian waters,
compensation for former prisoners of war, the trial of
Japanese war criminals, Japanese war dead in Australian
territory, and Japan’s potential inclusion in SEATO and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).72
(GATT was a series of multilateral trade agreements aimed
at the abolition of quotas and the reduction of tariff duties).
But boosting Japan’s economic power in the name of
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regional stability and progress was difficult for many to
understand. To the generation with close and sharp
memories of Kokoda, Changi and Sandakan, it seemed an
absurd irony. Both Britain and Australia were wary of the
potential danger of Colombo Plan finance facilitating the
commercial and political exploitation of smaller
South–East Asian nations. Sir Gerald Templer, from the
British High Commission in Malaya, told the Foreign
Office that there was a ‘clear danger of this being [a] cover
for economic penetration, particularly in [the] field of
fisheries and mining [with] which we were familiar before
the war. We hope, therefore, that [the] matter [of Japanese
admission] will neither be raised nor pressed’.73 DEA
officials worried that if Australian aid found its way to
Japan, ‘however devious the route’, the public hostility
towards Japan might spill over and damage the standing of
the Colombo Plan program itself. Whatever the concern,
the issue seemed ‘likely to remain “hot” for some time’.74
Yet it was always going to be difficult for Australia or
Britain to use fear of political domination as a public reason
to deny Japan access to the Colombo Plan. For to suggest
that Japan could use their member status to dominate
smaller South–East Asian economies might imply that
current donor countries could do the same. So instead of
the real reason, the DEA cited Japan’s balance of payment
problems and its inability to provide adequate assistance to
recipient nations as the principal reason for recommending
that Australia not admit Japan. The DEA assumed,
however, ‘that the real opposition lies in [the] doubts
of Australian people’. The immediate and convenient
solution for Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom was to do nothing, but this did not rule out the
possibility of a change of heart. Rather the DEA thought
the move ‘“premature” rather than inconceivable’.75
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American officials worried about Australia’s capacity
to tolerate a more intimate association with Japan. The
State Department noted that because Australia had a
positive influence on other Western powers, ‘every effort
should be made to prepare the ground through diplomatic
channels before [attempting] new measures which might be
misunderstood’.76 The Americans, however, were impatient
and appeared intent on denying the British Commonwealth
the luxury of slowly coming to terms with the issue of
Japan’s full return to the international community. 
All the while endeavouring to ‘avoid the appearance
of aggressive sponsorship’, the US embassy in Tokyo asked
British officials about the possibility of Japan’s attending
the 1952 meeting of the Consultative Committee in
Karachi as an observer.77 On hearing of the discussions,
Alan Watt, Secretary of the DEA, immediately informed
the United Kingdom that Australia was not keen about any
motion to admit Japan to Consultative Committee
proceedings.78 A cable from Canberra explained that
although the DEA was aware that Japanese admission
would most likely have a positive economic impact for
Colombo Plan countries, ‘formal participation of Japan
would naturally have important political implications and
[the] Australian Government is unlikely to agree in the
near future’.79 When the United Kingdom reported to the
United States that Australia and most of the other
committee members were ‘implacably opposed’ to the
suggestion, the Americans dropped the issue in deference to
such widespread and deeply felt opposition.80
Eighteen months later, the question of Japanese
membership stalled once more, this time, a result of
Japanese fishing activity in the Arafura Sea. The Japanese
Peace Treaty stipulated that the Japanese government
negotiate with Australia to ensure the conservation of
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oyster beds located in Australian waters. In August 1953,
while negotiations were in progress, Japanese pearlers
recommenced fishing, reputedly taking over 1,000 tons of
shell (compared to the Australian harvest of 170 tons).81
Moreover, some of this activity was taking place off the
coast of Darwin. With memories of the attacks on Darwin
and Sydney still alive, the presence of Japanese so close to
home unsettled many Australians. Negotiations between
Japan and Australia broke off. Haruhiko Nishi, the
Japanese Ambassador in Canberra, met with Watt in late
1953 and told him that Japan could not conform to
Australia’s demand that it restrict pearl-fishing activities in
Australian waters. Nishi then immediately questioned Watt
on Japan’s potential admission to the Colombo Plan. Watt’s
reply was curt, ‘indicating that this was hardly a propitious
time to raise this second question’.82 The Australian
government formally asked Japan to recognise the validity
of Australian restrictions on activity on the Indonesian
continental shelf — before it would consider their application
to join the Consultative Committee. This distraction
annoyed US officials, who asked their representatives why
the Australian Government would ‘interject apparently
extraneous issues into what US considers a desirable
objective’.83 Assistant Secretary, James Plimsoll, explained
to Arthur Emmons, First Secretary of the US embassy in
Canberra, that Australia would not bargain with Japan over
territorial matters: ‘The question of the Colombo Plan and
of pearling were linked only in one way: that the fishing
dispute had not made the atmosphere a suitable one for
raising the question of further concessions to Japan’.84
Plimsoll also took the opportunity to remind Emmons of
the devastation brought upon Darwin during the Second
World War and the considerable level of hostility still felt
towards the Japanese.
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Anxious predictions about Japan’s political and
economic future continued to dominated parliamentary
debates and stymied any chance of Australian support
for their membership in the Consultative Committee.
Australian representatives in Washington remained
unconvinced by American assurances. A State Department
official had explained that it would be ‘easier to influence
Japan against undue commercial exploitation in the area if
she were associated with the rest of us in the plan’. The
cable concluded, however, that ‘American thinking on the
economic side is rather woolly’.85 Where Australia did
agree with American assessments was over the capacity of
the Colombo Plan to dissipate anti-Japanese feeling in
South and South–East Asia, stimulate intra-regional trade,
and encourage other Asian countries to export primary
commodities to Japan.86
In the early 1950s, Japan was Australia’s second
largest buyer of wool. However, Australia was increasingly
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the Japanese economy, the
stabilising of which was of paramount importance if the
market for Australian exports was to be maintained. This
was crucial if Australia was to maintain its export potential.
Another problem was to redress the gross trade imbalance
between Australia and Japan. In 1952/53, Japan purchased
around £A84 million worth of goods (mainly wool), whereas
Australia purchased just £A5 million worth of Japanese
goods. The imbalance was set to increase into the decade.87
With the war in Korea nearing an end, Japan was so short of
sterling that ‘adequate allocations cannot be made even for
the purchase of Australian wool. Sterling aid to Japan
therefore now seems more necessary than Japanese aid to
the sterling area’.88
The very idea of aid finding its way to a former
enemy caused some concern. When the Japanese press
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began enthusiastically reporting that the Australian
government was seriously considering widening the scope
of the Colombo Plan to include them, an Australian
representative in Rangoon refused to believe such
audacious claims. ‘I feel sure that this is a cunning ruse
originating from some interested Japanese quarters’, the
embassy reported to Canberra:
It would amount to sheer madness. A country
need not for all time entertain ill feelings against
her former ruthless enemy, but it would be sheer
folly to go out of her way and give substantial help
in rebuilding industries … History will be
meaningless if a country does not learn by the
happenings in the past and model her actions by
past events and experiences.89
Apparently, the author had mistakenly assumed that
Japan would be a recipient of aid, not a donor. The embassy’s
obvious surprise also suggests the degree to which Casey and
the DEA kept the detail of their thoughts private.
Casey, however, sensed the potential for a new era of
regional engagement. The Japanese search for prestige was
a relatively transparent strategy — one that handed Casey
a powerful diplomatic tool. As he explained to Tange,
‘Japan’s wish to get into the Colombo Plan may be a rather
heaven-sent opportunity on which we might base our “new
deal” towards Japan’.90 He recorded in his diary that he
would endeavour to ‘make as much of this’ search for
acceptance as he could.91 The integration of Japan via the
goodwill of the Colombo Plan emerged as a politically
palatable alternative to direct financial assistance. By
helping Japan’s earning potential in Asia, the government
hoped that the balance of payments deficit would ease and
allow a more stable trading partnership with Australia. The
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prospects were good for Australian exports.92 Over the
decade, the demand for wool in Japan increased rapidly,
with consumption per head rising from 0.2 kg in 1950 to
1.1 kg in 1960, at which time Japan replaced the United
States as Australia’s largest wool market. The major
obstacle to a more equitable balance of trade was Japan’s
negative image and the reluctance of Australian consumers
to buy Japanese goods. To remedy this and to prepare the
ground for economic concessions, Menzies took to the
air waves to explain Australia’s complex economic
predicament. A transfer of the prestige associated with the
Colombo Plan to the Japanese was another important
factor the government thought would help the sale of
Japanese imports in Australia.
Cabinet’s decision to admit Japan to the Colombo
Plan coincided with the general adoption of a more liberal
attitude toward Japan. Although Cabinet approached the
liberalisation of Australian relations with Japan
‘reluctantly’, the meeting did identify sound commercial
and political advantages — apart from keeping Japan away
from the embrace of China. Assisting Japanese economic
integration with South–East Asia would increase Japanese
earnings and enable her to buy more Australian wool. The
committee was even prepared to accept the loss of
Australian exports (such as tractors and diesel locomotives)
when Japanese industry became more efficient. Any
disadvantages were ‘far outweighed by the necessity of
ensuring that Japan was a strong bidder for [Australian]
wool’ and the ‘psychological effect’ of ‘influencing them
towards association with Western Powers’.93 And any
disadvantages likely to arise from Japanese penetration of
Asian commercial markets were subordinated to strategic
objectives. On 27 August 1954, Cabinet agreed to support
Japanese membership in the Colombo Plan, on condition
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that it received support from a majority of member nations,
including the United Kingdom and the United States.
Unaware of the Cabinet decision, the US State
Department continued to place pressure on Australia,
implying that if Australia made concessions to Japan they
could expect reciprocal concession, not only in Japanese
tariffs, but in US tariffs as well. The timing of this request
suggests that the ‘concessions’ the United States expected
from Australia included Japan’s full admission to the
Colombo Plan. The DEA proceeded cautiously, aware of
the strange nature of the proposal: ‘The unusual character
of the American proposal is appreciated but we are not at
this stage in a position to indicate whether or not the
Government can take it up’.94 The cable instructed
Washington staff to seek US views on a possible reduction
in the duty on wool as the basis of future negotiations.
Although the offer turned out to be an empty
distraction, sometime in late August 1954, the DEA,
presumably with Casey’s approval, resolved to take a much
more active role at the Consultative Committee meeting to
be held in Ottawa in October. On 27 August, the DEA sent
a telegram to relevant posts announcing the decision to
support Japan’s admission as a donor to the Colombo Plan.
Much to the surprise of New Zealand, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, the DEA even offered to sponsor Japan’s
application.95 Unaware of the US promise to Canberra,
New Zealand’s Minister for External Affairs, Clifton Webb,
greeted Australia’s sudden change of heart with suspicion.
Remaining steadfastly opposed to the admission of Japan,
officials in Wellington regarded the amount of pressure
brought to bear by the Americans as excessive.96 On
8 September 1954, Webb conveyed his misgivings about
Australia’s diplomatic manoeuvring to his Washington
ambassador: ‘The Australians, who originally opposed
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Japanese admission more strongly than we did, have now
turned about-face and want to make a “dramatic gesture”
by sponsoring Japan themselves, in the hope that this
will secure some goodwill. Is this not “rather woolly”?’97
Nevertheless, the major Western allies and Asian Colombo
Plan nations had agreed on their stance toward Japan.
Facing further isolation, New Zealand capitulated and
agreed to vote in favour of admission.98
What had led to Australia’s change of heart? Was it
the promise of more attractive trade arrangements? Was it
the desire to impress the United States and the Japanese?
Or was it an attempt to garner greater support for the
Colombo Plan and Australia’s regional reputation?
Superficially, it looked as though Australia had only
succumbed to US pressure when offered a means to offset
any losses incurred through the displacement of local
produce by cheap Japanese goods. However, it is unlikely
that the US offer of further GATT concessions was more
than a minor factor in the decision to take a more active
role. At most, the promise of GATT concessions from the
State Department simply stiffened the resolve of Australian
officials. By August 1954, Australia had already determined
that it was as much in Australia’s interest as it was in the
United States’ to admit Japan. Sponsoring Japan, as
opposed to merely allowing her admission, was a relatively
painless way to maximise the seemingly magnanimous
nature of Australia’s decision. Sponsorship also restored the
goodwill lost as a result of the protracted negotiations. 
The Japanese embassy in Canberra suspected
American involvement and asked the DEA directly
whether Australia was acting at the behest of the United
States. Counsellor Masayoshi Kakitsubo came dangerously
close to the mark when he said that the United States was
trying diligently to have Japan admitted to GATT and had
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pressured Australia to have Japan as a Colombo Plan donor.
Naturally, his suggestion was ‘firmly rejected’, the DEA
informing him that the initiative had been undertaken
independently — in the interest of Japanese relations with
Australia and the Colombo Plan region.99 Curiously
enough, after Australia’s decision to sponsor Japan, Under-
secretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith expressed
‘his gratification at Australia’s decision and agreed that
nothing should be read in any way which would suggest
that [its] decision had not been completely on [its] own
initiative’.100
Casey withheld the decision from parliament. Fearful
of a premature announcement and hoping to achieve
maximum publicity at the official meeting in Ottawa,
Casey claimed only to have heard a ‘tentative proposal’ that
another country was being invited to join the program.101
The DEA had asked some journalists who had learned of
Australia’s plans not to announce anything before the
Consultative Committee agenda had been set. On 22
September 1954, Menzies, replying to a Question on
Notice, gently announced the decision to support Japan’s
admission to the Colombo Plan. There was no debate, just
as the government desired.102
Canberra also went to considerable effort to ensure
that the formal admission procedure held during the
Ottawa meeting went as smoothly as possible.103 The DEA
guided Japan through the application procedure, thus
ensuring that India did not take credit (as she was
appearing to do) for officially proposing Japanese
membership. Now actively encouraging Japan’s economic
resurgence, the DEA’s Assistant Secretary to the United
Nations Division, Patrick Shaw, encouraged Japan to apply
for full membership of the Consultative Committee (as
opposed the more limited membership of Technical
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Council) because it ‘gave Japan access to the economic
planning of a number of countries in which Japan
presumably was interested from a commercial point of
view’.104 In the event, Japan received full membership, but
confined its initial contributions to just $US40,000 in
technical aid.105
Two days after Japan’s admission, Nishi meet with
Tange and Shaw in order to thank the Australian
government formally. The First Secretary of the Japanese
embassy, Y. Yamamoto, visited the DEA later that evening
offering more appreciation for achieving a ‘milestone in
Japanese–Australian relations’. In keeping with the
transparent and deferential nature of Japanese diplomacy
of the time, Yamamoto then announced that he looked
forward to the next milestone — ‘the abolition of
discrimination in import licensing against Japanese
goods’.106 Indeed, that milestone, embodied in the 1957
Australia–Japan Agreement on Commerce and Trade, was
still a few years away.
Cabinet had based its decision to admit Japan to the
Colombo Plan on interrelated economic, political, and
strategic issues. As a raw material supplier and importer of
industrial products, Australia was part of the South–East
Asian resource hinterland that Western strategists
considered fundamentally important for regional stability
and prosperity. Against this background, the Truman
Administration’s support for a $US250 million loan through
the IBRD in August 1950 was a tangible expression of the
US desire to see Australia develop as a key feeder nation
supporting Japanese capitalist expansion.107 However, the
Colombo Plan served as an important political and
diplomatic tool that allowed the Menzies Government to
manoeuvre itself into a stronger position. Once more, the
congenial alliance suggested by universal support for
Japanese inclusion in the Colombo Plan belied the complex
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interplay between anti-communist containment and the
Anglo–American approach to economic regionalism. 
For those concerned to extend the Colombo Plan’s
reputation as a unifying symbol of resolve against the
communist bloc, Japan’s admission came just in time. For the
following year, the Soviet Union launched its own foreign
aid program for the developing nations of Asia, a program
which placed renewed pressure on the Colombo Plan.
A red Colombo Plan for Asia
The Western world received scant warning about Soviet
intentions to create an aid program for Asia. During the
early 1950s, Australian representatives abroad detected few
signs of a communist alternative to Western development
initiatives, merely an increasing number of pronouncements
about the necessity of the underdeveloped world to
embrace the socialist model. Then, in 1955, the Soviet
Union burst onto the foreign aid arena. At a cost of over
$US200 million, the Soviets announced a commitment to
build the Bhilai steel plant in India, intended as a global
demonstration of communist planning, technological
capacity, and concern for oppressed people. With much
fanfare, the Soviet Union took over the ambitious Aswan
high dam project in 1956 when the United States withdrew
in retaliation for Egypt’s recognition of China and its
weapons deal with Czechoslovakia. The blustering and
ebullient leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev,
would not officially challenge capitalist leaders to a
peaceful competition in the underdeveloped world until
1957, but the Soviet ‘economic offensive’, as the White
House called it, had already begun.108
Australia’s role in the ensuing battle would be an
auxiliary one, but it was equally alarming. ‘ASIA GETS A
RED COLOMBO PLAN’ ran the headline in the
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Melbourne Herald for a story by English foreign affairs
analyst Barbara Ward. She cautioned Western powers not
to be complacent about their own aid programs because
Russia was making a start on a Colombo Plan of its own.
Russian training programs seemed to be ‘going forward
more ambitiously’ and might soon outnumber those offered
by Australia and her allies. She spurred the West to act, for
‘upon the horizons of Asia may be the portent of vast
political upheavals still to come’.109 Ward’s observations
proved prescient. With the launch of Sputnik — a striking
symbol of modern scientific progress — and a burgeoning
industrial capacity, the Soviets demonstrated an apparent
technological and economic superiority over the West. The
communist model of economic planning, not to mention
the generous conditions of Russian foreign aid, appeared
increasingly attractive to Asians looking for a means to
embrace the modern age.
Western aid provided to Asia under the Colombo
Plan and multilateral aid programs dwarfed Soviet finance.
But a number of important features distinguished the
communist program and jolted the confidence of Western
policy-makers. Focusing on major ‘prestige’ projects in
fewer countries, the Soviet Union deliberately provided
low-interest loans instead of outright gifts; the latter option
was considered condescending and demeaning. Significantly,
they also accepted repayments in local currencies or in
exports, a feature especially attractive to countries with
balance-of-payment problems. According to Western
perceptions, the Soviet Union was unfettered by
democratic procedure and could bring its highly centralised
industries more quickly to bear on Asia’s economic needs.
Many also believed that the supposed absence of a profit
motive in the communist economy might allow the Soviets
to eliminate competitors and to dominate Asian markets
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with consummate ease. The combination of these features,
warned the US Director of International Cooperation
Administration, J.R. Smith, meant that the communists
were ‘much better equipped than we are to wage economic
warfare’.110
The propaganda deployed by the Soviets was no
different from the methods and language adopted by the
Western sponsors of the Colombo Plan. Communist aid
emphasised impact projects that would not only assist the
region’s economic advancement, but also generate
maximum publicity. Writing in Moscow’s Journal of
International Affairs, Viktor Rymalov celebrated the Soviet
Union’s ‘unselfish’ supply of ‘material and cultural
assistance to backward and oppressed peoples’. And he
criticised the Colombo Plan’s emphasis on agricultural
production as a trick to restrict Asia’s role to that of a
plantation economy, capable of suppling much needed
primary commodities. The Soviet program, on the other
hand, funded both industrial and agricultural expansion.111
Of course, the reality was that, as with the United States,
post-war reconstruction left the Soviets with an oversupply
of capital goods and a need for new markets in exchange for
Asia’s raw materials.
Always critical to Western geo-strategic assessments of
Asia, the avowedly neutralist Indian government seemed
particularly open to the blandishments of both socialists and
capitalists. Seemingly paralysed by the audacity of the Soviet
program, Australia’s High Commissioner in New Delhi,
Peter Heydon, believed that the Indian government felt
politically obliged to balance its receipt of Western aid with
Russian assistance. While he thought it unlikely that India
would be ‘swept off her feet [or] … allow herself to be
inextricably entangled in any Russian economic web’, he
worried about the added allure of the ‘exceptionally quick’
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delivery of high quality goods, the competitive prices, and
the acceptance of local currency. Heydon’s recommendations
were a mixture of resignation and resolve. ‘It is difficult to
point any way for Australia’, he said:
We are given some credit for the Colombo Plan,
but late deliveries result in some loss. We cannot
attempt to match volume with the USSR or the
USA, but we could perhaps improve our
performance. Speedier delivery of equipment if
possible would help, but selection of an individual
project for assistance, as an Australian project,
would be immeasurably better if limitations on
Colombo Plan aid could be relaxed.112
The arrival of Soviet aid forced Australia to engage
with countries hitherto ignored. In Burma, wrote Lewis
Border, Australia’s Ambassador in Rangoon, ‘we have little
trade and we have little in common in other directions’ and
without the Colombo Plan Burma would be cut off from the
Western world. It was therefore necessary for Australia to
balance communist aid and not leave Burma vulnerable to
an ‘influx of technicians, experts, cultural groups, etc. from
the communist countries and to a campaign of penetration
and subversion’. He believed the buses already donated by
Australia served as a ‘positive reminder that the
government does not have to turn to the communist
countries for its aid’. Equally, communist aid helped expose
the flaws and fallacies that had grown up around the
provision of aid as a political and cultural antidote. Francis
Stuart, Australian Minister to Cambodia between 1957 and
1959, oversaw the implementation of many Colombo Plan
projects, including a municipal vehicle and machinery
workshop in Phnom Penh.113 However, the machines and
vehicles fixed by Australian technicians had in fact been
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan114
donated by the communists! So much for the idea that
foreign assistance would transmit democratic values and
endear Asians to Western designs for regional development,
simply by virtue of its geographic origin.
Nevertheless, American military and non-military aid
(including the supply of surplus agricultural produce)
increased conspicuously from 1955 on, despite public claims
that the United States would not attempt to counter Soviet
aid.114 Of course, the Soviet economic offensive was not the
only reason the United States re-examined its aid programs,
but most members of Congress considered the region too
important, and too unstable, to stand back and let the
Soviets move in unopposed. One member of Congress
metaphorically thumped the lectern: ‘The Soviet strategy
has been changing again, and so must ours … We cannot be
guilty of “too little too late”, for the fate of humanity is at
stake’.115 In this climate, the Americans were not about to
abandon the Colombo Plan, its Commonwealth taint now a
distinct advantage. Although senior US bureaucrats
maintained their reservations about the loose nature of the
Consultative Committee and the fact that ‘little if any
pressure is exerted upon [recipient countries] regarding the
management of their economic affairs’, the ‘family link’
between Commonwealth nations was to be savoured.
Extolling the Colombo Plan’s virtues, J.H. Smith Jr. told the
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs:
Among the interesting features of the Colombo
Plan are that it excludes the Soviet bloc countries,
antedates the Sino–Soviet economic offensive, and
is regarded by the Asians as their own organisation.
The Russians cannot attack it as they attacked
SEATO [South East Asia Treaty Organisation]
and the Asians are not likely to leave it.
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An American attempt to rework the Consultative
Committee into a more coercive, multilateral agency — led
by Harold Stassen, Director of the Mutual Security Agency
— collapsed when it failed to garner Congressional or
widespread Asian support. The failure turned out to be a
blessing. Although the Americans continued to explore
ways they could strengthen the regional integration of
Colombo Plan nations without challenging the bilateral
framework, it was in fact better, Smith said, for Asian
countries to work through an ‘admirable institution such as
the Colombo Plan’ rather than to adhere to a rigid
multilateral agency closely identified with the United
States. The highly regarded program prompted Smith to
suggest that his country should do more to associate its aid
programs with the Colombo Plan name.116
Beyond these limitations, the Colombo Plan
administrative framework proved a resilient and flexible
structure for negotiating foreign-assistance programs. The
Consultative Committee framework was a product of the
economic nationalism that pervaded post-colonial Asia. This
structure, and the strict adherence to bilateralism, also went
some way to preserving the economic and political autonomy
of Asian nations. That bilateral negotiations partly
contradicted the regionalism the Colombo Plan designers
hoped to foster mattered less than the achievement of
bringing disparate governments together to discuss common
problems. In 1960, international affairs expert Creighton
Burns identified the diversity and complexity falling under
the Consultative Committee rubric:
It links countries already bound by military
alliances to either Britain or the United States with
those which have maintained an uncommitted
stand in foreign policy. It is politically eclectic,
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combining traditional Western liberal democracies
and their Asian models with military dictatorships
and left-wing experiments in collective leadership.
Of the current ideologies, Communism alone is
unrepresented. The economies of the Colombo
Plan countries shade the spectrum from semi-
feudal through qualified free enterprise to those
with a high degree of central control.117
Paradoxically, the politically benign nature of the
Colombo Plan Consultative Committee ensured its survival
in a fractious international climate. Positive, if superficial,
dialogue between Asia and the West was maintained
precisely because it avoided overtly political language and
strategy. Indeed, this non-political forum did not stop
Western governments from privately — and sometimes
secretly — attempting to incorporate political and military
strategy within aid programs. The triumph of bilateralism
and the willingness of the Soviet Union to embark on a
foreign economic program ensured the legitimacy of
political neutralism. The fact that recipient governments
could also draw from a Soviet source gave them bargaining
power and protected their political autonomy. Economist
John P. Lewis succinctly explained the situation concerning
India. The Indian people, he wrote, ‘do not want to be
thrown into the same statistical bin with two or three dozen
other countries’:
they fear the inappropriate egalitarianism that
international politics injects into the parceling out
of funds under multilateral operations. The Indian
Government … wants to keep its foreign aid
bargaining dispersed … Not only may the present
arrangement occasionally allow India to play off
one benefactor against another; it maximises the
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autonomy of Indian developmental planning. And
the latter is something that a government of the
independence and stature of the Indian is no
readier to surrender to the World Bank or the
United Nations than it is to the United States or
the Soviet Union.118
The continuation of the Colombo Plan’s original
bilateral architecture helped maintain the nation–state
bilateral dialogue and that, in turn, helped to sustain the
combative, bipolar nature of global relations. In the
absence of an overarching regional organisation dedicated
to economic development, the ‘bidding war’ became an
entrenched component of Cold War politics. For the next
forty years, the two power blocs vied for influence and
recognition in Asia.119 It is, of course, debatable whether
a multilateral, regionally-integrated program (supported by
a substantive increase in US funds) would have had a
greater impact on the economic development of Asian
countries. The inexorable force of international commodity
markets and tariff manipulations was infinitely more
damaging to Asia’s economic progress. More important for
the Australian government was the prospect that a
multilateral agency would absorb Australian contributions
and leave no trace of their origins. Thus, by maintaining
the Colombo Plan’s bilateral framework, Australia’s role as
contributor to and creator of a major Asian aid forum was
preserved, if not enhanced. It also ensured that Australian
efforts to generate maximum dividends from its nascent
links to the region would continue unabated.
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5. A GOOD 
SHOE-HORN FOR
OUR INTERESTS
Richard Casey struggled throughout his career togenerate interest in Asia and in Australia’s foreign aid
program. In 1954 he lamented in his diary that Australians
were ‘living in a fool’s paradise of ignorance about the
East’. ‘Most people’, he continued, ‘are hostile to the UN
— hostile to the Colombo Plan — and unsympathetic with
Asia’.1 Strict export restrictions and the Treasury
department’s reluctance to look beyond domestic economic
concerns were constant thorns in Casey’s side. But the
essence of the problem, as he explained to diplomat Walter
Crocker, was that his colleagues simply saw ‘no immediate
material advantage’ in giving away millions of pounds.
Lacking Percy Spender’s punch, Casey’s verbose Cabinet
orations compounded the problems.2 His biographer notes
succinctly that he was ‘not tough enough, cunning enough
or politician enough to carry Cabinets with him’. Moreover,
he felt that Treasury and the Cabinet ignored his attempts
to pursue Colombo Plan objectives in a financially
restrained and responsible way. In fact, he believed it
worked to his disadvantage. ‘Being honest and
accommodating doesn’t seem to pay’, a forlorn and
frustrated Casey noted in his diary.3 But he learned quickly
that grafting Cold War priorities onto his submissions
generated greater momentum and interest for Australian
aid initiatives. In August 1954, Casey outlined his vision to
Menzies:
The Colombo Plan is a good shoe-horn for our
interests. What we most want to see in South East
Asia is the development of stable, democratic and
friendly governments. In other words — a group
of reliable buffer states between ourselves and the
Communist drive to the South — although we
must never call them that. I believe our main
endeavour should be to give further positive aid
towards attaining this objective with every weapon
in our armoury — ranging from diplomatic
relations, through increasing cultural contact and
economic support, to less respectable activities.4
Over the decade, as the Menzies Government
employed the Colombo Plan to fight in the Cold War,
Casey tested the political and moral limits of Australia’s aid
program.
By the mid-1950s, Australia’s Cold War objectives in
South–East Asia were to support friendly and stable anti-
communist governments, improve economic development,
exchange security intelligence with friendly nations, build
strategic alliances with the United States, and improve
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cultural and diplomatic relations with Asia. In the longer
term, the Government initiated a more nebulous campaign
to convince Asia’s political elites, and the population
at large, that communism was not in their interests.5
Exploratory discussions about Cold War activities took
place in December 1954 when an inter-departmental
committee met to consider the development of a coordinated
Western approach to Cold War planning.6 The committee
concluded that a tightly-defined Cold War plan was
essential and that it was important for a single department
to be made responsible for Australia’s effort.7 On 7 January
1955, Cabinet approved Casey’s submission that he, and
his department, should assume full responsibility for
coordinating Australia’s Cold War planning.8
The Colombo Plan appeared to be an easy and
relatively inexpensive way to solidify political and military
support in an unstable regional context, in conjunction
with the Western alliance. While responding to a defence
appreciation, which concluded that overt military conflict
in South and South–East Asia was unlikely, Casey told
Cabinet that non-military measures were likely to assume
greater prominence and yield more success than
conventional military strategies. He warned that the
political situation to the north remained no less grave in
the light of the reassessment. Emphasising the point, Casey
argued that Australia’s direct interest in the outcome of the
Cold War was ‘greater than that of any other non-Asian
power’. To meet the new situation, Australia needed to
exchange information with other Western powers, provide
technical assistance to local security forces, produce
propaganda and information to counter communist activity,
promote democratic and pro-Western values, and eliminate
communist influence in schools, trade unions, youth
organisations, and other political, cultural, and religious
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organisations. Foreign aid emerged as one of the few
measures which could be applied to such a diffuse and
difficult task. The challenge to incorporate the Colombo
Plan into a sophisticated propaganda strategy clearly
excited Casey, who demanded that ‘we must be prepared to
pursue policies in the Cold War with no less energy than is
required for the preparedness of our armed forces’.9
The nature of the work probably took Casey back to
his time as a deception planner during the Second World
War. Days after Cabinet had approved his control of Cold
War planning, Casey wrote to Arthur Tange, Secretary of
the Department of External Affairs (DEA), about the need
to enhance Australia’s Cold War effort. ‘The whole of this
business of anti-subversive work is almost a virgin field’, he
enthused. ‘It has fascinating possibilities for the exercise of
imagination. We must organise discussion groups of selected
individuals to meet periodically — men likely to strike fire
from uninhibited discussion with each other’. While Casey
restated the central importance of foreign aid to Cold War
strategy, he cautioned Tange that the ‘ordinary accepted
aims’ of the Colombo Plan might have to be ‘stretched’ to
accommodate the new campaign.10
Casey was eager to supplement the growing pool of
talent working for the DEA, in order to facilitate these
‘uninhibited discussions’. In January 1955, he mentioned to
Tange the possibility of seconding John Hood to Canberra
to lead a section devoted to Cold War activities. Hood had
developed a reputation as a diligent and reflective political
analyst during the war while working as an adviser to
Colonel W.R. Hodgson (Secretary of the DEA between
1935 and 1945), and then as External Affairs Officer in
London. Hood’s pen, according to Casey, was ‘his sharpest
and most effective tool’,11 making him highly suitable as a
‘senior back room thinking boy’.12 Casey’s praise was more
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than an idle comment, because three days later Tange
recalled Hood from Bonn for six months’ work in Canberra.
On his way to Australia, he discussed Cold War planning
with the British Foreign Office, before meeting Casey in
Bangkok for the Manila Treaty Conference.13
The establishment of Australia’s Cold War campaign
was, of course, secretive and sensitive. However, the
Australian press soon became aware of Hood’s appointment
as director of the ‘psychological warfare campaign’.14 While
visiting London, Tange, realising what was at stake, sent a
sharp directive to Acting Secretary James Plimsoll and the
Minister:
I strongly believe, while it may be inevitable and
even desirable that some of our proposals be publicly
discussed, we shall make ourselves suspect all over
Asia if these activities are described as ‘Cold War’
exercises … In any case we will be embarrassed by
persistent enquires from other Governments if there
is too much public talk of Hood’s functions in the
Department and I want public explanations kept to
an absolute minimum.15
Australia’s growing propaganda and security interests
in South–East Asia were bringing the DEA and Casey into
much closer relations with defence and intelligence
strategists. Casey’s diaries and correspondence reveal his
consuming interest in developing a propaganda machine.
The warm and intimate tone of Casey’s letters to Alfred
Brookes, the first director of the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service (ASIS), was a departure from his
characteristic formality. The large number of letters they
exchanged suggests that they had a series of discussions and
meetings about subversive techniques to counter the
infiltration of the police, armed forces, government
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departments, and the priesthood. In one letter to Brookes,
Casey remarked that, given the ‘insidious methods’
deployed by the communists, he felt obligated to do his
utmost to expose publicly these underhanded tactics. Casey
then asked Brookes for his opinion on the idea of creating a
‘corps of whisperers’ working in South–East Asia.16 This
intriguing mention of a team of spies was followed up a year
later with a cryptic diary entry. Casey wrote that the
propaganda campaign was all about ‘helping the goodies
and unhelping the baddies [and] helping the local
governments on the security side and inspiring people to
say the right things’.17 Was this a reference to the ‘corps of
whisperers’ Casey hoped to have roving the halls of Asia’s
political institutions?
The apparent scientific and technological superiority
of the Soviet Union — which culminated in the launch of
Sputnik on 4 October 1957 and the beginning of the missile
age — hardened Australia’s commitment to covertly
fighting the Cold War with foreign aid. Competition for
political and economic control would now extend rapidly
into the realms of science, technology, economic and social
development, and propaganda. And perhaps, thought
Western political leaders, the increasingly restive and
assertive leaders of Asia would be convinced that the future
lay with the Soviet model of economic planning. Away from
the traditional front line of Cold War confrontation in
Europe, Australian posts across Asia carefully reported the
development of relations with the communist bloc. The
High Commission in Ceylon, for example, reported to
Canberra as early as September 1956 on an agreement
signed between Russia and the Ceylonese that included
plans for diplomatic representation, trade cooperation, and a
tour by educationalists and a troupe of ‘ballerinas [who were
to] visit a large number of schools, attend cultural shows,
A Shoe-horn for our Interests 131
and hold conferences with teachers’ unions’.18 Later, the
ubiquitous ‘Skoda’ trademark was registered in Ceylon to
cover vehicles, machinery, and metallurgical products.19
The Australian High Commission remained optimistic that
Ceylon’s lack of traditional markets in the communist bloc
would prevent it from becoming dependent on them for
vital commodities; it subsequently reported in 1958 that
there had been little impact on either Australian or British
trade relations.20
Likewise, the British Foreign Office grew wary of the
new situation emerging in South Asia. Although the
official political assessments were notably calm, British
officials recommended that aid donors place greater
emphasis on propaganda and give the Colombo Plan
Information Unit a more prominent role. The Russians
aimed at ‘extending their prestige and influence in
South–East Asia through various offers of economic
assistance’, one Foreign Office official wrote. Their aid
initiatives might have been small, but ‘comparisons apart, it
is still a significant amount, and there is no doubt that the
Russian economy is wealthy enough to provide it … [and]
we may be certain that Soviet propaganda … will make the
most of it’.21 The ‘promise of Russian aid’ spurred Casey to
boost the profile of Australia’s Colombo Plan programs. In
addition to the likes of Brookes, Hood, and Galvin, Casey
liaised regularly with Senator (and future Prime Minister)
John Gorton and Brigadier Dudley-Clark, head deception
planner for the United Kingdom in the Middle East during
the Second World War. At Casey’s request, Dudley-Clark
submitted a detailed report on propaganda strategies
Australia might consider implementing.22 Among the
extensive proposals, use of the Colombo Plan as part of a
‘bolder approach to the whole matter of advertising
Australia to other countries’ featured prominently.23 The
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report also included a section on ‘influencing the
Australian mind’ in relation to South–East Asia. Casey
immediately wrote to Tange recommending that the DEA
restructure the Colombo Plan. ‘We should drag our feet on
the economic aid side and speed up the technical assistance
side’, he wrote. ‘The latter is the side that has inherently
vastly more publicity potential, which we must exploit’.24
One person Casey hoped would push the intellectual
boundaries of the DEA’s propaganda strategy was the multi-
talented John Galvin. A journalist by training, Galvin
joined the British Special Operations Executive in Hong
Kong during the Second World War. Casey knew him to be
a difficult character, but was convinced of his
‘genius’.25After making his fortune by purchasing Malayan
tin mines immediately after the Japanese surrender, Galvin
moved to San Francisco where he occasionally associated
with the Australian Consul-General, Stewart Jamieson.26
Casey wrote to Laurence R. McIntyre, Senior External
Affairs Representative in London, about the elusive
Galvin:
With the Cold War hotting up in South East Asia,
Galvin might well be of use to us. He’s an
imaginative fellow — and not obsessed with too
many scruples — and I’d expect that he knows a
good many people of S.E. Asia. If I were ‘by
chance’ to run across him again, it might well be
that we could, between us, evolve some means of
his being useful to us, possibly in unorthodox
ways.27
In fact, the CIA became interested in using Galvin
as part of a covert weapons shipping operation to Indonesia,
but decided against him because of his unpredictable and
flamboyant nature. It is not clear whether Galvin ever
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became a member of Casey’s Cold War team, although it
seems unlikely. He was last reported to have fled America
for Ireland in the late-1950s, closely pursued by the US
Inland Revenue Service.28
Other members of the Commonwealth Public
Service shared Casey’s interest in fighting the Cold War in
Asia through propaganda and development projects. He
diligently and enthusiastically recruited these individuals
during his time as minister. The result was a diverse
collection of people who came together to generate ideas
about how to engage with Asia, both in a defensive sense
with propaganda, and in a more progressive way through
cultural and educational links. This counters the myth that
Casey was a lone advocate of engagement with the region.
Certainly, Casey did have trouble persuading his Cabinet
colleagues of the importance of his work, but he had the
support of a dedicated department which, under Tange,
pursued a dynamic and forthright development of
South–East Asian foreign policy. Although the DEA was
responsible for the overall coordination of Australian Cold
War planning, ideas and strategies were drawn from a range
of people and departments. Key members of the Cold War
activities committee — which later became the Overseas
Planning Committee (OPC) — included Tange, John
Hood, A. Griffith, James Plimsoll, Charles Kevin, Malcolm
Booker, and William Landale. The members from outside
the DEA were Allen Stanley Brown (Secretary of the
Prime Minister’s Department), R.J. Randall (Treasury),
Brookes and R. Ellis29 (ASIS), Arthur Noel Finlay (ABC),
Kevin Murphy (ANIB) and A.P. Fleming (Defence). Other
DEA staff who contributed much to the development of
ideas generated at these committee meetings included John
Quinn, David McNicol, John E. Oldham, John Davis, and
the future director of ASIS, Ralph Harry.
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The OPC devised a basic set of principles to guide
Australia’s information activities in South–East Asia. The
critical aspects of the policy can be summarised in three
general points. First, Australia was to be depicted as being
in the early stages of development and thus sharing many
Asian developmental problems. Second, Australia was not
a great power and should not be feared; ‘on the contrary the
existence of a stable neighbour such as Australia should be
a source of reassurance’. Third, propaganda was expected to
emphasise the ways in which Australia’s economic stability
benefited the entire region — ‘cooperation was advantageous
to all’.30
In order to achieve these goals, Australia’s Cold War
planners argued that propaganda activity needed to address
specific problems faced by Asians, in a manner that was not
overly theoretical or didactic. They hoped to counter
communism by focusing on people’s daily concerns and
promoting the material benefits of democratic institutions,
rather than by relying merely on negative scaremongering.
Paradoxically, the OPC was wary of promoting democracy
too forcefully, as this might offend undemocratic — but
nevertheless anti-communist — governments, upon which
Australia depended to resist the red menace. Policy-makers
determined that Australia should support a stable, but
undemocratic government in the absence of a viable
alternative, lest a dangerous political vacuum be created.
Australian influence would be best achieved by emphasising
the virtues of Australia’s advanced social, industrial, and
administrative infrastructure and by educating Asians about
how they could achieve this level of development. The
final, but by no means least significant, goal was to convince
Asians that Australia’s immigration policy did not imply any
animosity towards Asians.31
The committee was keenly aware that the United
States and the United Kingdom were spending considerable
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sums on propaganda. Australia’s much smaller financial
capacity heightened the DEA’s sense that a carefully
targeted program would have to be initiated to avoid merely
being lost in the flood of Western propaganda already
testing the ‘digestive capacity of the area’.32 With some
success, Casey and his department appointed diplomatic
personnel who ensured that stories about Australia (many
involving Colombo Plan projects) were distributed to local
media.33 In September 1956, a distressed British Embassy
staffer in Rangoon, P.H. Gore Booth, wrote to the Foreign
Office about the lack of publicity for British Colombo Plan
projects. He lamented that he never heard about British
endeavours but saw that the Australian and New Zealand
programs received ‘constant publicity’ in local Burmese and
English papers. Gore Booth even claimed that ministers
and politicians invariably spoke as if ‘Australia and New
Zealand were alone running the Colombo Plan’. He ended
his letter with a plea: ‘I really do hope that you will be able
to find some solution. But bluntly, the Australian and New
Zealand effort, particularly in regard to photographs, makes
us look like a lot of bungling amateurs’.34 Evidently,
diplomatic staff had heeded Casey’s drive to extract every
ounce of publicity from Colombo Plan projects, at least in
Burma. That such publicity was making an impression at
the highest level would have pleased Casey greatly.
From the DEA’s point of view, the more people who
came into direct contact with Australian aid projects the
better. Indeed, the DEA cited this as one of the major
reasons for supplying 100 diesel buses to Indonesia: ‘they
would be an especially tangible form of aid which would
bring the Colombo Plan to the attention of the mass of the
inhabitants of Djakarta’.35 To remove all confusion about
the origin of the buses, a hand-sized plate with a map of
Australia was fixed at eye-level near the front entrance.
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Visibly branding Australian projects became an important
feature of the Colombo Plan. Just as donated equipment
came well-labelled, by the mid-1960s students, too, were
encouraged to display their Colombo Plan credentials with
a special badge, lapel pin, or broach made of an ‘antique
silver’ alloy, which the designers promised would never
tarnish in tropical conditions.36
The effectiveness of Australian-sponsored aid
projects affected their value as propaganda. Conversely, the
overwhelming emphasis on shallow publicity had a direct
bearing on the long-term benefits generated by the
Colombo Plan. Western aid donors quickly learnt how
fickle aid recipients could be and just how tenuous attempts
to instigate a deep ideological shift with foreign assistance
could be. In 1954, the British reported from Afghanistan
(which joined the Consultative Committee in 1963) that
Soviet propaganda conducted by the technical experts sent
to carry out the development project meant that ‘the
Afghan population as a whole tends to become pro-Soviet
in direct response and proportion to the material benefits
which it receives’. However, the Afghan government’s
staunch non-alignment policy ensured that Western
attempts to match or compete with Soviet programs would
see the acceptance of a Soviet overture in order to maintain
an appropriate balance. This frustrating commitment to
neutralism meant that the government of Afghanistan will
‘never be won over to the spirit of Western cooperative
effort or allow that spirit to effect [sic] their political
attitude. They can, in short, be politically bought but not
politically converted’.37
The DEA’s ideas about propaganda exposed their
assumptions about Asian people and their political
institutions. A common theme in the department’s
thinking was that Asian political structures seemed to
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possess a natural tendency towards authoritarianism and
corruption. Moreover, it was believed that ordinary citizens
passively accepted these flaws as an intrinsic part of the
political and cultural landscape. As one OPC paper
suggested: ‘A certain amount of despotism seems
unavoidable in some Asian countries and is often taken as a
matter of course by the population. Where we have to work
with and through despotic government, there is nothing
much we can do about it anyway’.39 Some members of the
department, such as Counsellor John Oldham, head of
Information Branch, posited theories about the changes
occurring in Asia, despite having almost no experience of
Asians. Asians, he claimed, were more susceptible to
propaganda because they endured poverty, feudalism, and
anti-colonialist rhetoric and, generally, suffered from a ‘lack
of experience of genuine freedom and responsible
government’.39 But Oldham was hopeful, sensing a
movement in Asian philosophy away from fatalism towards
a belief in development and progress through social and
political change.
Clearly, increasing aid to Asia did not necessarily
correspond to a more detailed understanding of decolonisation
and the complex interplay between nationalism, communism,
and post-colonial power struggles. In fact, political rhetoric
about the transformative power of foreign aid tended to
reinforce the simplistic, yet powerful, idea that poverty
acted as a seedbed for communism, and that liberal
democracy was inseparable from economic individualism.
While such theories were deeply seductive, a more
moderate and complex interpretation was available to the
government. Four years after his ‘Goodwill Tour’ of Asia in
1948, Melbourne academic Macmahon Ball published
Nationalism and Communism in East Asia, one of the first
attempts to comprehend the political, social, and economic
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aftermath of decolonisation in Asia from a Western
perspective. While he thought it important for Western
democracies to win the support of non-communist Asia, he
argued that the current strategy was destined to fail. He
warned against heavy-handed military solutions, stressed
the dangers of assuming that ‘Western ways have universal
appeal’, and criticised Western policy-makers’ view of the
talismanic role of science and technology. By explaining
that there was ‘no simple correlation between poverty and
Communism’, Macmahon Ball undermined the foundations
of the Western aid policy. He feared that if economic aid
merely increased national income with no regard for its
equitable distribution, productivity increases were likely to
exacerbate social disintegration rather than reduce it —
except, of course, in the case of technical and scientific
training.40
The OPC agreed. They reasoned that the Colombo
Plan and other ‘do-good schemes’ may have been able to
improve living standards generally, but they had a tendency
to ‘make the rich richer’, thereby exacerbating social and
political tensions.41 Such interpretations, however, did not
lead to a reassessment of the effectiveness of the aid
program itself and the welfare programs in place in Asian
countries. Instead, they lent support to arguments for covert
strategies to deal with communist activity, strategies that
would supposedly take effect more quickly than the long-
term development projects, the impact of which was less
tangible. 
Shortly after the inception of the Colombo Plan,
Australian diplomatic posts throughout Asia received
requests to train local personnel in police and security
methods. Spender had made it clear to Cabinet in 1951
that, ‘short of armed force’, improving the efficiency of
police administration in the region was the only means of
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securing stable democratic governments. The Thai police
department was the first to request assistance, in October
1951, followed by Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon.42 In
September 1953, Pakistani officials approached the
Australian High Commission in Karachi about the
possibility of police officers undertaking further training in
Australia. DEA staff explained to Casey that, provided
instruction was restricted to criminal investigation methods
and did not extend to ASIO or special branch training, the
requests could be funded under the technical assistance
program because the civil police organisation was a
component of the public administration infrastructure.43
Plimsoll, as Acting Secretary, wrote to Alan Watt, former
Secretary of the DEA and now the Australian
Commissioner in Singapore, about the possibility of police
and military training for Burmese officers. Among other
matters, Plimsoll briefed him on talks with the UK and US
delegations and emphasised that officers should not portray
police and military training ‘as Cold War activities’.
However, his qualifying remarks are significant:
the broad objective of the Colombo Plan is to
combat communism, [and] we have been careful
in the past to keep our contributions quite apart
from politics. With regard to military training, it
seems essential that the Burmese should not be
given the impression that we regard this as an anti-
communist move as they might then consider it an
infringement of their neutrality and even
reconsider their use of Australian facilities.44
In 1955, Casey breached the distinction between
public administration training and covert counter-propaganda
training, further politicising the Colombo Plan. He met with
Charles Spry, Director General of ASIO, and asked him to
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train a small group of English-speaking Thai police in 
anti-subversive techniques — training that would ostensibly
be financed under the Colombo Plan budget.45 By October
1955, training was well underway and state police
departments expressed a willingness to participate in a much
larger program. The DEA then asked Manila Treaty countries
whether they needed further assistance in this field.46 Spry
immediately indicated that ASIO, pending available funding,
would organise two courses a year for Asian intelligence
officers in counter-subversion techniques.47 A complete
record of the number who undertook these courses does not
exist, but there is direct evidence of security training of Asian
officials taking place in Australia.48 One notable trainee was
Tran Van Khiem, ex–press secretary to the President of
Vietnam, who completed four months of training in the
period 1955–56 with ASIO and the Victorian and NSW
police on a Colombo Plan scholarship. He was trained in
security methods that he hoped would provide him with the
skills to ‘cope with the terrorist war in Saigon’.49
Some members of the DEA and ASIO expressed
doubts about the practicality of security training and were
inclined to refer such requests to UK Special Branch
divisions, which had begun advanced courses in counter-
espionage in Malaya and Singapore during the mid-1950s.
Spry also raised concerns about the ‘language problem’ and
the embarrassing ignominy of providing training to
potentially hostile countries. The DEA dismissed such
reservations because they had the potential to undermine
the entire basis of Colombo Plan training. As Max Loveday,
acting head of the Defence Liaison Branch, suggested: ‘If we
follow Spry’s reasoning we should consider cancelling other
Colombo Plan offers — because I don’t think the security
training courses [are] much different from, say, an
engineering course if we are considering the dangers of
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training potential enemies’.50 The number of Colombo
Plan police trainees rose substantially after 1956, to over
100 by 1965.51 The figures, however, do not distinguish
between the types of courses undertaken. Of course, given
the politically sensitive nature of the training, it is
debatable whether these courses would appear in official
statistical sources.
As the likelihood of a direct military assault in the
region receded, the need to address subversive disruption
emerged as a higher priority for the Menzies administration.
Talk of a protracted ‘psychological war’ became common-
place, both inside and outside government circles.52 Police
training was deemed an appropriate way to combat
attempts to overthrow government institutions, but such
training had little impact on the attitudes and opinions of
local citizens, academics and community leaders. Despite
Loveday’s assurances, police training was risky, likely to
prove counter-productive and diplomatically embarrassing
should a government change (or be overthrown) and the
allegiance of the police force shift to support a political
structure unfriendly — even hostile — to Australia and the
West. The DEA spent considerable time developing means
by which it could bypass the government and appeal
directly to the people. Radio was the medium which
captured the Department’s imagination.
Australia’s overseas broadcasting service, Radio
Australia, began operating in 1939, its mission to explain
Australian and British policies to people in Asia and the
Pacific. John Oldham and others in the DEA proposed that
Australian propaganda disseminated to the region move
beyond negative, anti-communist rhetoric.53 He believed
that the most effective means of increasing awareness of the
‘Australian point of view’ was an objective and factual
presentation of current affairs. The United States Far
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Eastern Bureau told Oldham that, in the face of a pervasive
anti-American sentiment, Australia was more likely to
succeed in promoting a pro-Western viewpoint to Asians.
Radio Australia had already proved successful, particularly
in Indonesia, and its content and transmission range
warranted expansion. The OPC also expected that a
sophisticated broadcasting infrastructure, both in Australia
and throughout Asia, would yield strategic benefits should
war actually break out.54 Late in 1954, Oldham suggested
that an ambiguously worded May 1950 Cabinet directive,
which conferred discretionary control of Radio Australia
broadcasts on the editor, be amended to bring information
services under direct DEA control. He believed this would
‘increase the technical efficiency of Radio Australia and …
make the programme material more effective in countering
Communist propaganda and subversion in Asia’. Funding
would also be required to bolster ailing infrastructure that
was still using equipment assembled in 1945. The network,
consisting of one 50-kilowatt transmitter and two 100-
kilowatt transmitters in Shepparton and a 10-kilowatt in
Lyndhurst (both in Victoria), was especially vulnerable to
jamming by powerful communist radio waves. The
Department of Defence was particularly concerned because
there was no reserve power to cope with breakdowns, as the
system was operating at maximum capacity. Australia would
need to build a relay station in New Guinea in order to
maintain the clarity and reach of the broadcasts.55
Earlier, in May 1950, Spender had written to the
Chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Commission,
Richard Boyer, informing him that it was crucial that
‘Radio Australia be looked at as an instrument of foreign
policy’.56 Throughout the decade, the DEA demonstrated
its determination to exercise a stronger influence over the
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content of Radio Australia broadcasts. In 1955, Casey
escalated the campaign to take control. Predictably, his
argument to Cabinet emphasised the importance of radio
‘from a political warfare point of view’, in addition to its
ability to establish and maintain a political and cultural
dialogue with the region.57 In a letter to Tange, he outlined
his strategy:
we will need to clear our own minds as to where
we want to go and the extent to which Radio
Australia broadcasts are to be extended, and the
extent to which we would propose to increase their
political content — and how this political content
is to be compiled and canalised into the Radio
Australia machine. Maybe we will have to seek
direct control in respect of material to constitute
the political content of Radio Australia broadcasts.
In other words, we may have to bring it about that
External Affairs and not Radio Australia
determines what goes into these broadcasts on the
non-entertainment side.58
Radio Australia’s struggle for autonomy and editorial
independence is not the focus of this chapter. Suffice to say
that the organisation did not yield easily to the persistent
attempts by the DEA to influence content and
presentation. However, from August 1955, Radio Australia
based its news commentaries on material provided by the
DEA, which ensured that relations between the two
organisations continued to be antagonistic.59
The decision to use radio as the principal instrument
to provide information to Asia brought the Colombo Plan
to the forefront of attempts to forge political and cultural
links between Australia and Asia. While attending a
meeting with the United States Information Agency
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(responsible for Voice of America’s international broadcasts),
Percy Spender suggested that the fundamental objectives of
Voice of America broadcasts were the same as Radio
Australia’s, and he envisaged a much closer relationship
between the two agencies. Casey proudly told officials of
Australia’s effort to distribute short-wave and medium-wave
radios to village leaders and teachers throughout Asia.60
Speed was the key. In early March 1955, the DEA enlisted
E.S. Heffer, a radio engineer for Amalgamated Wireless
Australasia, to conduct a six-week technical survey of the
capacity of Indo-China and Thailand to use and maintain
portable radio receivers. The department envisaged that
around 1,000 sets would be distributed across the area, with
South Vietnam as the highest priority.61 At the request of
the South Vietnamese Minister for Defence, Australia used
Colombo Plan funds to supply military units with petrol-
driven generators for use in wireless transmission.62 The
example of Vietnam reflected a wider trend towards
promoting the use of radio in Asia. By the mid-1960s
around 6.5 per cent of Australia’s Colombo Plan allocations
for capital aid was being spent on radio equipment, having
risen from just 2 per cent in the 1950s.63
The Australian Embassy in Djakarta expressed
concern about the effect the expansion of Radio Australia
might have on the Colombo Plan. They warned that,
without seeking the active participation of the recipient
country in the development of radio programs, ‘the
Indonesians may come to dislike it [thus] affecting the
attitude towards the Colombo Plan generally’. Second
Secretary Wilfred Vawdrey doubted if any demand for
instructional radio existed among the populace.
Indonesians, he wrote, seem ‘to have little interest in
anything but musical programmes and perhaps the news’.
As for English lessons, they were already available through
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Radio Indonesia and the BBC, and ‘the family circle is
probably not going to take kindly to talk on tractor
maintenance in place of “listener’s choice”’.64 Vawdrey also
added that, in any case, a successful teaching program
needed trained staff with specialist knowledge about the
cultural particulars of each region: ‘Surely this would prove
a costly undertaking’, he surmised. Had the need to get
something off the ground not been so pressing, such
concerns may well have received a sympathetic response.
But, with reports flowing back to Canberra warning of the
pervasive impact of the communists’ propaganda and the
effect of the ‘Communist radio technique’, Australia had to
join the fray with whatever resources it could muster.65 By
September 1955, Indonesian broadcasts had been increased
from one to two hours daily, Thai broadcasts from one hour
a week to one hour per day, and the hour of Mandarin was
due to become two hours daily. Response was positive with
almost 3,000 letters, presumably complimentary, received
from Indonesian listeners between March and September
1955. In November, over 800 were received. Desperate for
any indication of the impact of radio broadcasts, the DEA,
on analysing these letters, concluded that the programs
were reaching a ‘fairly intelligent audience’.66 Travellers to
Asia were also aware of Radio Australia’s credibility and
integrity, characteristics not afforded as readily to Voice of
America. Other letters indicated that listeners considered
Radio Australia more friendly and cheerful than the BBC.67
For Casey, the English language was more than a
means of communication. It connoted modernity, progress,
and civilisation: concepts which he considered essential to
establishing and maintaining a pro-Western relationship
with Asia. As Casey told Brookes, English was a
fundamental political and psychological tool, ‘a weapon in
our hands’. Other forms of media occupied Casey’s thoughts
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during the OPC meetings. Writing to Brookes, months
after Oldham had first suggested the idea of employing
Colombo Plan monies to bolster South–East Asian
newspapers with anti-communist predilections, Casey
posed the question: ‘Might it not kill at least two birds with
one stone if we were to offer to take some free-Asian
journalists for attachment and training with selected
newspapers in Australia?’ The two birds that Casey referred
to were the twin desires, to make Australians more aware of
their Asian neighbours and to expose Asians to the virtues
of Australia’s free press. The results were another publicity
triumph for Casey. After a team of Indian editors toured
Australia in 1957, Peter Heydon, Australia’s High
Commissioner in New Delhi, rejoiced when he reported to
Canberra that on their return to India they wrote
enthusiastically about ‘the hard-working character of
Australians generally and our egalitarianism’.68
One of the English-language ‘weapons’ Casey had in
mind was Hemisphere, a monthly journal published from
March 1957.69 Designed specifically to influence the
growing Asian student body, the publicly-stated objective
of the magazine was to provide a positive and engaging
example of the ‘tolerant, thoughtful and sceptical spirit of
democracy and liberalism’ to be found in Australia.
However, Hemisphere was ‘not designed for publicity in the
ordinary sense’ despite its obvious suitability for such a
purpose.70 John Hood described the magazine as a ‘natural
and effective cover for contact and penetration among
Asian students’, fulfilling its ‘covert objective of enabling
contact to be made with these students in order to
influence them for anti-communist ends’. A suppressed
copy of the same committee report disclosed that in
addition to its overt purpose of publicising Australian life
and conditions and promoting friendly relations with
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South–East Asia, ‘the magazine will serve as cover to
M.O.9. [codeword for ASIS] in making special contact with
Asian students in Australia and also as a link in anti-
communist penetration in countries of South and
South–East Asia’.71
With the magazine produced jointly by the DEA and
the Commonwealth Office of Education (COE), the use of
Colombo Plan funds to finance it forced the government to
take particular care ‘not to raise any suspicions of propaganda
motives’.72 The emergence of other magazines on
Asian–Australian affairs also impelled Hemisphere’s editors to
produce a high-quality and visually appealing journal, lest the
government be left with a publication which looked ‘second
rate by comparison’.73 With regard to language, the DEA
asked the COE to consider revising the ‘preview’ issue to
remove words potentially offensive to Asians, such as
‘Chinamen’, ‘sinister little Japanese’, and ‘rickshaw coolies’.
Ironically, by adhering to such high standards, Australian
representatives in Asia reported that Hemisphere’s expensive
and glossy appearance, which made the magazine so popular,
caused some Asians to query its apparent editorial
independence. They advised that the inclusion of more
controversial material might allay some of these misgivings.74
Nevertheless, circulation rose quickly from around 3,000 in
1959 to around 15,000 in 1967, half of which went to Asia.75
Government officials even approached Trans-Australian
Airlines (TAA) and Ansett Australian National Airlines
(AANA) about the possibility of placing Hemisphere on
domestic flights as the in-flight magazine. The airlines
declined, ‘not because Hemisphere was propaganda … just that
the policy of the airline was to avoid anything which might be
regarded as “political”’.76
During the mid- to late-1950s, there was a general
feeling among DEA officers — no doubt influenced by
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Casey — that Australia was too passive in its approach to
cultural relations. In 1953, the High Commissioner to
Pakistan, Raymond Watt, wrote to Casey about the ‘urgent
need to make Australians more Asia-minded’ and suggested
that the Colombo Plan needed to transcend its focus on
economic and technical progress ‘when on the cultural
level so much extra could be done, at so little cost, to
promote better relations’. Inevitably short of finance, Casey
encouraged non-government and non-political groups, such
as the Australian–Asian Association, to remedy the
cultural malaise.77
Building cultural links with Asia saw Casey attempt to
establish a subsidy program for selected works of Australian
literature to be sold in Asia. The scheme was intended to
compete with a similar program initiated by the Soviet and
Chinese governments.78 The books also formed an important
part of Casey’s plan to educate Asian readers and ‘remove
misconceptions about Australia and Australian policies’.79
Casey approached the managers of Angus & Robertson and
Penguin Books, who both agreed to create a series of
Australian texts, selected by the DEA, to be sold well below
the normal price of books available in Asian countries. A
staggering 10,000 copies of each of the following titles were
planned to be distributed to Colombo Plan countries: Ernest
Titterton’s Atomic energy, Vladimir Petrov’s Empire of fear,
Francis Ratcliffe’s Flying fox and Drifting sand: the adventures of
a biologist in Australia, and Douglas Mawson’s Home of the
blizzard.80 Despite widespread enthusiasm for the idea and
the allocation of £A8,000, the DEA abandoned the Cheap
Books subsidy program after more than ten years of discussion
because no one could agree on which titles should be
included.81 However, throughout the decade, the Australian
government sent substantial numbers of books as gifts under
the Colombo Plan to universities and libraries across Asia.
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Casey had a strong sense of the images of Australian
life he wanted to promote to Asian audiences. Indeed, in
his quietly egotistical way, Casey, according to his private
secretary Harold Marshall, was particularly pleased with the
content and title of his own book, Friends and neighbours:
Australia and the world, destined for Asia under a US subsidy
program.82 But, in general, he placed considerable
importance on distinguishing Australia from the United
States, at a time when he felt it was difficult to express a
solely Australian viewpoint in world affairs. It was vital,
Casey thought, to establish a regional identity that was
independent and non-threatening, an identity that would
not attract the ire of an increasingly assertive Asia:
The kinds of themes I have in mind would include
the absence of racial prejudice in Australia, the
idea of Australia as a waterless land unsuitable for
mass settlement, Australia’s past and continuing
pioneering efforts — the absence of that decadence
attributed to capitalist societies in communist
propaganda, our progressive social reforms and the
egalitarian nature of Australian society, our
request [sic] for human and spiritual rights without
the extreme materialism of either Communism or
American individualism, the primitive nature of
our aborigines and of the New Guinea peoples,
and even the beneficial aspects of colonial
regimes.83
It is interesting that Casey positioned Australian
society between the Cold War power blocs and the values
they appeared to represent. Australia’s strength lay in the
fact that it was not a major colonial power, but the
successful product of a colonial regime serving as a model to
the region. There is something else of note in Casey’s
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musings about creating meaningful links with Asians. In a
1956 submission to Cabinet, Casey argued that Australia
was different from other Western countries, not just in
terms of its location and former dominion status, but in
having something to offer Asia, materially and culturally.
He wrote that a concerted effort was needed to convince
Asians that Australia was not ‘an outpost of an alien
culture, antipathetic towards coloured races’. A change
from reactor to actor is evident — it was Australia’s
responsibility to initiate a more positive and meaningful
relationship.84 It was not surprising that the re-orientation
suggested by Casey’s words was slight. While this was a long
way from an endorsement of racial and cultural pluralism,
such a comment suggests a re-conceptualising, if an
equivocal one, of Australia’s regional identity and was
perhaps indicative of the beginnings of a deeper cultural
shift.
Casey’s faith in the broader cultural impact of the
Colombo Plan extended to the domestic arena. Always
searching for avenues to muster support for the program and
maintain dialogue between Asians and Australians, Casey
mooted the idea of inviting members of the public to
subscribe to the plan on a ‘pound for pound’ basis with the
government. He believed this had the potential to
capitalise on the ‘considerable public consciousness of the
value of the Colombo Plan … and give people an
opportunity to express themselves in a practical way’. Casey
also proposed that particular Australian cities adopt a town
or city in one of the Colombo Plan nations and send money
or gifts.85 The DEA did not take up the idea.
Typically, educational aid proved to be the most
enduring way of binding many regional countries to
Australia. In 1957 the DEA expanded the South–East
Asian Scholarship Scheme to include Pacific and North
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Asian countries outside the Colombo Plan area. Like the
Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan
(SCAAP), which offered small numbers of scholarships to
African students, the tiny number of students funded under
the Australian Overseas Scholarship Scheme were
intended to connect Australia to as many non-Colombo
Plan countries as possible. In the case of Korea — which
did not join the Colombo Plan until 1962 — Australia was
particularly interested to broaden her international
contacts, compensate for Britain’s ‘lack of interest’ and vary
the ‘very full American diet with which Koreans are
served’.86 With characteristic impetuosity, Casey later toyed
with the idea of extending the program to Iraq.
Although not financed under the Colombo Plan, the
‘Asian Visits Fund’ was devised by the DEA with similar
objectives in mind. No doubt inspired by the American
‘International Visitor Program’ created under the 1948
Smith–Mundt Act as part of a plan to promote the United
States and foster mutual understanding, the modest Asian
Visits Fund aimed to build cultural relations between
Australia and Asia. Once again, a covert rationale appeared
mandatory, with the scheme ‘not established purely as a
goodwill measure or for cultural exchange, but as a means of
achieving definite objectives in the context of the Cold
War’. According to Cabinet records, Australia could lure
teachers, journalists, government members, trade unionists,
or broadcasters from the region with an invitation to
explore ‘some practical project in which the invitee is
interested. It would then be sought in the course of the visit
to indoctrinate him generally in relation to [the] Australian
way of life’. Conversely, tours by Australians would help
introduce Asians to influential and charismatic Australians,
in much the same way as the expert program. An annual
allocated sum of £A25,000 would fund the travels of around
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40 people. Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk — who happened
to possess a detailed knowledge of Australian tennis history
—requested that the ambassador organise a reputable
tennis coach to visit and train young Cambodian players.
Good manners were vital, the DEA determined. The
department deemed Jack Hopman (brother of Harry
Hopman) an appropriately ‘conscientious and good-living
man’ and he later took the four-month job under the
auspices of the Asian Visits Fund. By 1964, 377 Asians,
Africans and Pacific Islanders had travelled to Australia
under the program and 119 Australians had visited South
and South–East Asia.87
Cultural exchanges, such as through sport, also had
definite, if somewhat ill-defined, strategic benefits. Alex
Borthwick, First Secretary to the Australia High
Commission in Singapore, proposed the funding of
sportsmen to travel and coach in Asia. He suggested that
Australia pay men such as track-and-field athlete John
Landy, swimmer Harry Nightingdale, and tennis champion
Frank Sedgeman to coach young athletes in Asia. (In fact,
Sedgeman had already played in Ceylon during the 1952
Colombo Exhibition staged to celebrate the beginning of
the Colombo Plan). Suggesting the Colombo Plan as a
source of funding, Borthwick wrote that he thought the
idea ‘not entirely bizarre’ and perhaps a valuable ‘exercise in
the Cold War’.88 Although he was not in the circle of men
Casey had inspired to ‘strike fire’ from uninhibited
discussion of Australia’s Cold War effort, Borthwick’s ideas
would have been a welcome addition to the department’s
thinking. Sport had greater mass appeal than the
performing arts or visiting politicians and it had little of the
stigma of aid ‘hand outs’. From the mid-1950s, the DEA
instructed Asian posts to distribute Australian sporting
magazines and newsletters and directed Radio Australia to
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give greater attention to sporting events. Later, Colombo
Plan finance was used towards the supply of sporting
equipment, the construction of sporting fields and arenas,
and physical education scholarships. Of course, Australian
officials were responding to communist endeavours to
cultivate relations with Asia. The Soviet Union established
sporting contacts and funded the construction of sporting
venues, thus reaping a ‘harvest of publicity’, according to
the DEA.89 Colin Moodie, High Commissioner in
Rangoon, suggested that Australia stood to gain a great deal
by organising athletes to visit the region:
Particularly in the fields of tennis, golf, swimming,
soccer and athletics, there is a considerable field for
making a mark on numbers of Burmans who will
be able to judge for themselves the bearing of the
visitors and their freedom to move and speak as
they wished compared with visitors they may
receive from the Communist group of countries.90
There is a sub-text to Moodie’s words. Contact with
Asia through sport was more than a chance to build rapport
with ordinary Asians; the mere presence of Australian
visitors was a subtle advertisement for Western values. Like
many others, Moodie thought that the athletes, through
their bearing and attitude, would exude the virtues of
freedom and democracy. However, the benefit was double-
edged, for not only did it involve Australians travelling and
making contact in Asia, the DEA saw it as a ‘means of
promoting awareness and … understanding of Asian
countries among Australians generally’.91
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Casey, counter-propaganda and 
Osmar White’s Colombo Plan tour
By the mid- to late-1950s, the Colombo Plan became a
useful tool for addressing a variety of defensive, political,
and cultural issues affecting Australia’s place in the region.
Casey’s influence over the direction and scope of the
program remained strong, but he had failed to build any
appreciable enthusiasm for the program in Cabinet.
Although he was respected, his weak performance in
Cabinet was symptomatic of a growing alienation from
political life. To some extent, this was self-imposed. Arthur
Tange recalled that Casey reinforced his isolation from
his department and his political colleagues by refusing
to base himself in Canberra, instead returning ‘home’ to
Melbourne each weekend.92 Now in his late-60s, he flagged
under the strain of the demanding portfolio. Even before
the Suez affair and a humiliating defeat in his bid for the
position of deputy leader of the Liberal Party, those close to
Casey noticed that he looked ‘worn and strained’, having
also developed a nervous, twitching eye.93 The Colombo
Plan became something of a crutch, a means of gaining
personal exposure while simultaneously promoting Asian
affairs to other bureaucrats and members of Cabinet.
Crocker, who knew Casey on a professional and personal
basis, observed that as Casey became ‘befogged’ by the
complexity of foreign relations ‘the more desperately he
[clung] to the Colombo Plan’, turning it into a ‘huge
advertising racket for himself’.94 Casey’s attachment to the
plan meant he saw any criticism of it as a personal attack,
despite his protestations. In July 1956, he complained to
Tange about the ‘considerable campaign against the
Colombo Plan and against me personally — that the
Sydney Truth and Mirror are conducting. Scarcely a week
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goes by without a virulent savage article. I don’t believe it is
important — but it goes on’.95
Publicity for the Colombo Plan occasionally
stimulated the community’s latent hostility towards foreign
aid. With Australia so visibly supporting Asians, it is not
surprising that Casey also received his share of racist hate-
mail demanding the end of the Colombo Plan and more.96
However, despite the generally positive and even-handed
treatment in the media, few Australians were aware of the
impact Australian funds were actually having on economic
and social progress in Asia. Development was, after all, the
bedrock of the simplified public rationale for the operation
of the aid scheme. Under pressure to bolster his own
position in Cabinet, Casey embarked on his most sustained
attempt to convince his political colleagues and the
public that the Colombo Plan was worthy of financial and
moral support.
In 1958, Casey and the DEA became increasingly
interested in discovering how effective Australian aid
projects were in fulfilling the objectives of the Colombo
Plan. A public debate about the use of Australian donations
under the plan helped force the government’s hand. In April
1958, R.E.G. Cunningham, a former employee of the
UN Food and Agricultural Organization, spoke to a
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and then
to the press. He criticised Colombo Plan projects in
Pakistan, claiming that he had seen Australian tractors
rusting in fields and that 100 sheep sent as part of a breeding
program had all died. The criticisms forced Casey to try to
minimise the damage. He rebutted the claims, stating that
there was a ‘degree of experimentation’ in such programs
and losses were to be expected. But he denied strongly the
suggestion that aid money was wasted or misappropriated.
Australia worked in ‘close consultation with the recipient
nations to ensure that equipment was of the right type’.
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Furthermore, Casey emphasised that Colombo Plan experts,
diplomats, and other officials reported regularly on the
effectiveness of Australian aid programs. Casey did receive
reports about the effectiveness of Colombo Plan aid, but on
a more sporadic and piecemeal basis than he acknowledged
publicly. Two months before this flare-up, David Hay,
Assistant Secretary of the DEA, had written to Casey
lamenting the excessively general nature of the assessment
of Australian Colombo Plan projects. Any accurate
assessment, he said, could ‘only be produced by an
experienced “inspector general” able to spend a year or so
travelling extensively in the area’.97 Hay’s idea lay dormant
in Casey’s mind until after the Cunningham incident. 
But Casey chose counter-propaganda over sponsoring
an objective assessment of Australian aid projects. In July
1958, he began searching for a ‘top line’ journalist who
would undertake a lengthy tour of the Colombo Plan region
and report to the Australian people. The DEA deliberately
looked outside government ranks for an independent spirit
— a man who could write ‘lively, intelligent articles’, and
more significantly, a man ‘who could not be regarded by his
fellows as writing material to order’. The man whom Casey
eventually commissioned was Herald and Weekly Times
reporter Osmar White. White had had a distinguished
career as a wartime correspondent in the Pacific and
Europe. In 1945 he published Green armour, an evocative
and influential account of the war in New Guinea and the
Americans’ battle for the Solomon Islands. His intimate
knowledge of the region and his clear support of the Allied
cause made Casey’s decision straightforward. In December
1958, White and Australian News and Information Bureau
(ANIB) photographer James Fitzpatrick (not to be confused
with the American film producer-writer-director of the
same name) left for Pakistan. Their brief was to gather
stories, photographs, and film on the impact and influence
A Shoe-horn for our Interests 157
of Australia’s Colombo Plan contributions. When they
returned in June 1959, they had visited 14 countries:
Pakistan, India, Nepal, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand,
Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo,
Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia.98
In addition to writing a series of news feature articles,
the two men were to produce a documentary film and an
illustrated information booklet. Although the DEA had
relied on the sporadic reports from Colombo Plan experts
and diplomatic dispatches for information on the effect of
foreign aid, the White tour was more an opportunity to
promote the virtue of Australian aid to Asia than a
systematic or comprehensive attempt to assess the impact of
Australian economic and technical assistance. Casey had
struggled throughout the 1950s to generate Cabinet interest
in the aid scheme. The decision to send these two men was
part of Casey’s strategy to garner popular interest and
support for the Colombo Plan. The DEA also hoped to
enhance awareness and appreciation of Australian aid
among recipient nations.99
Before the DEA officially commissioned White for
the job, Casey summoned him to Canberra to discuss the
objectives of the exercise and, it would seem, to question
him about his political beliefs. Later, White wrote to Colin
Moodie, Assistant Secretary of the DEA, restating his
understanding of his primary responsibility to ‘produce
feature articles designed to inform the public, how, in
human terms the plan is operating, and what value it has’
and to write an information booklet. Moodie cautioned
White about assigning the booklet secondary importance
‘in view of its very considerable long-term importance …
[and its] value to us for publicity purposes for some years to
come’.100 That Moodie was at pains to correct White’s
seemingly casual comment suggests that he sensed White
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had a different understanding of the tour’s purpose. White
saw his role as providing a broad, critical, and impartial
assessment of the program, whereas the DEA saw the
production of good publicity as White’s principal function.
Casey was particularly concerned to avoid the
appearance of government involvement and agreed that
White should send his material ‘direct to the Features
Service for distribution, without the Department exercising
any editorial authority’. The DEA publicity machine swung
into action and White was provided with a list of former
Colombo Plan scholars and fellows who ‘for some
interesting personal reason, such as their personal charm,
their zest for the programme in Australia, their appreciation
of life in Australia, etc., placed them a cut above their CP
compatriots’. Although the DEA went to some lengths to
ensure White’s experience would be positive and fruitful for
the Australian government, at this stage, government
officials relinquished control over the outcome of White’s
tour. White left Australia believing Casey had giving him
‘carte blanche’.101
Neither White (even with his four years as a war
correspondent in Europe and the Pacific) nor Fitzpatrick was
prepared for their experience in South and South–East Asia.
They arrived in Pakistan in the midst of a gastro-enteritis
epidemic, and the first two weeks felt like a year. Within a
month, the pressure of their fast-paced tour and the strain of
adapting to the differing work protocols of Asia began to
take their toll. As White complained to his wife, Mollie:
The administrative inefficiency of these people has
to be observed — or suffered — to be believed. We
both spend endless hours drinking cups of tea,
making diplomatic speeches, accepting promises
and the only thing that causes some action is a
complete screaming blow-up. Against the grain,
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I now behave like a burra sahib almost from
the beginning, and snap, bark, shout and roar at
the drop of a hat. It works, but it’s hard on the
blood pressure.
Almost immediately, White became concerned
because his articles were not being published and Fitzpatrick’s
photographs were slow to be developed. ‘I refuse to worry
about this’, he continued. ‘If the dopes muck up the
newspaper side of the assignment, it’s their own bloody fault.
I have enough trouble with the Paks [Pakistanis] as it is,
without taking on our own public service into the
bargain’.102 White later told Moodie that he suspected that
Asian officials were only showing him the most successful of
Australian Colombo Plan projects and that ‘unfavourable
facts were being deliberately concealed’. When shown the
200 tractors donated by Australia, White’s instincts were
aroused: ‘My newspaperman’s radar indicates most strongly
the presence of a rat!’ Anticipating a disastrous tour and a
series of negative articles, he reminded Moodie of the
assurances provided by the DEA for a free editorial hand.103
White, a strong believer in the objectives of the
Colombo Plan, was disheartened to find widespread waste
and neglect in Australian-funded projects and equipment.
After five weeks in Pakistan, White and Fitzpatrick arrived
in New Delhi and informed Indian High Commissioner
Walter Crocker of their moral dilemma. Crocker recorded
in his diary that the two men 
had found so much corruption and inefficiency and
waste in the use of Australian Colombo Plan aid
that they could not write their articles, which
Casey said could be completely free, without
dealing with that side. And if they did the reaction
in Australia might well be to put an end to the
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Colombo Plan aid and even to put Casey out of
office. Should they go on with their mission?
Crocker felt also the pressure of his allegiance to
Casey. He felt unable to talk freely about his own
misgivings about the Colombo Plan, ‘always safeguarding’
Casey during his discussion with White and Fitzpatrick.
Cautiously, Crocker suggested that White telegram Casey
himself. He did so, telling Casey that his first duty as a
journalist was to report the situation as he saw it and that
he had accepted the job only on the condition that he had
full editorial control. Yet, White remained torn between his
belief in the developmental and anti-communist objectives
of the Colombo Plan and his journalistic desire to ‘make
headlines’. He told Casey it was the ‘knottiest professional
problem’ he had encountered since the war. Continuing
with the tour, White explained his predicament to Robert
Furlonger, Acting High Commissioner in Karachi:
it had become apparent that the cumulative effect
of publication might make all CP [Colombo Plan]
projects unpopular with the Australian public —
an effect which, apart from the terms of my
present brief, I would deeply regret. So I simply
passed the ball to the Minister and will await his
reaction before deciding what I must write and
how.104
Casey, sensing the implications of an ambitious and
comprehensive assessment by White, requested that he not
lose sight of the ‘original objectives’ of the tour. He asked
White to confine his attention to the particular rather than
the general: ‘I believe there are many stories with individual
human interest and appeal which we can look to you to
exploit. I would particularly like to see publication of a
number of articles about Australian-trained Asians holding
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responsible positions or carrying out colourful jobs back in
their own countries’. In this case, White faced no moral
dilemma, but a real problem: in Pakistan he simply could
not find a success story. As he explained to Casey, ‘I am
searching diligently for individual human stories but so far
have found that trainees mostly have been swallowed up in
routine public service jobs often unrelated to skills which
their Australian training sought to develop’. Again Casey
sympathised, but asked him not to circulate his articles
prematurely until he had visited more countries, by which
time he might have ‘a different view of Colombo Plan
achievements and shortcomings’. Casey was in the
invidious position of imploring White not to reveal his
findings, lest they ‘make it impossible for him to maintain
parliamentary support for the plan’. Clearly, White had
stumbled across a myriad of problems associated with aid-
giving procedures, but he may have been overzealous in
searching for examples of waste and neglect. While passing
through India, White complained bitterly to an official
about the ‘shocking waste’ of Australian Colombo Plan
material in Nepal, when in fact the Australian goods
destined for that country had not even arrived in India.105
The exchange between Casey and White continued a
month later, when White’s tour took him to South Vietnam.
The issue of waste and mismanagement had not receded.
Casey claimed that the Australian government had avoided
large-scale infrastructure projects and attempted to supply
more experts to oversee and monitor aid projects. Yet
Casey’s attitude towards the waste was revealing. He warned
White not to be perturbed by it, because ‘in underdeveloped
countries we must inevitably expect more waste and even
less efficiency’. Moreover, a loss of effectiveness might be
necessary in order to emphasise the non-political nature of
the aid. Casey explained his theory to White:
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Asian countries [are] extremely sensitive — often
peculiarly so — to any implication they are
incapable of running their own affairs on their
terms … I believe that the success of the Colombo
Plan and the goodwill Australia has won through it
is largely due to our basic practice of dealing with
Asian governments on a basis of full equality. To
achieve this we have had sometimes to accept a loss
in efficiency.
‘We are’, he explained, ‘relative new boys in the
foreign aid business’. Even the more conspicuous and more
rigorously supervised American projects suffered from
allegations of waste and inefficiency. Moreover, critics
berated the United States for interference in other
countries’ international affairs. All things considered,
Casey assured White, ‘we have not done so badly in getting
a return for money spent in the past, especially when you
take into account the intangible factors that I need not
stress to you’. Once more, we see Casey focusing on the
‘intangible factors’, the goodwill and prestige, which he
hoped would materialise in the minds of those associated
with Australian Colombo Plan projects. White would
eventually come to share at least a little of Casey’s faith. But
for the moment, he continued to struggle with his instincts
as a journalist. Days after receiving the cable from Casey,
White wrote to Kevin Murphy of the ANIB:
As a newspaper man all my instincts are to scream
my head off and be damned to the consequences …
The Colombo Plan and other aid is about the only
effective weapon our mob has against the Comms
[Communists] in the Mysterious East, and to tell
the tough truth to the long suffering taxpayer will go
a long way towards blunting the weapon.106
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Talk of censorship found its way to Cecil Edwards,
editor of the Herald and Weekly Times, who suspected the
DEA was vetting White’s material. Although White would
later deny that he was censored, Edwards asked that White
supply him with a list of what he had written in order to
determine if ‘stories had gone astray’.107
The professional exposure White was receiving in
Australia was some compensation for the intense work. He
told Mollie: ‘I’m writing for the whole bloody Australian
press, now twenty-four articles in all plus five TV scripts and
about 40,000 words of confidential reports. This stuff is being
used at an intensity which the News and Information Bureau
claims is an all-time record for placements’. But, after nearly
four months in the field, White’s partner, Fitzpatrick, had
‘just about packed up under the continued pressure. He’s
completely slap happy, and has started bullying Burmans and
trying to make every shot perfect’. White warned Fitzpatrick
that if he continued in this manner he would be recalled.
The arduous physical and emotional conditions, combined
with Casey’s insistence on his holding his fire, undoubtedly
tested White’s mettle. Venting his frustrations to Mollie,
White responded to the challenges by stiffening his resolve
to explain the effect of the Colombo Plan exactly as he saw
it: ‘we’ve been making the most fearful boners in pure
ignorance and the Tiger [Casey] is ruthlessly copping the lot.
As you say, my job is to see — and by gum I’m seeing, and
he’s getting told’. Nonetheless, White’s view of the overall
effectiveness of the Colombo Plan improved as the tour
progressed. In March, he claimed optimistically in a cable to
Edwards that the Colombo Plan
seems to be an effective instrument of foreign
policy, and in all countries I’ve seen so far — with
the possible exception of India — it had generated a
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surprising amount of goodwill. Furthermore, the
CP organization has, on the psychological level,
handled aid-giving infinitely better than the
American ICA [International Cooperation
Agency] which, although it has spent vast sums on
badly needed projects, is resented and distrusted by
Asians — far more so than is warranted by its
demerits.
White, however, exercised more tact than his sharp
letters might suggest. In late June he met with Casey and
Moodie. Once more Casey pleaded that ‘public criticism of
the Colombo Plan would militate against our national
interest’.108 White reiterated the major themes of his
extensive report, clearly describing the waste and inept
management (from both Asian and Australian officers) he
had seen while on tour. Yet he also said he wanted to see
the plan continue on a more effective and efficient basis.
His subsequent articles, such as ‘Colombo Plan has been
partly successful’ and ‘Colombo Plan “waste” unavoidable’,
were, he thought, constructive compromises intended to
bolster the program rather than scuttle it in favour of a
more censorious headline.109
In 1960, the DEA published White’s booklet, The
seed of freedom: Australia and the Colombo Plan, the title
having been adapted from President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s evocative speech about the ‘seeds of conflict’
to the 1958 meeting of the Consultative Committee in
Seattle. Government printers produced a staggering 50,000
copies for the first edition in Australia, with an additional
20,000 sent to Colombo Plan nations throughout Asia.110
In July 1961, a further 30,000 copies were printed.111 It
might not have been a bestseller, but it was a significant
free publication distributed by diplomatic posts. The
A Shoe-horn for our Interests 165
culmination of the Australian government’s attempt to
extract the maximum amount of publicity material from the
work submitted by White and Fitzpatrick was a 30-minute
documentary entitled The Builders, produced by the
Australian Commonwealth Film Unit and released in late
1959.112 The film was an important example of the DEA’s
attempt to manufacture an image of Asia under the
Colombo Plan that would resonate with Australian and
Asian audiences. The DEA oversaw the production of The
Builders but granted White considerable discretion over the
script and basic storyline. Although the Australian
Commonwealth Film Unit had already produced films on
Colombo Plan students, such as Our Neighbour Australia,
The Builders came to be something of a flagship public
relations document on Australia’s relations with Asia.113 Its
significance, for the government at least, was enhanced by
the fact that it was a product of a broad set of guidelines
governing the content and style of official audio-visual
representations of Australia and Asia.
In the mid-1950s senior bureaucrats determined that
the objectives of this media policy were to improve
Australian relations with other nations, explain national
policies, assist in counteracting ‘Russia’s … politico-economic
drive’, help to expand trade and commercial relations, and
provide Australian representatives abroad with readily
accessible information describing Australia’s position on
international issues. Specifically, the DEA said films should
be of excellent quality (to ensure maximum commercial
distribution), avoid the ‘squalid aspects of Australian life’,
and avoid patronising language and slang expressions. Nor
were they to encourage Asians to adopt Australian customs.
The government hoped that such films would convey the
themes of the ‘strength and virility’ of Australia, the lack of
racial discrimination, the importance of private enterprise,
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the harshness of the Australian environment and its lack of
arable land, the need for cooperative efforts in the Asian
region, the ‘dignity of labour’, and the message that ‘Asian
countries could also develop to [Australia’s] stage’. Where
possible, ‘the pomp and circumstance of official occasions
should be included, since Asians liked this’. The DEA
distributed The Builders to Asian posts for dubbing into
local languages and screening in commercial movie houses
and mobile cinemas provided under the Colombo Plan. In
Asia, it received a limited, but generally positive, reception.
In Australia, commercial television stations and the ABC
broadcast the documentary between 1960 and 1961.114
Immediately after the film’s release, concern among
some Australian diplomats began to trickle back to the DEA.
Lionel Wigmore, Australian High Commissioner in Delhi,
complained to Murphy of the ANIB that the documentary
made little reference to India and paid particular attention
to Colombo Plan projects in Pakistan. ‘Indians are quick
to notice any such disparity’, he warned. He then asked if it
was possible to provide an alternative version with a greater
emphasis on India.115 But pandering to Asian sensitivities
had its limits. The ANIB’s John Murray quipped:
Imagine the situation if, at some Colombo Plan
Conference, an enthusiastic Indian delegate
recommended that the Conference should see the
very fine film Australia had made about the
Colombo Plan … and the meeting agreed to have a
screening. If the Conference was being held in
Kuala Lumpur, the film would be provided by our
Malayan friends — the version that was made to
please the Malayans! (Crowd noise — exeunt all!)
Avoidance proved the better course. Murray
suggested that Wigmore return the print to Australia lest
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‘some curious person might whiz it away for screening to the
very people you do not want to see it’. While The Builders
had served its purpose in Asia, he was confident that it
would be ‘useful for a long time yet in Australian schools’.116
His comment was apt because the documentary and the
story of how it was created said far more about Australia and
its attempts to grapple with its place in the region than it did
about the collection of nations they called Asia.
————
The long-term developmental programs created under the
auspices of the Colombo Plan were only going to yield
benefits for Australia’s security in subtle, ill-defined and
inconclusive ways: perhaps more subtle than Casey and the
Cold War Planning Committee may have wished.
However, the fundamental rationale of the influential 1952
report into the United Kingdom Overseas Information
Service still held sway in Australia into the 1960s. Its
principal conclusion was that seemingly inconsequential
programs and decisions were likely to have consequences
far beyond their size: ‘the effect of propaganda on the course
of events is never likely to be more than marginal. But in
certain circumstances it may be decisive in tipping the
balance between diplomatic success and failure’.117 The
battle for the mind of Asia was a close contest. A small
effort could tip the balance, by influencing a parliamentary
committee, or helping to deliver a single vote that might
sway a decision in Australia’s favour. Dudley-Clark made
this very point to Casey in 1956 when he said success in the
Cold War could only come ‘out of a long and patient effort
in a hundred minor gains … it must inevitably be a war of
attrition’.118 The impact would be almost impossible to
quantify and governments could make only the most
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subjective and tentative assessments about the effect of
these programs. In official circles, the Cold War was
conceived of as a mental battle as much as a strictly
political and economic one — a Manichean contest that
simply had to be won. Casey saw the battle for hearts and
minds as a most serious one, where an Australian
propaganda campaign, orchestrated under the rubric of the
Colombo Plan, could play a pivotal role.
Towards the end of the 1950s, the Australian
government convinced itself that the Colombo Plan, in
association with other aid programs, had retarded the
effectiveness of communist insurgents. The 1959 ANZUS
communiqué ‘noted the growing awareness on the part of
Asian countries of the threat posed to life and liberty by
Communist imperialism’. Ministers believed that economic
and social progress would continue to render ‘Communist
political subversion and sabotage in the area increasingly
difficult’. But there remained an ever increasing ‘need for
other free countries to devote a large share of their
resources through … channels such as the Colombo Plan,
for technical and economic development assistance to
countries of the area’.119 The fading boundary between
non-military and military-aid — although it was always a
problematic distinction — continued into the 1960s. With
Australia on the brink of armed commitment to Vietnam,
the role of the Colombo Plan as a support program for more
tangible military goals became even more pronounced. In
May 1960, the Acting Minister for External Affairs,
Garfield Barwick, authorised a shipment of battery-
operated transistor radios to South–East Asian countries,
including South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Unlike the
shipment of transmitters made in the mid-1950s, the
government publicised this gift. A great problem for the
governments of South–East Asia, Barwick said publicly, was
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‘how best to dispel ignorance and to counter false rumours
and propaganda’. Australia’s donation would ‘assist in the
dissemination of information and teaching to school
children and villages in remote areas’.120 Early in 1964,
Australia provided 15 railway carriages to the South
Vietnamese government under the Colombo Plan,
ostensibly because they would play a role in economic and
commercial development. But as Hasluck explained to
Cabinet, from a ‘strategic point of view’ the gift was
important for ‘the carriage of troops, equipment and military
supplies’ between Saigon and the northern provinces.121
The DEA began to develop a more critical
appreciation of the problems facing the execution of
Australian foreign policy, yet the department’s attitude and
approach to propaganda in South–East Asia remained
essentially unchanged from the early-1950s. Considering the
pervasive fear of communist aggression and the primacy of
the Menzies Government’s defence imperatives, it seemed
almost inevitable that the government would use the
Colombo Plan to implement paramilitary and counter-
subversion operations. In 1961, the Information Branch of
the DEA produced an analysis of Australia’s propaganda
activities in South–East Asia. Among other things, the
report reflected on the politicisation of Australian foreign
policy. Specifically, it contended that ‘the Cold War now
extends into nearly every nook and cranny of information
activity … The Cold War has limited our capacity for self-
expression and this is a handicap which has to be accepted
in information activity as in other fields’.122 The response is
understandable, given the international and domestic
contexts in which these decisions were made. However, it
narrowed Australia’s perception of what was possible in its
engagement with Asia. Casey worked assiduously to develop
a workable propaganda strategy, drawing on expertise from
across the public service and abroad. The results of the
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planning committee he created are difficult to quantify, but
more importantly, we can see where the dictates of the Cold
War, combined with a rudimentary understanding of Asia
and its people, circumscribed the department’s imagination
and language. This process dominated the department’s
concept of engagement throughout the decade and would
continue to do so for another. That the Cold War ethic was
considered a fait accompli also encapsulates the reactionary
nature of the department’s strategy. Naturally, the Colombo
Plan and its associated programs, as key features of
Australia’s involvement in the region, were inexorably
caught up in this environment. 
The Colombo Plan embodied the growing tension
between a coercive intervention, oriented toward short-term
objectives, and a constructive, less prescriptive form of
engagement. On one hand, it reaffirmed Australian
nationalist sentiment, summed up by the widely voiced idea
that the Colombo Plan offered a chance ‘to show them
[Asians] that, in our way of life, there is something
worthwhile’.123 Yet it also cast stronger light on Australian
isolationism and forced policy-makers to re-examine other
policies. From deep inside the bureaucracy, a tentative shift
in regional awareness began to take a more influential form.
When contemplating the political objectives of the
Colombo Plan, Arthur Tange reflected that it was the white
Australia policy and a ‘history of isolation’ that had led to a
‘wealth of misunderstanding’ between Asia and Australia.
And although he thought irreconcilable differences on
complex international issues were likely to remain, the
Colombo Plan had allowed Asians and Australians to ‘mix
together in a way which [had] not been otherwise
practicable’.124 In its most defensive guise, the Colombo Plan
aimed to relieve the anxieties associated with living next to
Asia, to stimulate resistance to communist subversion, and to
reinforce the boundaries between Australia and the region.
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Yet the cultural interaction promised by the Colombo Plan
was set to challenge and transgress the very barriers the
government thought the program would maintain.
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6. FACE TO FACE
WITH ASIA
In 1953, a group of recently-arrived Indonesian ColomboPlan scholars waited for a tram to take them into central
Sydney. Among them was Sumadi, later to become a senior
official in the Indonesian Department of Information:
‘Everybody looked at us, everybody stared. We all joked
among ourselves, “No matter how much we dress up we still
[felt like we were at] Taronga Zoo … they consider us the
orang-utan.” Everybody always stare … and we felt there
must be something wrong with us. Then we realised that
maybe because at that time not many Australians have ever
come face to face with Asian students’.1 The arrival of
Colombo Plan students was one of the most striking and
conspicuous manifestations of Australia’s foreign policy and
the most tangible aspect of Australia’s program of
international aid. Privately-funded scholars from Asia
outnumbered sponsored students by five to one, but such
was the publicity afforded to the Colombo Plan that when
Australians saw any Asian student they invariably assumed
they were sponsored under the program, thus artificially
magnifying the scheme’s impact. While the Department
of External Affairs (DEA) spent more on large-scale
infrastructure projects, the scholarship scheme had an
immediate effect on the lives of many Australians and a
lasting impact on Australia’s social and political landscape.
The influx of private and government-sponsored
students from Asia in the 1950s coincided with the arrival
of over 1,000,000 immigrants, mainly from Britain and
Europe. While mass migration made Australia more
culturally diverse, that diversity did not include Asia. In
1954, just 0.4 per cent of the population was born in South
or South–East Asia, only marginally higher than in 1933.
By 1961, the figure had increased only slightly, with fewer
than 60,000 Asians living in Australia, representing 0.6 per
cent of the population. Between 1951 and 1965, Australia
hosted nearly 5,500 students and trainees, 16 per cent of
the 33,000 places offered by all donor nations contributing
to the Colombo Plan. Australia’s Colombo Plan scholars
came from 15 nations across Asia; three-quarters came from
Malaya, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, while
smaller numbers came from Burma, Brunei, Cambodia,
Korea, and Afghanistan.2 The expansion of the Colombo
Plan program corresponded with a dramatic shift in the
destinations of private Asian students. By 1965 around
5 per cent of the student body were international scholars
— with most coming from South–East Asia. Somewhat
shocked by the shift way from Britain and America, the
DEA thought that ‘something of a revolution’ was taking
place.3 The rising importance of the Colombo Plan student
program corresponded with a declining faith in the ability
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of large-scale infrastructure projects to deliver benefits for
Australia. Within five years of the inception of the
Colombo Plan, the DEA became increasingly worried by
negative reports about Australian-funded capital projects.
In part, government officials blamed recipient nations for
their lack of planning and management, but Australian
procedures were also at fault. The DEA’s experienced
Assistant Secretary, John Keith Waller, told Casey that
Australian administration had been ‘ill-considered …
cumbersome and slow’.4 By contrast, the scholarship
program was something of an unexpected success.
Australia’s High Commissioner to India, Walter Crocker,
who usually cautioned his Canberra superiors against
expecting gratitude or benefit from foreign aid, was
uncharacteristically positive when it came to the
scholarship program. In 1953 he reported to Alan Watt,
Secretary of the DEA, that ‘the best publicity we have
received so far has been from students who have been
studying in Australia. In fact I am inclined to feel that the
only political value which Australia has got out of its
Colombo Plan efforts has been from the students’.5 The
early success of the program was even more surprising
because the government had neglected to anticipate the
basic needs of overseas students or the problems they might
encounter. The cavalier embrace of Asian students was the
same in Britain. The goal, reasoned the Foreign Office, was
simply to get as many Asian students into the country as
possible; it mattered ‘much less what they do when
they arrive … as long as they do not waste their time’.6
Nevertheless, Asian delegates attending the Colombo Plan
Consultative Committee meetings expressed high regard
for Australian training, overwhelming Australian
representatives with nominations. Cabinet needed little
encouragement to trim some of the Colombo Plan’s more
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profligate capital enterprises. In order to minimise waste,
reduce demand on scarce primary materials, and capitalise
on the goodwill stimulated by the training scheme, Cabinet
insisted on diverting funds from the capital aid program.
Over the next ten years, the proportion of aid devoted to
education, training and the supply of equipment increased
steadily, from 22 per cent in 1954/55 to 46 per cent in
1963/64. By 1970, the government split the Colombo Plan
budget equally between capital aid projects and technical
assistance.7
Australia’s scholarship scheme focused on giving
Asians skills they could pass on to others once they
returned home. Students studied a broad range of subjects,
including agricultural production, animal husbandry, fruit
culture, textiles, wool technology, food preparation, mining,
road construction, civil aviation, railway administration and
technology, education, industrial welfare, social services,
nursing, public administration, sewerage construction, and
water conservation. Courses in science, engineering, health,
and education were by far the most popular, with more than
70 per cent of trainees (1,400) taking degrees in these field
by the late-1950s. By the mid-1960s, the number of
students acquiring these skills had increased to more than
4,000, but as a proportion of the total number of scholars, it
had dropped to 60 per cent. This change did not represent a
fundamental shift in attitude or policy; rather it was a
consequence of the increasingly diverse number of courses
made available, largely in response to requests from
recipient nations. Notable growth took place in the
numbers of students studying agriculture, industrial
production, mining and mineral research, police and legal
training, wireless operation and maintenance, journalism,
film production and broadcasting. Under pressure to
expand the reach of Australian training, the DEA launched
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a Colombo Plan correspondence scheme in 1955. By June
1961, nearly 1,000 students had completed a correspondence
course and more than 1,800 students were then receiving
training under the program.8
The basic political and cultural imperatives served by
the Colombo Plan scholarship program remained largely
unchanged during the 1950s and 1960s. In January 1962,
Arthur Tange, Secretary of the DEA, submitted a statement
on the demand for tertiary courses from foreign countries to
Leslie Martin, Chairman of the Australian Universities
Commission. He predicted that Australia was likely to
continue to grow as a preferred destination for overseas
students in the Asia–Pacific region and explained that the
Colombo Plan education program ‘incidentally’ fulfilled
political and cultural objectives. First, it was a practical
demonstration of Australia’s intention to assist ‘countries
geographically near us from which Australia has been cut
off culturally until the last 15 years’.9 Secondly, students
who had lived and studied under the program were
generating goodwill and prestige for Australia. As one
official put it, returning students had ‘something of a
snowball effect’ as they took up positions of influence.10 At
the heart of Australian management of the Colombo Plan
student program, however, was a concern to minimise the
negative impact of the white Australia policy. ‘Questions of
race and colour play a large part in determining the
attitudes of the Asian and African States to many
significant international problems’, the DEA explained to
the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in
Australia in 1962:
In these circumstances Australian aid programmes
like the Colombo Plan … which gain wide and
favourable attention are a valuable testimony to
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the absence of racial prejudice in our foreign
policies. The presence of Asian and African
students in Australia and their experience of the
tolerance and friendliness of the Australian people
are an effective counter to the charges of racial
discrimination which are sometimes levelled
against us.11
The number of Colombo Plan scholarships on offer
rose from 434 in 1959 to 656 in 1965. Despite the steady
rise, demand for scholarships always outpaced supply. As
numbers of international students increased, naturally so
did the pressure on universities to accept them. The
principal of Melbourne High School, George Langley,
crystallised a fundamental government concern when he
told Menzies about the ‘international aspect’ of the failure
of some Asian scholars to find places at Melbourne
University’s medical course owing to restrictions on the
number of places available to foreigners. Langley suggested
that, considering the prominent role ‘played by Australia in
the launching and implementation of the Colombo Plan’, it
was logical for the Commonwealth to fund the expansion of
medical education. ‘Panic’ among overseas students, he
warned, ‘might lead to ill considered letters home and poor
publicity’.12
During the first few years of the program, the DEA
struggled to integrate the rising numbers of Colombo Plan
— and private overseas — students into the academic and
social community — sometimes with tragic consequences.
Between 1950 and 1951, three Asian students studying at
the University of Western Australia committed suicide and
another suffered a mental breakdown, all ostensibly
suffering from social isolation. The neglect of the growing
student body had the potential to jeopardise the guiding
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maxim of the student program — namely, the idea that
the students’ exposure to Australian culture should be a
positive experience. Casey raised his concerns with Menzies
as early as July 1951: ‘My department has for some time
been concerned that accommodation difficulties, problems
of orientation and a good deal of ordinary loneliness may
not only lead to occasional instances of personal tragedy,
but also leave the way open to Communist influences’.13
Douglas Wilkie, journalist and ex–war correspondent,
wrote publicly of the risk to Australia’s foreign policy
objectives of failing to provide adequate housing. It was, he
said, ‘anomalous to bring Asian students here and then force
them to live in drab boarding-houses or in isolated
communities because we could not “afford” an International
House’.14 Ian Clunies-Ross, chairman of CSIRO, exploited
Casey’s preoccupation with shielding students from
communism, when he asked that Colombo Plan funds be
applied to the construction of a hostel for international
students. He also suggested that by closely integrating
Asians and Australians, the government would escape any
allegation that it supported racial segregation. The opening
of International House in Melbourne in 1957 (built with
the help of £A50,000 of Colombo Plan finance) certainly
suggested a new-found consciousness of Asia, yet it also
reflected the anxiety and defensiveness that underpinned
that awareness. Non-government groups moved much
faster to fill the growing demand. Keen to awaken the
churches’ obligations to international education, Anglican
Archbishop Howard Mowll moved to create a hostel for
overseas students immediately after the establishment of
the Colombo Plan. Through his work, the International
Friendship Centre officially opened in the Sydney suburb of
Drummoyne in 1952, initially housing 19 men, including
two Colombo Plan students.15
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The abstract benefits generated by the Colombo Plan
did not allay fears that students were a threat to Australia’s
social and political fabric. During the early years
government officials and the media tended to typecast
Asian students as potential spies or vulnerable innocents,
open to communist blandishments. In federal parliament,
one member believed that Colombo Plan scholars might
come into contact with ‘undesirable elements in our
community … we may be sending back rabid Communists
to the South East Asian countries … I am not ashamed to
say that we should also attempt to bring some moral
influence to bear on these students’. Lawrence Arnott, who
headed the DEA’s Economic and Technical Assistance
Branch between 1952 and 1956, warned Casey in 1951 that
if the government did not protect students from subversive
forces, they risked ‘nullifying [their] efforts under the
Technical Assistance Programme’. The Daily Mirror
wondered if Colombo Plan students were travelling the
countryside taking pictures of airports, army camps, and
defence installations, and asked readers to remember the
‘bowing Japanese students and businessmen’ who had come
to Australia before the war. That the Petrov inquiry in 1954
named a Colombo Plan student as a left-wing activist fuelled
such perceptions. The DEA even denied a request for
financial assistance from the student-oriented East–West
Committee to stage an exhibition of Asian culture because
ASIO investigators suspected that communists would use
the occasion to distribute propaganda.16
The government’s concerns, while understandable,
were largely unfounded. In response to a request from the
Malayan government, that the Malayan Students’
Association and Colombo Plan trainees were falling under
the influence of Australian communists, ASIO reported
that although the association was left-wing and nationalist,
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there was little evidence to suggest a significant communist
presence.17 The anxiety expressed by conservative media
about the vulnerability of Asian students was similarly
misplaced. For example, the Melbourne Sun ran the
alarmist headline ‘REDS WORKING ON ASIAN
STUDENTS HERE’ for a story about the failure of
communist groups to attract Colombo Plan students.18 The
popular Singapore-based newspaper, Malay Mail, reported a
more common scenario: after six years studying at the
University of Melbourne, ‘Anthony’ Ng Beh Tong said that
his fellow Malayan students were completely absorbed with
their studies and ‘had no time for politics’. Furthermore, he
said, they feared that if they dabbled with leftist politics
they might not be let back into Malaya.19
Private industry was nervous about trainees taking
back trade secrets that might be used against Australia.
Secretary of the Department of Labour and National
Service, Henry Bland, explained in a review of training
procedures that ‘fear that the knowledge gained will be used
in enterprises in Asian countries which, in many cases, are
direct competitors with Australian manufacturers, has led to
some hesitancy in certain sections of private industry to
provide training when requested’.20 The impact of such
anxiety, however, proved to be limited, with only a few
Colombo Plan students being denied placements in
industries where Australia competed heavily with Asia, such
as leather goods, tanning and meat-processing.
Information on the academic performance of
Colombo Plan students is scarce, although there is enough
evidence to suggest that they performed reasonably well. Of
the 309 individuals who sat for Bachelor’s degrees in 1956,
206 (66.7 per cent) passed. The most successful national
group was Malayan, with a 93 per cent pass rate, followed
by Ceylon (86 per cent) and Singapore (74 per cent). Pass
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rates for post-graduate degrees were higher. As the DEA
expected, students who had a greater command of English
and were familiar with British-styled education systems
fared better. Over the decade the implementation of an
increasingly rigorous selection process and compulsory
English classes helped to improve academic performance.
By 1963, the overall pass rate for Colombo Plan students
had risen from 71 to 79 per cent, with the pass rate for those
completing the first year of a Bachelor’s degree increasing to
77 per cent — higher than the equivalent statistics for
Australian students.21
The experiences of students in Australia were private
and deeply personal, and evade easy generalisation. The
case of a group of Colombo Plan students studying in NSW
provides an interesting example of problems faced by visitor
and host alike. Twelve Burmese students studying mining
technology at the NSW University of Technology
experienced the ignominy of getting the worst academic
results of the 1956 intake, with all of them failing their
exams. Although the DEA blamed the students for their
general ‘attitude to the course’, a closer examination of the
reports reveals a more complex picture. Language
difficulties appeared to be the most significant and
persistent barrier to success for the Burmese students.
Physics teacher, E.F. Palmer, noted that the natural shyness
and ‘embarrassing amount of courtesy’ displayed by the
students was in marked contrast to the ‘brusque manners’ of
the Australian miners who provide practical demonstrations
in the mines. Teachers and students frequently
misunderstood each other, and the generally passive and
withdrawn nature of the Burmese students compounded
these difficulties. C. Harrison, the coal-mining instructor,
noted that in some cases when ‘students received little
encouragement’ they hid in dark recesses of the mine,
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avoiding miners altogether. The students — suffering from
sustained exposure to Australian cuisine — escaped to the
rear of the hostel on weekends to cook traditional meals on
campfires by the riverbank.22
In addition to the cultural shock, many students
faced the difficulty of living on a substantially reduced
income, compared to what they might have been
accustomed. Students most likely to have the education
and language skills to benefit from courses in Australia were
likely to come from families which, if not wealthy, at least
had been free of basic wants and had a little to spare. Such
students were acutely conscious of their need to scrape by
and of their poverty in relation to some Australians, and
appealed to their parents for funds. Reports of the
inadequacy of the living allowance flowed back to the
DEA. Patrick Shaw, Assistant Secretary of the Economic
and Technical Assistance Branch, wrote to Casey in 1956:
‘Dissatisfaction with these rates under present conditions is
general and we have received copies of reports to their own
Governments from trainees who have returned home,
stressing the inadequacy of the living allowance we are
paying’.23 In practice, management of Colombo Plan
students was reactive, and turned on considerations about
the damage a disgruntled student might do on returning
home. But not everyone was aware of, or sympathetic to,
their plight. ‘Wet-nursed’ students, claimed the Daily News,
were met on arrival, given accommodation, books, travel
subsidies, and a living allowance!24 Perhaps expecting
scholarship recipients to be more demure and grateful, some
government officials interpreted assertiveness as greed.
A Commonwealth Office of Education (COE) officer from
Western Australia complained to the national director,
William (‘Jock’) Weeden, that ‘some sponsored students
appear to take everything for granted, and seem to think
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that the Branch Office representative has nothing to do but
suit their convenience in every detail’. The officer
wondered whether, in its approach to the scholarship
program, the department had been too eager to please.
Stipends were increased, but with the allowance not
intended to support a family, the DEA suggested to its
Asian posts that they ‘discreetly endeavour’ to discourage
married men and women from applying.25
Student experience became increasingly important,
particularly when it came to fulfilling the foreign policy
objective of instilling in students an appreciation of Australian
mores. During the early 1950s, the administration and
integration of Colombo Plan students had been a sporadic, ad
hoc affair. In order to create a more flexible, ‘less haphazard
procedure’, the DEA delegated various administrative
functions to other government instrumentalities and shifted
responsibilities to private community organisations.26 Guided
by the COE, the Coordinating Committee for the Welfare of
Overseas Students brought together the functions of middle-
class community organisations across Australia. Fortunately
for the DEA and the Menzies Government, a significant base
of support became active. These groups included Rotary
Clubs, Apex Associations, the Asian Student Council, the
YWCA, the Malayan Students’ Association, the
Australian–Indonesian Association, the Country Women’s
Association, the Thai Students’ Association, and many
others. Together these groups shouldered much of the burden
of integrating overseas students into the wider community.
Colombo Plan scholarship holders still occupied a
privileged place among the student fraternity, primarily
because of the publicity attached to their presence. As
Bevan Rutt, head of the University of Adelaide branch of
the COE, observed, Colombo Plan scholars were so well
provided for that they invariably received more invitations
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for holidays and other forms of hospitality than they could
accept.27 Private students, on the other hand, received less
attention and were often left to their own devices. The
potential neglect of the private student body prompted
some university administrators to offer guidance to
Australians on how to best interact with and support
overseas students. The Reverend Frank Borland, Warden of
the Union at the University of Adelaide and President of
the Australian–Asian Association in South Australia
between 1957 and 1958, sent letters to ‘potential hosts’ of
Asian students and short booklets to those already
providing accommodation, offering instructions on how to
prepare their homes and how to converse with Asians.
‘Their happiness and well being is greatly influenced by the
hospitality they receive’, he advised. ‘But please do not
over-mother them or smother them with attention. They
like to be independent, and are able to make their own
plans and decisions’.28 Others pointed out that Asians were
not that different from Australians. In 1954 C. Sanders told
the audience at the Pan-Indian Ocean Science Association
and British Psychological Society conference that Asian
scholars enjoyed interacting with Australians, were keen to
improve their language skills, and preferred to live with
private families or in smaller hostels. Sanders also reminded
the audience that Australians also ‘suffered emotional
upset’ if isolated from familial support and that such feelings
were not, as some were inclined to believe, peculiar to the
Asian temperament.29
Contact with Australians, especially for those who
boarded with local families, was marked by the shyness of
students, and their sometimes overly polite nature. Nervous
yet congenial encounters were the rule; overt racism or
discrimination, the exception. In homes and hostels across
the country a more intimate bond formed between Asians
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and Australians. Few could have guessed the impact Asian
students would have on host families and the community in
general. With accommodation shortages a perennial
problem, the response from ostensibly middle-class families
was striking. The changing sentiment towards Asian
students took Meredith Worth, DEA Liaison Officer at the
University of Melbourne, by surprise. Placing the first wave
of Colombo Plan students in acceptable lodgings had been
difficult because the ‘right type of landlady’ was hard to find
and few were even aware of the existence of Colombo Plan
students, let alone interested in helping them. Worth
informed Casey:
The position now is very different, mainly due,
I think to the excellent impression which Colombo
Plan students have made here and to their willing
co-operation with all efforts to publicise the
Colombo Plan and the importance of closer
relations between Australia and South East Asia.
I now receive many unsolicited offers of good
accommodation and the recent appeal in the ‘Sun’
and over 3DB for hospitality … has resulted in
over fifty offers of hospitality in Melbourne as far
afield as East Gippsland.30
Hosts often felt compelled to express publicly their
support for Asian students and their discomfort with the
immigration policy. Mrs M.G. Swinburne of Surrey Hills in
Melbourne provided board and lodging to three Colombo
Plan students and in 1954 sent in these observations to the
editor of the Age:
Our contact with these young men proves to us
that they are normal, natural boys from good
homes. They have distinct personality, are
generally of excellent character, good intelligence,
Face to Face with Asia 191
fine sensibilities and very likeable … We find that
to know these students better is to regret very
much that we are debarred by our own
immigration law from having them as our real
next-door neighbour.31
Swinburne’s reference to the ‘distinct personality’ of
her boarders is particularly significant. She simultaneously
acknowledges and challenges a version of the nineteenth
century ‘Asian hordes’ metaphor which had been
transplanted into a Cold War context, where Asians were
seen as being homogenous and vulnerable to communist
influence. Swinburne’s letter prompted Irtaza Zaidi to write
to the newspaper:
It is through personal contacts that we know and
understand each other fully well and not merely by
reading in schools and colleges … I do not want to
indulge in controversy on whether Australia should
allow Asians to settle here or not — a point raised
by Mrs Swinburne — but I think Australia should
at least encourage more and more Asians to come
and visit Australia on social and cultural missions.
At the same time Australians should be
encouraged to visit different countries of Asia.32
In these two letters the acceptance of Asia is genuine
— if circumspect. These personal encounters were perhaps
the most important factor in altering Australian
perceptions of Asians and their ability to live harmoniously
with Anglo–Australians. Their academic success may have
given rise to new stereotypes of Asian diligence and
dedication, yet it debunked the myth of Asian intellectual
inferiority or backwardness. Collectively, Colombo Plan
students (and private Asian scholars) were a non-
threatening, but powerful, challenge to conventional
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stereotypes of non-Europeans and epitomised their ability
to adapt and assimilate to Australian conditions. Indeed,
their socio-economic background facilitated their ready
integration. Colombo Plan students were typically male,
from middle-class families, educated, and able to speak
adequate English. Importantly, scholarship holders could
not take permanent employment (although vacation jobs
were acceptable) and were required to return home on
completion of their studies. As visitors, they could not be
condemned as an economic or social threat; nor did they
appear to threaten Australia’s racial integrity.
Capitalising on the growing support for Asian
students, Worth proposed that the Good Neighbour
Council, created by the Chifley Government in 1949 to
assimilate migrants, establish a sub-committee dedicated to
Colombo Plan recipients. Committee members would greet
students on arrival, assist in finding appropriate
accommodation, organise social events, help with personal
problems, and arrange publicity. In 1953, Casey created the
‘Meet Your Neighbours Campaign’, whereby Colombo Plan
students attended arranged dinner parties with Australian
families. ‘While they have returned to their home countries
armed with much information and professional and
industrial experience’, Casey said, ‘few have known the
average Australian working man in his own home
surroundings. Yet this is hardly a less vital part of their
education’.33 Casey expected that these ‘casual’ meetings
would counter perceptions that Western citizens led selfish
and indolent lives, surrounded by limitless wealth.
Contented and articulate Asian scholars were perfect
grist for the government’s slick publicity mill. In 1956, the
Australian News and Information Bureau published My life
in Australia, the story of Filipino dramatic arts student
Minda Feliciano. Later broadcast through Radio Australia
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and local Manila radio, Feliciano recalled that by talking
about ‘our common interests, our way of life, and our
aspirations I found that not only have I told others a great
deal about my land, but now I have been indoctrinated in
the way of life of this land of which I knew so little’.34 In
another government publication about a group of Ceylonese
photography students, laudatory justifications of the white
Australia policy prevailed. Victor Sumathipala wrote: ‘I was
aware of the so-called White Australia policy — a term
which, I soon learned, has no official existence in
Australia’. He went on to say: ‘What very few Asians can
appreciate until they visit Australia, is that Australia’s
immigration laws are aimed not at the exclusion of
individuals, but at the preservation of national unity among a
people faced with great problems in developing their
country’.35 Awkward and manufactured as they were, such
statements reveal the government’s continuing preoccupation
with social stability and the idea that Asians would, after a
period, uncritically adopt Australian values. Yet using
Asians as ciphers for propaganda had its drawbacks and the
surge of publicity surrounding the Colombo Plan sometimes
offended the very students the government hoped to
befriend. This sentiment emerged in a letter to the
government-financed Hemisphere magazine in March 1959,
when a student wrote angrily to the editor: ‘I am sick of
being constantly asked if I am a Colombo Plan student —
a fact which goes to show how poorly the Press in general
has informed the Australian public. Probably your magazine
can put more stress on the private students and use the
words “Colombo Plan” with less relish’.36
Given that the government policy-makers hoped the
Colombo Plan student program would minimise negative
opinion about Australian immigration and foreign policy,
it is no surprise that recipients were officially forbidden
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to engage in political activity. But while serious public
criticism was unlikely to come from conscientious
scholarship holders absorbed with their studies, government
attempts at censorship were only partly successful. On
9 August 1965 the Perth Daily News interviewed Asian
students at the University of Western Australia about the
Labor Party’s decision to drop ‘white Australia’ from its policy
platform. Although they had some reservations about the
political motivations behind the change, the students
welcomed the removal of a phrase they found personally
offensive and damaging to Australia’s international
reputation. The article carefully let readers know that their
objections to immigration restrictions did not imply that
they wanted to remain in Australia. ‘We like Australia, and
we have had a pleasant time here’, said one student, ‘but our
countries are home to us’.37 One month later, the seemingly
unremarkable story was front-page news because senior
External Affairs officers visited the two Colombo Plan
students quoted in the story. Abdullah Toha and Jimin Bin
Idris were both admonished for breaching their undertakings
to avoid pubic statement on Australia’s foreign and domestic
policy. The Daily News claimed the government interrogated
the students and threatened them with deportation. While
on campus, the DEA officers also took the opportunity to
remind the organisers of an upcoming conference of the
Overseas Students’ Association in Adelaide that Colombo
Plan students could not be involved in a proposed discussion
of immigration policy. The organisers later dropped the
forum from the conference agenda. On hearing about these
events, Jimin’s anthropology lecturer, D’Arcy Ryan,
attacked the government’s hypocritical position in an angry
letter to The Australian: ‘The image of Australian democracy
and political freedom that we are so assiduously trying to
implant in Asian minds becomes a little distorted when
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students here are subjected to this kind of clumsy and
impertinent supervision’.38 Not surprisingly, the students
refused to comment further when questioned by a Daily News
journalist.39 Toha later withdrew from an unrelated
public debate on Australia’s economic aid program to
underdeveloped countries. When the rights and
responsibilities of Colombo Plan students were raised in
parliament, the government refused to yield.40 The
experience of Australia’s liberal democracy remained strictly
conditional and did not extend to the right to publicly
criticise the government.
Criticism of Australian policy, especially by Asians,
invariably drew a nationalist and racist ire, often from those
at the forefront of Australia’s relations with Asia. Indeed,
some of the more conservative and reactionary views came
from articulate and experienced diplomats. Roden Cutler
VC, war hero and Australia’s High Commissioner in
Colombo, reacted defensively to a local newspaper article
critical of Australian immigration law. In a brusque memo
to Canberra, he said that Asians saw Australia as a Garden
of Eden where jobs were plentiful and well paid:
It has not occurred to those who declaim against
the Australian immigration policy that they are in
effect asking for a share in the fruits of labours of
the Australian people from the pioneers until the
present time, without the Asians being prepared to
contribute the same qualities as the pioneers,
namely initiative, hard work and perseverance
against difficulties. These qualities, if they existed
amongst the Asians who desired to migrate to
Australia, could be used to sound advantage in the
countries of Asia.41
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It is important to remember that Cutler’s views, and
their many variations, were commonplace — those who
believed in racial equality and cultural pluralism were still
in the minority. But these conceptions of racial inferiority,
which rejected the possibility of Asians ever having the
necessary moral and physiological rectitude to share
Australia’s bounty, were already being quietly undermined.
For their part, Asian commentators did not always
rally behind their students. Endorsing the government’s
policy, the editor of the Singapore daily Straits Times wrote
that Malaysian students ‘grumble too much and too
publicly’ and that disputes should be settled in a ‘quiet and
friendly manner’. As guests, the article went on, there are
‘rules of propriety which they must learn to observe. To
criticise the host country harshly and publicly offends
against the very first of these rules’.42 Nor was it in the
interests of Asian governments to recommend obstreperous
students to represent their countries. Recipient nations
enforced their own regulations regarding the conduct of
Colombo Plan scholars. For example, in June 1953, after
two Ceylonese students made disparaging remarks about
Australia, the Ceylon Government sent warnings to each
of their Colombo Plan scholars that they would be
immediately recalled or fined if they defaulted under the
conditions on which they had been sent abroad.43
In response, Asian students discovered more
constructive and unrestricted avenues for expression. From
the 1950s on, newsletters and journals dedicated to
Australian and Asian affairs sprang up on campuses across the
country, and many overseas scholars contributed to
established university newspapers. These journals combined
articles from prominent journalists, academics, diplomats, as
well as Asian and Australian students. Free from the editorial
distortions of the major daily newspapers, Asian students
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wrote considered and critical pieces about Australia and their
own countries. They commonly used pseudonyms, especially
if their material was too politically charged for the ever-
watchful DEA. The founding editors of such journals aimed
to deepen the nascent interest in Asia they sensed among
their fellow students. One such journal was the attractively
produced Asiana: Asian–Australian forum, sponsored by the
Asian Students’ Council of NSW and the National Union of
Australian University Students. Rumoured to be a potential
rival to the external affairs brainchild, Hemisphere, Asiana’s
mission was ‘to make some contribution towards a deeper
understanding between a relatively homogeneous “western”
Australia and a kaleidoscopic rising Asia’. The time had
come, wrote the journal’s editor and former Colombo Plan
student Mr Oedojo, ‘to have a literary medium … to
complement the oral interchange that has already become a
daily occasion’. The editors of the short-lived journal The
Asian, published by the University of Melbourne Asian
Students’ Federation, emphasised the importance of
‘understanding and goodwill — goodwill which is
spontaneous and real, and not necessarily on paper only’. The
University of New England Overseas Students’ Association
periodical Small World, also guided by an idealistic and
humanitarian ethos, aimed at bringing a degree of critical
awareness to Australian understandings of Asia and the
problems associated with cross-cultural education.44 Most of
these journals quietly disappeared after a few years. Hemisphere
carried on — aided by a stable government subsidy — and
became the pre-eminent forum for Australian–Asian writing.
There were always Colombo Plan students prepared
to brave the public arena. Lee Yee Cheong, a Malaysian
electrical engineering student at the University of
Adelaide, thought that Australia had missed an
opportunity to gain first-hand information on Asian affairs:
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Asian students have found that the Australian’s
home is too much his castle. Although they have
the opportunity of meeting many Australians
through being invited to picnics, garden parties and
other social functions … very few Australians
have seen fit, after an hour or so of handshaking
and small talk, to invite the students home and
develop more personal and deeper friendships.
Some might have seen his letter as simply a comment
on Australian insularity, but others might have interpreted
it as a deft metaphorical jibe at immigration policy. Taking
the less controversial interpretation, the editor of the
Adelaide Advertiser responded somewhat cryptically. He
agreed with Cheong’s sentiments and put it down to
‘mainly shyness and thoughtlessness’ on the part of
Australians. It was more common to see Asian students
socialising together, he suggested, because they ‘naturally
find more in common with each other; there is something
missing somewhere. It is nothing to worry about, but it
deserves some thought’.45
Asian students politicised the image of Australia that
government officials hoped to project, both domestically
and internationally. For example, in 1957 the government
of Ceylon marked the sixth anniversary of the Colombo
Plan with an international exhibition. Promoted as an
opportunity for all donor nations to demonstrate the nature
of their regional aid projects and to present an informative
display about their own domestic economic development
programs, the Australian Cabinet appointed an inter-
departmental committee to consider possible ramifications.
With respect to the display on Papua New Guinea, the
Department of Territories thought it ‘preferable only to
refer to white people’ lest it ‘create confusion in the minds
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of the audience, particularly as photos would be shown …
of Asian students taking part in various activities on the
mainland’. In a similar vein, the designers felt that
references to Aborigines should be avoided. They felt that
audiences might raise awkward questions, such as, ‘if there
are dark-skinned people in Australia why are Asian people
excluded?’ Any ‘long explanations’ of Australian history
were likely to raise more questions than they could answer.
Officials also feared that any mention of dependent people
under Australian trusteeship would give the impression that
colonial exploitation underpinned Australian prosperity.
Furthermore, the stark contrast in development between
the mainland and Papua New Guinea might lead to a
potentially embarrassing offer of aid from India or Japan!46
Clearly unsettled by the prospect of international attention,
the exhibition forced government officials to recast their
representations of Australian life. The avoidance strategy
the DEA chose to adopt and the conscious presentation
of white Australia marked the realisation that the presence
of Asian students, and the attention that generated, had
drawn Australia into a much murkier and problematic
arena.
The draconian nature of Australia’s immigration
restrictions meant that Asians expected a chilly reception.
As Walter Crocker explained to Casey in one of his fulsome
despatches, students had such low expectations that ‘they
have been surprised and gratified by the friendly reception
… Their gratification is the greater because they go half
expecting to encounter something in the form of a colour
bar’.47 Foreign students almost certainly encountered
discrimination and intolerance on a personal and institutional
level during their time in Australia. Yet they were also
significant witnesses to Australian tolerance and
adaptability. Student associations, church groups, and the
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan200
official Colombo Plan Liaison Office organised picnics,
dinners and formal evenings as a means of facilitating social
interaction with Australians. Significantly, overseas student
groups themselves, such as the Colombo Plan Fellows
Association of Sydney, established in June 1953, staged
parties, cultural evenings, film nights, and excursions for
Australian and overseas students. Newspapers acknowledged
the difficulties faced by visiting students and appreciated
the gradual nature of the changing attitudes: ‘Obviously it
isn’t easy for Asians to settle into life here’, confessed one
writer in the Adelaide News in 1957, ‘but it is probably
easier than it was, say, six years ago’, with instances of
‘abysmal ignorance and intolerance [having] grown less’.48
Cases of extreme alienation and personal hardship brought
to the DEA’s attention also declined, in large part because
of the work of community support networks. The DEA
rightly interpreted the rising level of academic success
among the students as evidence of their ability to overcome
intellectual and social obstacles present in Australia.
A more worrying trend for the government was that the
Colombo Plan might become a victim of its own success.
For now, the DEA feared ‘the reluctance of students who
have become over-identified with the Australian way of life
to return to their home countries’. The corollary, according
to the DEA, was the possibility that by allowing Asians to
linger too long in Australia they would develop unrealistic
expectations for their own country and resent Australia for
its prosperity.49
It was inevitable that many Australian students
would begin romantic relationships with Asians they met
on campus and elsewhere. Mariam Manaf, a distinguished
scholar from Malaysia, won a Colombo Plan award to study
medicine at the newly-founded Monash University in
1963. There she met fellow medical student Tim Hegarty.
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The couple began courting in the mid-1960s and married
before final year exams in 1969. Obliged to return home on
finishing her degree, Manaf began her compulsory
residency at General Hospital, Kuala Lumpur. Hegarty, who
began his residency at Queen Victoria Hospital in
Melbourne, convinced his employer to allow him to join
his wife and complete his ‘housemanship’ in Malaysia.
Although formally required to remain in Malaysia for five
years, Manaf, like other Colombo Plan students, opted to
repay part of her award in order to leave the country early.
In 1971, having both completed their internships, they
returned to Australia — and stayed.50 In similar fashion,
University of Western Australia student David Rome
followed his girlfriend Daraka (‘Dara’) Vajarapan when she
returned to Thailand after a year-long stay in Australia. An
architecture graduate from Chulalongkorn University in
Bangkok, she was awarded a Colombo Plan scholarship to
study English at Perth Technical College in the late 1960s.
Rome first saw Vajarapan when she appeared in the daily
press with other Colombo Plan scholars shortly after their
arrival in Perth. They met later through the Thai Students’
Association. Obliged to return for a minimum of 12 months
by the Thai government, Vajarapan worked as an
architectural drafter with an American company based in
Bangkok, before returning to Perth with Rome in 1970.
They married shortly afterwards.51 These encounters were
not exactly what DEA officials had in mind when they
warned of potential ‘over-identification’ with the
Australian way of life.
The phenomenon of cross-cultural education sparked
interest from social scientists, demographers, and
psychologists. In 1969, Daphne Keats, from The Australian
National University, conducted a follow-up study on
Australian-trained Colombo Plan students. Among other
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things, she found that 83 per cent of the 503 respondents
kept in regular contact with Australians.52 Interestingly, the
number of former students who maintained contact with
formal graduate associations of ex-Australian students was
much lower. This can be partly explained by the absence of
such associations in some countries, but it might also
suggest that personal relationships were a more enduring
and meaningful basis for continued contact with Australia.
Another important dimension of the Colombo Plan
and the cultural exchanges it fostered was the supply of
technical expertise. Australian technical experts may have
been lost among the growing contingent of international
advisors, administrators, and technicians that descended on
Asia in the 1950s, but they played a conspicuous role in the
delivery of Colombo Plan projects and were therefore at the
forefront of cultural interaction between Asians and
Australians. By the mid-1960s, over 500 Australian experts
had completed around 650 assignments in Colombo Plan
countries. Over 40 per cent of Australian personnel
contracted under the auspices of the program went to
Malaysia. Singapore and Thailand received 116 and 105
experts respectively. Smaller numbers travelled to
Indonesia (64), India (37), Ceylon (65), Pakistan (58), and
Cambodia (33).53 The DEA paid experts a basic living
allowance for the duration of their assignments, and they
typically continued to receive their normal wages and
conditions. But they volunteered for these physically and
emotionally demanding assignments, some going on for
years, not for financial gain, but because they genuinely
believed they were fulfilling part of Australia’s obligations
to its regional neighbours.
For many, it would be their first trip outside Australia
to a region they knew little about. Norman Stringer,
agricultural adviser with the South Australian Department
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of Agriculture, travelled to the Mianwali district of
Pakistan in March 1954. Commissioned to monitor the
Thal irrigation project, costing nearly £A1 million, Stringer
approached his task with enthusiasm, diligence, and
fortitude. He wrote to his boss in Adelaide:
the place was in a terrible mess both from an
administrative and cropping or agricultural aspect.
My first job was to rectify the errors that the
Australian had made before me and to try and
retrieve the good name for Australia … bringing
sand dune country into an irrigable state and crop
sufficient area to feed 400 head of milking buffalos
[sic] and Dhni cattle, 1,000 head of sheep and
produce sufficient grain for 1,000 head of poultry
… Being a foreigner not speaking the language all
this has been no easy task particularly during the
summer months with the shade temp. for several
months over 120 degrees mark and at times getting
up to 128 degrees in the shade.54
At the request of the Pakistan government, the DEA
extended Stringer’s assignment for 12 months. While it was
inconvenient for Stringer’s department to be without him
for another year, his director felt it ‘was one way in which
the state can make some contribution to under-developed
regions’.55 In his final appraisal of Stringer’s work, Eric
Harrison, from the DEA, told South Australian Premier
Thomas Playford that Stringer had ‘established excellent
relations with Pakistanis of all grades and this contributed
greatly to his achieving the maximum success possible in
the circumstances in improving farming’.56
The government also actively encouraged high-
profile Australians to show off their technical prowess
under the Colombo Plan mantle. In 1954, Casey
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approached prominent plastic surgeon Benjamin Rank
about the prospect of travelling to Asia to do a ‘series of …
operations on local people whose faces had gone wrong in
one way or another’.57 Rank, who famously performed
reconstructive surgery on John Gorton during the Second
World War, undertook a three-month tour of Singapore,
where he completed over 80 operations and lectured on his
surgical techniques. According to Casey, Malcolm
MacDonald and Gerald Templer from the UK High
Commission were ‘falling over each other with
enthusiasm’.58 Even Walter Crocker, who was usually
hostile to this style of Colombo Plan venture, saw the
potential for a similar visit to India and asked the well-
connected Casey if he might persuade Rank or other
notables. The following year Rank completed an
assignment in India, as did the acclaimed virologist and
bacteriologist Macfarlane Burnet. The surgeon Sir Edward
(‘Weary’) Dunlop and the physician Clive Fitts were among
other prominent Australians to complete assignments
under the Colombo Plan.59
Distinguished visitors such as Rank became conduits
for the government’s heavy-handed message about
Australian values and the significance of Australian–Asian
relations under the Colombo Plan. Leaving nothing to
chance, the DEA gave Rank a ready-made speech, intended
to help him answer any curly questions about the aid
program or immigration laws. The speech emphasised the
‘good neighbourly feeling’ demonstrated by Australian aid,
the presence of Indian students, and shared environmental
problems, notably that large tracts of Australia remained
‘incapable of supporting life and cultivation’. At its most
sanctimonious, Rank’s mock-speech explained that while
Indian men had long been accustomed to avoiding ‘manual
work’, through the scholarship program ‘many Indian
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students in Australia have learned from us the dignity of
labour’.60
Just as the presence of international students
challenged racial stereotypes, so the expert program changed
Australian perceptions of Asian people and work practices.
In 1954, S.W. Dunkerley, a refrigeration expert from
Melbourne, undertook an assignment to advise the Pakistan
government on the creation of a cold storage industry and to
determine what technical equipment Australia might
supply. Accompanied by his wife, who proved ‘an effective
brace’ to Dunkerley’s morale, he travelled to Karachi,
Hyderabad, Lahore, and other provincial cities. Much to his
surprise, Dunkerley met intelligent, courteous, English-
speaking Pakistanis, and ‘big-hearted and big-thinking’
Pakistani scientists, all of whom afforded him a warm
welcome. He commented in his report to the DEA: ‘Like
many Australians, I knew little of what goes on inside the
Eastern countries which are our neighbours’. While
Dunkerley worked, his wife spent her time visiting places of
interest and shopping in the bazaars, but ‘never at any time
did she experience fear or apprehension’. With his
perceptions of Asia substantially de-mystified, Dunkerley
returned to Australia with the ‘conviction that the people of
Pakistan are worthy of all the help that can be given them.
Our Colombo Plan aid should be extended to the utmost,
and Australians should see to it that it is so extended’.
Maybe this would ‘force the man in the street out of his
sense of glorious isolation’.61 Casey could scarcely have
written a better promotional article for the plan himself. Yet
neither Casey, nor anyone at the DEA, tampered with
Dunkerley’s impressions. Following a now well-established
pattern in Casey’s approach to the Colombo Plan, he
welcomed Dunkerley’s ‘frank enthusiasm’ and then saw to it
that copies were sent to major Australian newspapers!62
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Australian officials searched for a politically and
culturally appropriate way of working with Asians. The DEA
was particularly aware of the potentially damaging nature of
the technical appraisals provided to recipient governments.
Overly emphatic reports and ‘undiplomatic language’ had
caused offence to Asian officials in a number of cases, so in
1956 the DEA instructed technicians to first send their
‘tactful reports’ to Australian diplomatic representatives in
their respective countries. The intention, Arnott explained
to Australia’s diplomatic posts across Asia, was not to stifle
criticism, but to ‘ensure that they did not contain offensive
remarks’ or promise further assistance that Australia might
not be willing to give.63 The DEA also watched for signs that
its experts were losing their cool in often testing working
environments — such as the technician sent home for taking
on the role of colonial overlord and attempting to ‘discipline
local labour with his foot’.64
While technical aid and the scholarship program
were valuable precursors to deeper professional and political
links, the use of Colombo Plan experts as cultural
ambassadors was as much an attempt to reduce latent
anxiety over whether Asians would accept Australians as
it was an attempt to promote Australian generosity.
Professional exchanges (through the expert program), and
the personal relations that contact inevitably fostered,
became an important measure of the effectiveness of
Colombo Plan aid and a litmus test of Australian character.
In 1959, H.W. Moegerlein, an engineer with
Commonwealth Railways, surveyed the use of Australian
railcars and rolling stock in Singapore, Malaya (Malaya
incorporated with Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah into
Malaysia in September 1963), Thailand, Vietnam, and the
Philippines. The practical problems he encountered proved
manageable, and local authorities made good use of
Face to Face with Asia 207
Australian equipment. However, the highlight of his trip
came when he met eight Thai engineers who had studied in
Australia. ‘As important as the service they render to their
country is the goodwill they are spreading’, he wrote.
Moegerlein’s pride was palpable: ‘anyone who had doubts
about the success of the Colombo Plan training scheme …
should have seen the expression on their faces when they
were talking about Australia’.65 An equally relieved —
although slightly more muted — response came from the
Prime Minister when in 1955 he told Thomas Playford that
‘independent Australian observers [Colombo Plan experts]
are now returning with reports that Asians are realizing that
the Australian people are friendly and sympathetic to their
aims and aspirations’.66 The anxious search for approval
spilled over into the wider community and was most evident
in respect to the student program. ‘Do they like us?’ asked a
headline in Perth’s Daily News. Reassuringly, they did. But
the sting for Perth readers was that while the students liked
‘us and our way of life’, they found the city ‘dull and
unsophisticated’.67
Rather than averting scrutiny, Asian students, the
expert program, and the ubiquitous propaganda campaign
that accompanied them actually exposed Australia to
international censure. Few could ignore the invective
coming from respected Asian media. The Times of
Indonesia, for example, attacked the Colombo Plan as
empty tokenism: ‘the Australians cannot do enough to
show how much Australians like Asians in absentia. The
Colombo Plan and other such schemes are a kind of blood-
money paid by the Australian to silence his guilty
conscience towards Asians and Africans’.68 At the same
time, however, diplomats such as Tom Critchley, Australian
High Commissioner in Malaya, could suggest that Colombo
Plan students were Australia’s ‘most signal contribution to
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Australian–Malayan amity’. And Peter Heydon, High
Commissioner in New Delhi, could tell Canberra about a
team of Indian editors who toured Australia and on
their return to India wrote enthusiastically about the
student scheme, ‘the hard-working character of Australians
generally and our egalitarianism’.69
The incongruous and contradictory relationship
between immigration restrictions and the personal
interactions between Anglo–Australians and Asians grew
into the decade. By the mid- to late-1950s, diplomatic
correspondence, student writings, and media coverage drew
a distinction between the welcoming and positive reception
Asian students received while studying in Australia and the
harsh rigidity of the immigration restrictions themselves.
Asian writers struggled to come to terms with the possibility
that although protected by racially-based immigration laws,
Australians themselves were not necessarily hostile or
overtly racist. In 1955, after spending three years in
Australia, writer Tennyson Rodrigo returned to Ceylon and
reported that Asian students and educated Australians were
convinced that a colour bar did not exist. The white
Australia policy, he wrote, ‘is purely a government policy
and it does not point to the attitude of Australian society
towards Asians’, and the awkwardness that characterised
encounters between non-Europeans and Australians was
due to anxiety, unfamiliarity, and ignorance — not race. In
a similar vein, the Indian daily paper Hindu explained
quizzically, ‘many forward Asian students find no difficulty
in getting Australian girl partners to dance with them and a
small number of Australian girls have married Asian
husbands. The term colour bar is positively misleading
when applied to Australia’. Asian diplomats in Australia,
while ever critical, also appreciated the subtlety of social
change. In 1960, the Indian High Commission in Canberra
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reported that despite continued intransigence over
immigration, Australia’s ‘impregnable insularity’ was
beginning to subside and ‘the Asian facet of the Australian
personality has been taking clearer shape’.70
Increasing professional and commercial contact with
Asia, the influx of students, and a growing regional
awareness, deepened the cultural tissue of Australian
society. The immediate and tangible contact facilitated by
Asian students built momentum for a campaign to
dismantle the white Australia policy. The Ceylon Daily
News, for example, reported the radical views of the
Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane, Reginald Halse, who
supported the recognition of communist China, welcomed
Colombo Plan students, and wanted to admit a quota of
Asians ‘who would add something to our way of living’.71
The Reverend Thomas Rees-Thomas of the Brisbane City
Congregational Church denied that a quota system would
reduce living standards. According to a report in the
Brisbane Courier-Mail, the Christian church believed
that throughout ‘universities and colleges … there were
thousands of educated and cultured Asians who could not
only live up to Australian standards, but could elevate
them’.72 The basic sentiment expressed by Halse and Rees-
Thomas took a more politicised form when the influential
Immigration Reform Group (IRG) used the Colombo Plan
to expose the dangers of maintaining a policy offensive to
Asian nations. The group, citing the cases of prominent
Asian leaders educated in British institutions, asked
rhetorically, ‘could they have felt the same if the
atmosphere of freedom and racial equality which they
experienced in Britain had been tainted by an immigration
policy that seemed to them a denial of the fundamental
equality of mankind?’ The IRG deliberately refrained from
condemning the Colombo Plan as a total failure. Working
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from an assimilationist perspective, they proposed that
Asian students had demonstrated their capacity for ready
absorption into Australian society. Indeed, this integration
would be enhanced if they could remain permanently:
‘Australia cannot become “home” in their minds …
Knowing that their stay here must be temporary, they have
little encouragement to develop a sense of affinity with or
affection towards this country’.73
Popular attitudes towards Asian immigration only
began to soften from the mid-1950s. In 1943, 51 per cent of
respondents to a Gallup Poll fell into the ‘Keep Out’
category. In 1954 it was 61 per cent. The number of
respondents in this category fell steadily throughout the
decade and stood at 33 per cent in 1960. After increasing to
39 per cent in 1961, it fell sharply to 16 per cent in 1965.74
The pattern described here mirrored a gradual reduction in
the number of respondents who believed that overall
migration numbers were too high. That shift over a decade
was a fundamental change in both national attitude and
people’s perception of what their nation should be.
The government followed by making minor changes to
Australia’s immigration regulations, notably the scrapping
of the infamous dictation test in 1958 in favour of a simpler
entry system.
By the late 1950s, with the white Australia policy
under regular attack, Asian students and the Colombo Plan
played a crucial role in facilitating the turnaround in the
government’s immigration policy. In 1958, Harold Holt,
Minister for Labour and National Service (he was Minister
for Immigration between 1949 and 1956), dodged the
accusation of racism by suggesting that the Australian
people ‘had no better ambassadors’ of their tolerance and
friendliness ‘than those Asian students who come here to
be trained’. Exclusion, he said, merely acknowledged ‘the
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difficulties of assimilation for those with different racial and
traditional backgrounds and customs’.75 But with the idea
that non-Europeans were unable to assimilate so visibly
discredited, by 1966 Holt, now Prime Minister, emphasised,
in an unabashed volte-face, the cultural affinity between
Asia and Australia as a major reason to abandon the white
Australia policy. As he explained in parliament:
Australia’s increasing involvement in Asian
developments, the rapid growth of our trade with
Asian countries, our participation on a larger scale
in an increasing number of aid projects in the area,
the considerable number of Asian students — now
well over 12,000 — receiving education in
Australia, the expansion of our military effort, the
scale of diplomatic contact, and the growth of
tourism to and from the countries of Asia, combine
to make such a review desirable in our eyes.76
Although the 1966 reforms did not see the end of the
white Australia policy, they signalled its imminent
departure. The changing nature of Australia’s interaction
with Asian people during the 1950s and 1960s is succinctly
encapsulated in one of Casey’s diary entries. The day after a
difficult meeting in October 1953 with members of the
Ceylon Cabinet, Casey wrote:
Some things a good many people in Australia should
learn about Asians
– not to patronise them
– not to believe we’re superior to them
– not to misinterpret their good manners
– not to underrate their ability77
By the end of the 1960s, Australia had indeed taken
note of Casey’s patrician reprimand. The nation’s cautious
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embrace of Asia — both officially and in the wider
community — was sufficient to allow the liberalisation of
immigration law without significant political or social
disruption.
————
Through the Colombo Plan education program and the
broader integration of Asian scholars, the Menzies
Government unwittingly unleashed a quietly subversive
force upon the Australian community; a force made more
powerful by its non-confrontational and temporary nature.
Socio-cultural engagement between Asians students and
Australians helped to change imperial accounts of Asian
dependence and passivity into more complex and intimate
appreciations. It also dented Australian dreams of racial
superiority and regional dominance. The assimilationist
credo that underpinned the embrace of the Colombo Plan
and private scholars allowed Australia time to adjust,
understand, and accept radical social and cultural changes
associated with immigration. Interaction between
Australian technical experts and Asians was an important
factor in facilitating a change in outlook among the
Australian people, and broke the myth — at least for
middle-class Australians — that Asians were anathema to
the ‘Australian way of life’. Even Menzies, who had largely
ignored Asia throughout his career, remarked in his memoirs
that the ‘daily association of Australians with students and
scholars from Asian countries has greatly widened the
experience and understanding of our own people’.78
With few exceptions, the experience of Asian
students in Australia proved illuminating and beneficial, for
student and host alike. Official reluctance to look beyond
the narrow frame of foreign policy and cold war politics
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stood in stark contrast to the willingness of the Australian
community to accept and engage with Asian students.
Students may well have become ‘valuable testimony’ to
Australian tolerance, but instead of generating sympathy for
immigration policy, it intensified domestic and international
criticism. But while international condemnation of racial
discrimination was instrumental in encouraging the
attitudinal changes that swept the country, international
pressure alone would not have led the government to
dismantle the white Australia policy. The ideals of equality,
tolerance, and understanding were rendered less abstract by
Colombo Plan students and the thousands of private
scholars who spent time in Australia. The number of Asian
scholars may appear small, but they marked a watershed in
Australia’s cultural development and their appearance on
university campuses and in private homes across the country
provided a sustained challenge to Australian insularity.
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7. A TOOTHPICK TO
PROP UP A SWAYING
SKYSCRAPER
The immediate and unexpected success of the studentprogram in Australia threatened to overshadow the
Colombo Plan’s primary objective: the reduction of poverty
in Asia. Simmering beneath the government’s carefully
manufactured publicity were deep-seated problems with aid
management, the use of Australian projects, and the
complexities of international trade. By the mid-1950s,
much of the early optimism for the Colombo Plan —
arising partly from the sheer novelty and boldness of the
program — had faded, and a more searching and
penetrating body of opinion began to emerge. The
renowned journalist and interpreter of Asia, Peter Russo,
accused aid donors of acting like witch-doctors who saw
little in Asia that could not be ‘cured with brass knuckles or
a brew of politically flavoured handouts’. The Colombo
Plan and other aid programs, he said, amounted to ‘a
toothpick to prop up a swaying skyscraper’, incapable either
of making a constructive impression on Asian economic
development or of forestalling political turbulence.1 The
Royal Institute of International Affairs in London offered
the judicious assessment that although the Colombo Plan
represented the most effective means of conducting an
‘onslaught on extreme poverty’, its progress had been
difficult and slow.2 Chief among those qualified to judge
Australia’s aid program was the journalist Osmar White. At
the conclusion of his six-month tour of the region, White
offered his own assessment of the Colombo Plan aid
program. His report, breathtaking in its scope and audacity,
was a damning indictment of the international aid arena
and, in particular, Australian practice. Corruption, wastage,
gross mismanagement and ineptitude were recurring themes
in White’s appraisal of the much-vaunted Colombo Plan.
The situation was at its most dispiriting in India (one of the
largest recipients of Australian assistance in the 1950s),
where aid was ‘engulfed by the Greater Indian need —
without leaving any measurable impression’. White told a
foreign affairs committee that the task ahead was simply
immense, ‘as far as India is concerned, nothing foreigners
can do will really affect the situation much at all. The
problem is far too big. The most we in Australia can
contribute is a mere drop in the ocean’.3
Inexperience and the lack of a systematic approach
to international aid delivery fostered a cavalier attitude
towards Australian aid to Asia in general, and the capital
aid program in particular. From the outset, government
officials seemed distinctly uninterested in what happened
to goods once they left Australia and were reluctant to
criticise publicly the uses to which Australian gifts were
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put. In keeping with the Colombo Plan’s bilateral spirit,
Australia resisted attempts to implement a systematic or
centralised system of monitoring the technical aid program,
and maintained that such evaluations were ‘something which
individual Governments should do to satisfy themselves’.4
Delegates to the annual Consultative Committee meetings
offered cautious — and always diplomatic — appraisals of
Colombo Plan projects in their respective countries. Donors
and recipients alike rarely used this forum to discuss the gritty
realities of aid delivery and national development.
Assessment of the Colombo Plan within official
circles was sporadic and inconsistent. An undue emphasis
on extreme cases of abject failure or glowing success tended
to obscure any underlying pattern in the efficacy of
Australian assistance. Eager to avoid the charge of
attaching political conditions on the use of aid, Casey
ignored early cases of misuse and mismanagement.
Anticipating the waste of aid or the unlikelihood of aid
halting the growth of political extremism, Casey became
fond of publicly quoting the generous pronouncements
made by Asian politicians, and he always alluded to the
non-material benefits of the program. ‘The significance of
such friendly assistance far transcends its material value’,
Casey told the parliament, recalling the words of India’s
finance minister, Chintaman Deshmukh.5 Even the sober-
minded academic commentators Gordon Greenwood and
Norman Harper were caught up in the excitement, when
they wrote about the ‘meeting of East and West in fraternal
association’ and Australia’s ‘increasing maturity’. But few
could deny that the impact of Australian foreign assistance
and the complexities associated with building Asia’s
economic potential had yet to be evaluated.6
Aid contributions were often not coordinated with
pre-established development plans because of limited official
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regulation or monitoring. This was so despite official decrees
to the effect that support for the Colombo Plan was
‘predicated on the belief that assistance should be within the
context of well conceived development plans’.7 Early
projects, in particular, suffered from a combination of
inadequate supervision, poor coordination, hasty execution,
and ‘unbusinesslike’ procedures. For example, in 1952 the
Pakistan government reported a ‘most embarrassing
situation’, after a shipment of water pumps provided by
Australia had been found to be completely unsuitable for
the job at hand and discarded. With Australia eager to give
and Pakistan eager to receive, neither country sent
representatives to closely investigate the requirements of the
project. A similar case occurred when Australia supplied 200
tractors for the Punjab Canal Links Project. After they
arrived, officials discovered that much heavier vehicles were
required to undertake land reclamation work. Compounding
the error, Australia had supplied two technicians to train
local staff how to operate and maintain the tractors, but the
Pakistan government sent no personnel for training. The
Australian experts left without conducting a single class. For
Australia’s part, Pakistani officials bemoaned the fact that
Colombo Plan aid was not a simple supplement to their
resources because they were often restricted to receiving
‘Australian commodities, material, equipment and facilities’
for a given project.8 Goods and equipment manufactured in
Australia consisted of around 65 per cent of the capital aid
program to 1965. This procedure of ‘tying’ aid to the
resources of the donor country was a common practice,
intended to support local industrial capacity and agricultural
production. Thus, high-wage nations, such as Australia,
forced recipient nations to purchase expensive supplies
and equipment that they might have been able to purchase
more cheaply elsewhere.9 Crocker, for one, felt helpless.
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The practice hampered Australian short-term publicity
objectives as much as it hindered effective economic
development: ‘what little it has accomplished has cost about
three times what it would have in the free market. The same
truth applies to American Aid and to the Technical
Assistance of the UN’.10
Asian governments did not shirk responsibility for
their role in project failure. Contrary to the tenor of many
expert reports and Osmar White’s pronouncements, the
Pakistan government possessed a complex understanding of
the aid-giving environment and the limitations of its own
bureaucracy and work culture. The Pakistan Ministry for
Economic Affairs (PMEA) took a savage view of its project
directors:
most do not appreciate their responsibilities or fail
to live up to them. Sometimes, they act like ‘white
collar’ desk workers, signing papers and issuing
orders rather than field operators, having direct
and daily contact with the job. In certain cases,
they showed deplorable ignorance of the details of
their projects, particularly the list and
specifications of equipment ordered.
The Ministry also resolved to curb the growing
tendency to request foreign expertise on the slightest
pretext and to discourage the attitude that the employment
of a foreign expert would magically solve difficult problems.
This ‘creates a sense of undue dependence and discourages
Pakistani technicians’, the report warned.11
Although the Department of External Affairs (DEA)
rarely knew how much aid they had to spend on the
Colombo Plan until Casey secured Cabinet approval,
Pakistani officials criticised Australia for not disclosing how
much aid would be available each year. Instead, the DEA
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preferred to see what projects the Pakistanis laid before
them, and then to take its pick. When Australia did
volunteer particular material and expertise, the preference
for discrete and often isolated aid projects, while
minimising the risk of a large-scale failure, had significant
ramifications for Pakistan’s national development program.
As the PMEA contended in a major report:
in the case of Australian aid, most of the projects
taken up were not approved projects nor were their
details drawn up in advance. The range of
availabilities in Australia was limited. In the
anxiety to use the aid offered, projects were
sponsored to suit the equipment available: in other
words, the aid led to the project rather than the
project leading to the aid.12 
Australia’s narrow industrial export base, and the
desire to reduce the export of goods with a high US dollar
value, also restricted what Australia could provide, namely
heavy capital equipment needed for complex projects such
as power generation, mills, factories, and port facilities.
Domestic budgetary problems in recipient countries
also hampered the effective use of equipment. In Indonesia,
for example, the 100 diesel buses so conspicuously supplied
to the Djakarta public transport authority soon required
running repairs and modification for local conditions.
Unable to afford the expensive parts — the result of an
unfavourable exchange rate — the authority kept two
Australian experts on site, and they had no option but to
cannibalise 80 buses to keep 20 on the road.13 But the news
was not all bad. A cement pipe plant for the Karachi water
supply project, for example, proved to be a more successful
venture because, as the PMEA stated, a ‘real need existed’
and project managers implemented appropriate planning
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mechanisms.14 Similarly, the Kangaroo Tractor Station in
Anduradhapura, Ceylon, while not without its problems,
appeared to run smoothly. The station served as a repair and
maintenance depot for agricultural equipment hired to
local farmers. On inspection in 1960, Murray Bourchier
from the High Commission reported that the Australian
tractors were well-serviced, in reasonable mechanical
condition, and ‘presented a very smart appearance’.15 Other
successful ventures included the supply of over £A5 million
in railway cars to India and Pakistan, £A1 million in
broadcasting equipment for All India Radio, and an
extensive feeder road construction project in Thailand.
As with most aid projects, quiet success could be
disappointingly anonymous, but failure could be very
public. An Australian official reported that two
earthmoving vehicles provided for refugee resettlement in
Vietnam did not reach their intended communities because
they were too heavy for local bridges, but also ‘because no
Vietnamese really knew how to operate’ them. Public
scrutiny was unavoidable because the large, yellow tractors
stood conspicuously idle between the airport and Saigon.
The Saigon Public Works department did, however,
eventually use the tractors to extend the runway. If the
provision of assistance proved difficult in Vietnam, it was
nothing short of a disaster in Laos. An assessment of
Australian technical equipment by R. Soudre was enough
to test the fortitude of the staunchest advocates of the
Colombo Plan. Of three excavation machines sent to the
public works authority, one was irreparable after being
started when the shipping bolts were still in place, another
rested on the bottom of the Mekong River after a transport
accident on the way from Bangkok, while the third was in
poor condition because of poor handling and lack of
maintenance. Of the seven bulldozers provided by
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Australia, just two were in working order (and being
operated by the Americans), and spare parts for 14 diesel
rollers had been destroyed in a fire at Nong-Kai. Soudre’s
litany continued. No one knew whether three rock-
crushing plants shipped to the area were in operation, or
even where the equipment had been sent! A DEA
representative from Saigon accompanied Soudre on a field
trip and confirmed most of his observations. Together they
also discovered structural equipment provided by Australia
for a sawmill lying unprotected and weathered in the
Saigon goods yards. The final insult to these conscientious
public servants was the assault on their olfactory systems,
with the equipment now serving the locals as a public
lavatory. Soudre was angry at the misuse of Australian aid
and said that equipment should ‘never be sent to Laos
without being accompanied by Australian engineers; nor
should it be provided unless for use on specific and detailed
projects’. He delivered his parting shot squarely at local
people. The Australian government was unlikely ever to
attract people to work in the region, he said, ‘due to the
appalling living conditions in Laos and the obstructiveness
of Laotian officials’. DEA staff chided Soudre as being ‘not
the most tactful of people’. Nevertheless, his observations
were disconcerting, not just because of his indictment of
the Laotian authorities, but because he bluntly confirmed
the worst fears of those administering the Colombo Plan.16
Australia’s reluctance to engage in long-term,
expensive infrastructure ventures stemmed partly from the
obvious wastage, as well as from an inability to gain public
recognition. D.O. Muller undertook an assignment to
Pakistan in 1961 and reported on a deep level of distrust
between himself and the local officials who attempted to
‘suppress all the undesirable features’ of the inspection sites.
More importantly, Muller found no obvious recognition that
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the aid came from Australia; rather it was ‘generally
accepted that the scheme was conceived by the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’. He concluded
that by the time the Tubewells irrigation program solved the
problem of salinity in the Punjab, Australia’s ‘gift of 2
million worth of equipment … will have been completely
forgotten’. By the 1960s, with Casey now retired, diplomats
reasserted their interest in funding sustainable and visible
infrastructure development. The urbane and respected high
commissioner in India, James Plimsoll, reported that ‘what
we need badly in India is some rather large project, in a
place which is easily accessible and likely to be seen by a
large number of Indians; which is almost completely
financed by Australia’. He proposed the construction of a
phytotron, a greenhouse with precise environmental
controls used to study plant physiology and biochemistry.
Simply giving aid to villages was wasteful, he said: 
Some Australians come here, and many
Americans in the Peace Corps, to work in villages.
The young men themselves benefit from the
experience and come back to Australia (or the
US) the better for it. But the gain is often to them
rather than to the Indians they have been working
with. As a general proposition, it is not a choice
between Australia assisting in villages, or in more
sophisticated ways. It is often a choice of the latter
or nothing.17
The DEA’s early fear of a ‘trail of well-written’ but
‘useless reports’ from its technical experts was being
realised. In November 1956, the DEA requested that
Australian diplomatic posts throughout the Colombo Plan
region prepare a general assessment of the expert program,
based on questionnaires completed by the technicians
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themselves. The results showed that while most achieved
their basic objectives, they were hampered by ill-defined
project proposals, worked in ‘lower powered’ positions than
they anticipated, and had generally expected a higher
degree of cooperation from local authorities than they found.
Asians, some suggested, considered Western technicians a
luxury: ‘“frills” from … the Colombo Plan cornucopia’, as the
Australian High Commission in Singapore put it.18 Notably
absent from the official report on the value of expert
assistance was any mention of oversights by Australian
officials and administrators. An independent survey
conducted by Australian National University researcher
Alan Boxer, however, found the DEA wanting. Boxer’s
report revealed that the most persistent problem associated
with the provision of technical expertise was the lack of
feedback and consultation initiated by the DEA. Experts
identified themselves closely with the projects they
undertook and the countries in which they worked. ‘They
had a lot to say about what they had done and how things
could be better organised in the future’, wrote Boxer, but
had difficulty finding aid officials who were willing to listen.
But such concerns had quietly disappeared from the
department’s list of priorities. Of course, the successful
completion of their assignments was important, but the role
of the expert as cultural emissary now overshadowed all
other concerns. Once again, independent and governmental
observers alike considered cultural interchange adequate
compensation for expensive and economically dubious
assignments: the value of the expert scheme, declared
Boxer, ‘greatly exceeds the actual money outlay incurred’.19
The prestige associated with the Colombo Plan scholarship
scheme, which always preceded the technicians, may also
have been some compensation. Often local authorities
enthusiastically received the Australians on assignment and
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politely waited for an appropriate period of time before
asking them if they could organise further training places in
Australia.
Casey’s enthusiasm for the Colombo Plan blinded
him to its faults. Yet observers, such as White, and senior
diplomats also alleged that Australian officials concealed
unpalatable aspects of the aid program from him. John
Quinn, head of South and South–East Asia Branch, and
Walter Crocker, suggested that ambitious officers would
‘fawn on the Minister’s foibles’ and take advantage of what
had become Casey’s obsession.20 Four years later, while on
his investigatory tour, White reported that significant
quarters of the public service had glossed over the failure of
certain projects and generally neglected to ‘inform Casey
on what’s been going on’. For his part, Casey preferred
Asian authorities to manage their own aid allocations, thus
avoiding potentially uncomfortable or destructive cultural
and social misunderstandings. This official indifference to
aid management and the reluctance to tread on Asian
sensitivities helped perpetuate the ineffective management
of Australian aid. White put it forcefully: Australia had
been timorous and ‘profitlessly diffident in failing to make it
clear that reasonable utilization is a reasonable price to ask
for continued aid-giving’.21
With limited resources at their disposal, Australian
diplomatic staff were daunted by the magnitude of the
developmental work facing many Asian countries. The
growing administrative demands generated by Colombo
Plan projects exacerbated official indifference towards what
experts had to say and over the effectiveness of aid. In
Indonesia, for example, senior diplomats were regularly
spending the majority of their time on Colombo Plan
matters. Casey concluded on his 1955 tour of the region
that aid management was ‘absorbing a good deal too much
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time’.22 Rarely receiving explicit advice from Casey or the
DEA in Canberra, this pattern of administration continued
into the decade. According to Francis Stuart, Casey simply
expected that he would ‘get on with the job’ with existing
staffing levels.23 According to Crocker, the spiralling
burden had ‘nothing less than a disastrous affect on the
department’. Administration of aid came to be considered
an incidental, additional chore to the routine duties of
diplomatic posts, often relegated to inexperienced junior
officers, untrained in the assessment of technical matters.24
As the novelty receded and the continuing management
responsibilities mounted, Arthur Tange saw his department
becoming overloaded with the unwieldy task of administering
an ever-expanding program of foreign aid. In the mid-1950s
he decided that another department might better handle the
growing responsibilities associated with the Colombo Plan. In
fact, he hoped to retain policy control and, as he put it, simply
‘off-load the administration’.25 He found no takers. Australia’s
aid program stumbled on under the control of the DEA until
1974, when the Whitlam Labor Government created the
Australian Development Assistance Agency, which brought
together the various functions performed by different
departments since a bilateral aid program (to Papua New
Guinea) had begun in 1946. Renamed in 1976, and again in
1987, the agency finally settled on the title of Australian
Agency for International Development (AusAID) in 1995.
Goodwill
Australian policy-makers placed considerable stock in the
Colombo Plan’s ability to generate benefits incommensurate
with the limited funds channelled through the program.
Personal rapport between officials and the somewhat
amorphous concept of international ‘goodwill’ became an
important measure by which the success of the Colombo
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Plan could be judged; indeed, it was sometimes the only
one. Assessment was also important to allay the concerns of
those who thought that the Colombo Plan did not bring
sufficient benefits to justify the costs. The constant
repetition of the word ‘goodwill’ in departmental
correspondence and public speeches throughout the 1950s
and 1960s helped to establish its legitimacy as part of the
international affairs lexicon. Such imprecise and flexible
benefits also helped the boosters assuage those who decried
the Colombo Plan as a wasted exercise.
Goodwill was often synonymous with the personal
interactions facilitated by the Colombo Plan, and observers
other than politicians also argued that even if aid did not
raise living standards ‘when related to the individual’, it had
‘been an instrument of mutual understanding at the personal
level’.26 To a great extent, this was the only meaningful way
Australia could interpret the usefulness of foreign aid,
especially considering the problems associated with large-
scale project management and the piecemeal nature of the
program itself. Former diplomat and senior DEA official
Malcolm Booker suggested from retirement that despite the
meagre and ‘misdirected’ nature of Western assistance,
personal interaction succeeded in ‘winning the trust and
goodwill of the people’ of Asia.27 Australian politicians used
the outwardly magnanimous Colombo Plan as a diplomatic
tool to build a reserve of goodwill. ‘Goodwill’, said Menzies in
1955, was central to the Australia’s ‘good neighbour policy’
toward Asia. Australia had made ‘substantial contributions to
the store of capital and other goods and of goodwill in several
Asian countries’. Specifically, he contended that:
personal contacts between Asian students and the
Australian people in Australia and between
Australian experts and the countries they have
visited, and the physical symbols of goodwill to be
found in Colombo Plan programs, have all helped
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan230
to make our attitude and the integrity of our
motives better understood and reciprocated in
Asia.28
The impression left by Menzies here is that the
‘stores’ of goodwill being built through Australian
generosity were as tangible and quantifiable as the tractors,
rolling stock, wheat and flour donated via the aid program.
From the very beginning of the Colombo Plan, however, it
was always easy to claim widespread understanding and
acceptance of Australia’s good intentions; it was much
harder to measure it. Nowhere was this more apparent than
with the student program.
The DEA’s failure to instigate a methodical
evaluation procedure resulted from the lack of resources,
the difficulty in locating ex-students, and cultural barriers.
Often assessment was simply beyond the embassy’s capacity
and its knowledge of the country. To gauge the real value of
their benefit to the national economy, said J.M. McMillan
from the Djakarta embassy, ‘would require a far more
thorough knowledge of the apparatus of government in
this country than can readily be obtained by foreign
representatives’. The suggestion that returnees be
approached directly was also problematic. ‘Indonesians tend
to be evasive’, McMillan generalised, ‘particularly in view
of their fear of losing face and of their desire always to
appear more important than they are’. Canberra insisted
that the post must offer some indication of the effectiveness
of the scheme. Going beyond the call of duty, the third
secretary resorted to staging informal social gatherings of
returned students at his home in order to circumvent these
cultural constrictions. Diplomatic staff in Ceylon were also
forced to ‘tread warily when seeking information from
Government Departments’ about the destinations of
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returning Colombo Plan scholars. Once again, informal
evaluations revealed a series of minor problems that marred
the effectiveness of the program. Lack of planning and poor
administration sometimes saw former students employed in
work unconnected with their training. Some students
regarded their Colombo Plan qualifications merely as
something to mark them out for early promotion. The High
Commission also heard reports of cliques forming of
ex–Colombo Plan students (according to the country they
studied in) and ‘for these cliques to be jealous or critical of
one another’. On another occasion, two Ceylonese
nationals who interviewed Colombo Plan students in
Australia, told the commission about the dissatisfaction felt
by students who had experienced a ‘better life materially in
Australia’. They claimed that these students ‘did not relish
the thought of returning to Ceylon’ for the five years
required of them by the Ceylon government and ‘thought
of establishing themselves in the UK or Canada if Australia
would not have them’.29 To a greater or lesser extent,
Australian diplomatic posts throughout Asia expressed
these concerns about the viability of the student program.
Wastage and the potential for abuse by ambitious,
middle-class Asians offended some commentators. The
middle-class leanings of most Colombo Plan students
prompted journalist Peter Coleman to describe the scheme
as a ‘racket for yes-men only’. Coleman suggested that the
scheme shift its focus to provide poorer Asians with
Leaving Certificates. This, he believed, would encourage
economic development and discourage ‘careerist’ scholars.
Chiming in, John Quinlem suggested that money would be
better spent by establishing centres for technical education
in Asia, and reserving scholarships to Australia for talented
Asian post-graduates. Not only would this be more efficient
for building the necessary skills among Asians, but it would
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also address the wastage which occurred because of the
language and cultural difficulties experienced by many
undergraduate scholarship holders. Raffles Professor of
History at the University of Singapore Ken Tregonning
flayed the Colombo Plan for giving Asians an ‘irrelevant’
education ‘opposed to conditions in their own environment’.
His rather thin body of evidence came from personal
experience. Suffering from a painful earache, Tregonning
got no relief from his Australian-trained Chinese doctor.
Only a locally-trained physician recognised his ailment as a
tropical ear infection. ‘I could not help wishing the first
doctor knew more about the diseases of his country’,
Tregonning wrote. The point that training needed to be
better tailored to local conditions may have been valid. But
as Asia’s appetite for Colombo Plan stipends, other
international scholarships, and overseas tertiary experience
in general grew apace, he seemed wide of the mark when he
suggested that ‘in many cases’ outside education led to
‘estrangement, even possibly an emasculation, of those
involved’. And his fanciful suggestion that ‘deculturised’
Asians returned home from Australia unable to
communicate in their native language was based on a deeper
fear about the corruptive impact of Western values.30
Nevertheless, Australia continued to resist the
establishment of education centres in Asia, preferring to
educate Asians in Australia. Cultural exchange and the
search for the elusive store of ‘international goodwill’, even
at the cost of achieving developmental objectives in Asia,
remained an overwhelming government priority.
The DEA was generally less perturbed by the precise
destinations of Colombo Plan graduates. Robert Birch in
Rangoon reported that although Australia had lost contact
with most of the returning scholars, some trainees went on
to provide valuable links to the Burmese government
A Toothpick to Prop up a Swaying Skyscraper 233
service. The embassy in Djakarta posed questions about an
Indonesian Colombo Plan student, Mr Saud, who studied
commerce and price control, then returned to Indonesia,
and within a short time became head of the Criminal
Division of the Djakarta Police. Did he gain valuable public
administration experience while in Australia, the DEA
wondered? Did he just get enough kudos to obtain a
promotion? Did it matter? Indirectly addressing these very
issues, Asian student Chai Hon-Chan acted as an unwitting
propagandist when he took issue with the likes of Quinlem
and Coleman. Encapsulating the government’s prevailing
concerns, he wrote that Coleman’s argument was moot
because Asia’s emerging middle classes were precisely the
social group that needed to experience Australia’s liberal
democracy if progressive development was to be encouraged
in the region. Officials and policy-makers alike accepted
some waste and mismanagement because they were
convinced that ‘the growing cadre of people associated
directly or indirectly with the training aspect of the
Colombo Plan’ was a boon for Australia and stood in stark
contrast to the capital aid program. Copying the American
practice, the DEA proposed to present Colombo Plan
certificates at Australian diplomatic posts throughout Asia.
This presentation, they believed, would help establish
personal contact between the Australian representatives
and returned students and help to ensure Australian
involvement in solving any problems they might encounter
when ‘adapting their Australian experience to local
conditions’, such as the provision of equipment or further
technical assistance.31
A conference of government agencies involved in
the training of Colombo Plan students that met in
Canberra in 1960 was one indication of increased effort to
evaluate the impact of educational assistance. Although
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan234
delegates complained about getting inadequate information
on trainees, they acknowledged that Asian governments,
motivated by the rising demand for the highly prized
scholarships, were beginning to institute rigorous selection
processes and methods of evaluation. By the mid-1960s, the
DEA, in conjunction with the Bureau of Census and
Statistics, set about developing a more sophisticated means
of surveying ex–Colombo Plan scholars.32
Australians expected to be applauded as good and
generous neighbours. But the response of Asian authorities
to the Colombo Plan was equivocal, ranging from
appreciation through to indifference and even hostility.
Asians, while happy to receive aid, did not wish to appear as
lesser or subservient people in need of advice, charity, and
surplus goods. Nor did they accept passively the role of
grateful and pliable recipient. Many Australians working in
Asia were genuinely surprised and hurt by such
ambivalence, and, in turn, responded defensively. Osmar
White reported the Indian attitude to aid as being
‘ungracious and at times obliquely contemptuous’.33 For
others, the ingratitude and righteousness displayed towards
donor nations seemed to grow as they became accustomed to
receiving aid. As Crocker committed to his diary: ‘another
thing to strike one is the widespread feeling amongst
Indonesians, as amongst so many Asian people, that the
better-off-world and especially the West, owes it to them to
give aid a’la [sic] Colombo Plan’.34 Australian experts on
assignment in Asia may well have reported on a changing
attitude towards Australians, but that did not necessarily
extend to a sense of appreciation for aid. With surprising
regularity, those working in the region suggested that very
few Asians were aware of Australia’s aid contributions and
only an educated minority thought more positively about
Australia. Once again, it was only former students and those
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who worked alongside Australian technicians who displayed
any gratitude towards donor countries.35
The goodwill that Australia did generate often had
more to do with timing than the particular effectiveness of
aid projects. Osmar White noted that in Pakistan even
though much of Australia’s aid contribution was inadequate
and mismanaged, it was supplied on a consistent basis at a
time when the Western world regarded the nation with
suspicion. Like Indonesia’s admission to the Colombo Plan,
the ‘spectacularly well-timed’ gift of aid to Pakistan allowed
Australia to gain ‘room for manoeuvre and fields of contact
with Pakistani opinion beyond the normal diplomatic
field’.36 But using aid to bolster diplomatic relations was
fraught with problems. As White explained to the DEA in
July 1959: ‘Goodwill built up in this way is a fragile thing. It
can be destroyed by one ill-timed political speech. That is
the tragedy of it’.37 Of course, the government already knew
this well, but they received an explicit reminder the
following year. In May 1960, the Indian newspaper the
Hindu attacked Menzies’s failure to speak out when South
African police opened fire on black demonstrators at
Sharpeville, killing 67. The paper claimed that by
describing it as simply a domestic and ‘internal affair’, he
destroyed ‘at one blow much of the work of Mr. Casey in
creating a friendly image of Australia’.38
Western allies could be just as fickle towards
Australia’s aid efforts as Asian leaders. In the field, US aid
managers were cooler in their attitude towards Australia’s
use of the Colombo Plan. According to DEA reports,
Australia’s aversion to submerging her smaller contributions
within larger American projects was ‘unsympathetically
received in some instances’, as was the tendency to avoid
difficult projects in favour of ‘politically rewarding’ ones.39
But in diplomatic circles, American representatives in
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Canberra were forced to concede that the Colombo Plan
still had the ‘highest reputation of any of the international
aid programs and has been fully successful in establishing a
framework for Australian assistance’. And, regardless of the
effectiveness of individual aid projects, the Colombo Plan
reduced Australia’s sense of dislocation from Asian affairs.
It facilitated access to all levels of government and enabled
Australian diplomats to get to know a wider range of people
than they might have in its absence. The DEA, quite
rightly, reasoned that the Colombo Plan had ‘much to do
with the opening of doors and the readiness of ministers
and officials in most countries of Asia to give Australian
representations a sympathetic hearing’.40
Yet Australian leaders could forget the Colombo
Plan as easily as they could invoke it. Bipartisan support
(and the concomitant lack of public debate) and
competition from Soviet aid programs took attention from
Western aid, and prompted former Secretary of the DEA,
and now Commissioner in South–East Asia, Alan Watt, to
tell Casey that ‘some of the novelty of the Plan has worn off
and the impact of the Plan upon Asian consciousness has
lost some of its freshness’.41 Menzies’ major statement on
international affairs, made to his own party in 1957,
ignored the Colombo Plan entirely.42 Even Casey, the
plan’s champion, grew less interested: his diaries hardly
mentioned it by the end of his time as minister. It was the
same outside Australia. The institutional success and public
cohesiveness of the Consultative Committee did not make
exciting copy, especially as Asian governments came to
expect and rely on regular aid payments. ‘The Colombo
Plan has lost its initial novelty. It has become an accepted
fact, and a successful institution in the community
of nations’, said Ceylon’s finance minister, M.D.H.
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Jayewardane, during his opening address at the 1955
Consultative Committee meeting.43
Despite the Colombo Plan’s fading lustre, the annual
meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee
prevailed as the diplomatic high point of the aid-giving
calendar — an event that promised opportunities for
Western donors to test, and perhaps draw on, their stocks of
international goodwill. Social events, excursions, and
informal meetings accompanied the formal business of the
week-long conferences. Although the rigours of the heavy
social agenda tested Casey’s stamina, he revelled in the
power and influence at his command. Seasoned diplomat
that he was, Casey worked the floor and took the
opportunity to drop hints about the forms of assistance that
Australia could supply. For example, during the Ottawa
meeting he mentioned informally the availability of
Australian-built light trucks and tractors to the Burmese
delegation: ‘their eyes opened wide’ at the remark, he
recorded.44 The pressure brought to bear on Asian
recipients during these meetings was always subtle. When
donor governments did exert pressure and make
suggestions, this occurred in the congenial atmosphere of a
dinner party or over cocktails. Indeed, often the recipients
of aid had the upper hand, able to canvass a range of glad-
handing representatives, who were in turn eager to appear
generous and obliging.45 Nevertheless, the increasing
importance of informal discussion, and the corresponding
decrease in the significance of official business, was
institutionalised, albeit casually. During the Melbourne
meeting of the Consultative Committee in 1962, the
chairman apologised for pushing delegates to conclude their
business quickly, but said that the formal business was less
significant than the informal discussions after the close of
proceedings. They agreed.46
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Quiet diplomacy
Australia’s Colombo Plan aid may have been sporadic,
limited, and loaded with political and cultural
preconceptions, but it was rarely capricious. The DEA did not
suspend aid in retaliation if a country took a stance at odds
with Australian foreign policy. They also avoided accusations
of providing assistance on a political basis alone because even
though political relations with Indonesia deteriorated over
the West New Guinea dispute, there was no corresponding
reduction in assistance. Certainly, some officials and
politicians would have preferred to use foreign aid as a direct
political lever. The conciliatory and incremental nature of
Australian diplomacy, which played an important role in
securing Indonesian participation in the Colombo Plan, was
lost on some members of the Australian parliament, who
demanded explicit political concessions in return for aid.
Henry ‘Jo’ Gullett, son of the late Sir Henry Gullett, saw
Indonesia’s involvement with Australia as an opportunity to
bully Indonesian elites over West New Guinea:
I trust that the Australian Government, though
under the Colombo Plan it is giving aid to
Indonesia, among other Asian countries, will speak
firmly and bluntly to the Indonesians. I have never
believed that one buys popularity in this world …
Australia should tell Indonesia bluntly that if it
wants assistance from us, we should like it to adopt
a more reasonable attitude towards West New
Guinea.47
Extreme and out-of-touch as Gullett was, he
represented the imperial apologists who lurked ever more
furtively in Australia’s halls of power. But the example
highlights an important evolution in the history of
Australia’s diplomatic service. The gulf between those who
A Toothpick to Prop up a Swaying Skyscraper 239
recognised that Australia’s engagement with Asia required
a more mindful approach and those who maintained a
paternalistic and imperial view of regional affairs continued
to grow. Decision-making power, however, rested with
those who insisted that the political usefulness of the
Colombo Plan arose from the spirit of bipartisan
cooperation it had come to represent. The Assistant
Secretary of the DEA, Keith Waller, rejected suggestions
from his staff to direct Colombo Plan aid to Australia’s
SEATO partners and cut assistance to neutral governments.
The Colombo Plan ‘flourished because political issues have
been kept at bay’, he told Casey. ‘No country has ever had
to vote in a minority in Colombo Plan councils because all
decisions are taken unanimously and harmoniously. It
would destroy the fabric of the Plan to give political
considerations undue weight’. Of course, this did not mean
that the Colombo Plan was about to shed its strategic and
political essence. Aid to India, Ceylon, and Pakistan slowly
tapered off towards the end of the 1950s and flowed in the
palatable form of scholarships and technical equipment to
South–East Asia, notably Malaya, Indonesia, and later
Vietnam; regions ‘where we have an obvious political
target’, explained Waller.48 That shift to the ‘near north’
also reflected a growing consciousness among Australians of
the relative importance of the immediate region over the
old ties of Empire and Commonwealth.
The immediate region to the north was of
particular significance. With a communist nation
potentially sharing a land-border with Australian territory,
Australian relations with Indonesia had greater
repercussions for Australia’s security than any other country
in the region. They would continue to do so for many
decades. John Kevin, Australia’s Minister and Charge
d’Affaires in Djakarta, told Casey in 1953, ‘both as near
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neighbour and for reasons of self-interest’, Indonesia was a
nation Australia could ill afford to ignore.49 As an aid-giver,
Australia had established a greater rapport with Asian
leaders and officials, but the goodwill created by the
Colombo Plan was not always enough to offset the negative
consequences of other aspects of Australian foreign policy.
For example, Australia’s refusal to support Indonesian
claims to West New Guinea, according to White,
‘obliterated memory of Australian support for Indonesian
claims to independence … and had certainly overshadowed
any warmth that might in other circumstances had been
derived from appreciation of attempts at economic,
technical and educational assistance’.50 Australian self-
delusion over this issue featured in a political report written
by Samar Sen, the Indian High Commissioner in Canberra
in 1959. Among a myriad of topics, he suggested that the
Australian government had not realised that Colombo Plan
aid could not repair the ‘ill-will and suspicion caused by its
attitude over West Irian’.51
By the mid-1950s, Australian predictions of
Indonesian militancy were being realised. Indonesia lobbied
the UN General Assembly to force The Netherlands to
enter negotiations over the West New Guinea issue; and in
1955 the Bandung conference of Afro–Asian nations —
that quintessential expression of Asian nationalism —
rallied behind Indonesia. Rising nationalist sentiment,
combined with Sukarno’s increasingly restive and
unpredictable behaviour, prompted Australian officials to
think carefully about the consequences of a breakdown in
diplomatic relations. With Australia still unlikely to change
its position on the issue, the DEA looked to the Colombo
Plan to maintain stable relations. In November 1957,
former Ambassador in Bangkok, David Hay, wrote a draft
memo to Casey:
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The Colombo Plan is perhaps our best way of
keeping open the door to Indonesia … There is
little doubt that our Colombo Plan activities
constitute a very positive aspect of our foreign
policy and that good relations have been cemented
with responsible people in Indonesia by means of
our training programmes, supply of useful
equipment and willingness to undertake such
integrated projects as the printing school and the
central Sumatran medical school. Should there be
any termination or suspension of our aid it would
be extremely difficult to ever recapture the present
atmosphere of our unique partnership under the
Colombo Plan.52
Kevin had also told Casey that providing
scholarships to Indonesia continued to be the ‘best
propaganda’ on offer because opportunities to study in
Australia were ‘greatly appreciated … much sought after
and [receive] wide publicity’. The decision to maintain
Colombo Plan aid to Indonesia, Casey explained to James
Plimsoll, Assistant Secretary of the DEA, represented a
‘mild piece of generosity’ that would pay off in the long
run.53 At this time, however, he was not to know how
quickly things would deteriorate. One week later,
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister since 1957, Dr. Achmed
Subandrio, made the ominous announcement that
Indonesia would no longer seek redress through the
General Assembly, but would pursue ‘action outside the
United Nations’. In December 1957, the Indonesian army
took control of Dutch businesses, banned Dutch
publications, revoked the landing rights of the Dutch
airline KLM, and took steps to repatriate Dutch citizens.
The Dutch responded by calling for a mass exodus and
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan242
more than 40,000 Dutch citizens left Indonesia in a matter
of weeks. Throughout this chaotic time Australia’s
Colombo Plan aid program continued relatively smoothly.
Projects continued to be developed, technical experts
travelled and worked throughout the archipelago, and
students continued to study in Australia. In fact, in 1957
almost 500 Indonesians were attending Australian
educational institutions, or had completed their studies and
returned home – the highest of any Colombo Plan nation
supported by Australia. By 1970, that total approached
1,500.54
Australia also maintained Colombo Plan assistance
when Indonesia aggressively resisted the formation of the
Malaysian federation in September 1963, and President
Sukarno’s policy of ‘confrontation’ saw Australian troops
fighting in Borneo in an undeclared war against Indonesia.
In January 1965, in the face of pressure from the opposition
and the press, Cabinet elected to restrict the negotiation of
new Colombo Plan projects, but to maintain existing
projects operating in Indonesia and the flow of scholarship
holders. Cabinet determined that the ‘abrupt discontinuance’
of Colombo Plan aid risked ‘adverse repercussions without
yielding any balancing advantage to Australia’.55 Menzies
defended the decision by saying that he strove to ‘preserve
our contact with Indonesia in such directions as are open to
us in the hope that this may produce opportunities to work
towards peace and stability in the area’.56 Here was the
Colombo Plan clearly fulfilling an important purpose in
maintaining visible, positive, and non-political contact in
the face of hostilities that, at the time, had the potential to
escalate into a much wider conflict with Indonesia. The
government rescinded its restriction on the negotiation of
new Colombo Plan aid projects as soon as the prospect of a
resolution appeared likely.57 Using the Colombo Plan to
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chart a quiet but persistent path through seemingly
intractable regional disputes had become an important
feature of Australian diplomacy.
A difficult business
However, the Colombo Plan’s usefulness as a diplomatic
tool and facilitator of cross-cultural relations stood in
marked contrast to its ability to generate economic growth.
Piecemeal as it was and wedded to political and strategic
incentives, Australian Colombo Plan aid was spread so
thinly across a wide range of countries that it had little
measurable impact on capital formation. Indeed, the
billions of dollars supplied by Colombo Plan donors did
little to alter the trajectory of South and South–East Asia’s
economic evolution. But in the mid-1960s, the shadow cast
by Rostow’s theorem was long. Although the language
employed by planners and economists became increasingly
sophisticated, the message was the same. ‘No country can
arrive at the “take-off” point purely through foreign aid’,
the DEA advised in 1964 during the first major review of
Australia’s aid program: ‘domestic effort is vital to any
economic development program’.58 The role of trade was
more pronounced than ever before, but responsibility for
economic performance rested squarely with Asian
authorities themselves. And, by regularly claiming that the
Colombo Plan would make people richer in the future,
donor nations could at least distract attention from the fact
that the recipients were poorer at present. Asians were
always encouraged to keep looking towards the future.
Donor nations paid cursory attention to the
complex interplay between trade, aid, and economic
development. This annoyed Asia’s more truculent leaders,
who were only too willing to point out the flaws and
contradictions inherent in the giving of foreign aid. ‘Make
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no mistake’, President Sukarno blustered at a state banquet
for Colombo Plan delegates in Jogjakarta in 1959, ‘the
greatest evils and dangers facing humanity are the perverted
products of a technical civilization centering in the West’.
Of course, he welcomed aid but confessed, with heavy
irony, to being ‘very puzzled when a market manipulation of
prices destroys in one day all the aid and assistance received
in one year’.59 Shattering the collegial and cordial
atmosphere, most delegations found his bellicosity in
‘extremely bad taste and inappropriate to the traditional
harmonious spirit’ of Colombo Plan meetings. Nevertheless,
Sukarno had a point. In the short term, the Korean War
boom pushed up commodity prices for many Asian
countries (and Australia) and increased their foreign
exchange earnings. In turn, this allowed them to spend
more of their own finance on development projects. But
from the end of 1951, as export prices fell, developing
countries lost as much through the deterioration in their
terms of trade as they received in aid. Sukarno’s provocative
speech reminded Colombo Plan donors that recipients of
aid were alive to the impact world markets and trade
barriers had on their economic progress and were unwilling
to fall into the role of grateful and supine recipients.
However, according to the US delegation, Sukarno’s speech
was ‘rebutted without creating sharp dissension’. That
congeniality prevailed was, according to the Americans, a
‘remarkable tribute’ to the atmosphere of the Colombo
Plan. However, it was equally a ‘tribute’ to the reluctance of
delegates to confront the complex relationship between aid
and trade that might otherwise have been expected to
accompany such an outburst. But then the Consultative
Committee never was a forum for discussing the gritty and
often depressing realities of development aid.60
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Australia, like other nations with primary industries
to protect, found itself in the contradictory position of
offering aid on one hand — presumably to help Asian
nations expand their export potential — and invoking
trade barriers to deny competitive access to the Australian
markets on the other. Australian policy-makers found
themselves in a double bind. By resisting pressure to give
unrequited tariff concessions, they increased the obligation
to give more aid. Alternatively, giving trade concessions
might reduce pressure to give aid. The decision to bolster
the Colombo Plan and multilateral aid agencies instead of
negotiating trade concessions emerged as the path of least
resistance. Helping Asia with aid spread the burden and did
not single out the local manufacturers likely to be adversely
effected by freer trading arrangements. Of course, Australian
manufacturers were keen to exploit the increased exposure
made possible by Colombo Plan gifts, yet they were
ambivalent — and often hostile — to the prospect of tariff
reduction and increased competition from Asian imports.
The trade concessions, which might have made a far
greater economic impact than aid, threatened national
economic interests. While gaining access to Asian markets
was a relatively minor factor in the genesis of the Colombo
Plan, policy-makers envisaged that the promotion of
Australian technology, expertise, training facilities, and
commercial produce would generate substantial
commercial business.61 In fact, only very occasionally did
the exposure of Australian equipment under the Colombo
Plan generate commercial interest. Of course, some grew
frustrated at the tantalising but unrealised potential. In
1955, Alexander Downer (Snr) asked Phillip McBride,
Acting Minister for External Affairs, whether Australia
could supply a shipment of dried fruit to Colombo Plan
countries, thus exploiting a ‘hitherto undeveloped market’
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan246
and stimulating a struggling local industry. McBride was
circumspect, explaining that it was usual for Australia to
respond only to explicit requests for goods and equipment.
The government had received no request for dried fruit.62
But it was not policy or a fine sense of morality that
distanced the Colombo Plan from the pursuit of new
export markets. Indeed, the DEA reassured conscientious
officials who expressed concern about taking advantage of
their Colombo Plan connections to foster additional
commercial sales that such transactions were ‘within
normal business methods’.63
In some cases, winning a contract to provide goods
under the Colombo Plan boosted a company’s production
levels and saved them the expense and responsibility of
shipping. However, many Australian manufacturers with
‘comfortable and sheltered’ domestic markets had little
incentive to give priority to filling Colombo Plan orders,
especially when they had little prospect of further sales. In
addition, the ubiquity of US aid (usually tied to the purchase
of American goods) also affected the chances of Australian
manufacturers gaining their share of the market.64 The
typically caustic Tange wrote that in addition to the
‘faltering, uncertain, tardy and relatively inefficient
Australian manufacturing industry’, the inability to break
the ‘franchise arrangements where South East Asia belongs
to the American parent company’ meant that Australia did
‘not seem to have very much ice upon which to skate’.65 In
the 1950s around 10 per cent of Australian exports went to
South and East Asia, mostly in the form of foodstuffs, only
marginally higher than it had been in the 1930s, and slightly
lower than in the 1910s. By the early 1970s this figure had
risen to 15 per cent, largely on the back of limited tariff
concessions granted by Australia in the mid-1960s and not
from any cumulative impact of Colombo Plan aid. With the
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exception of Japan, trade between Australia and Asia
struggled to expand because of low commodity prices,
political instability, concurrent population growth, debt
repayments, and the crushing weight of tariff barriers. The
small market for Australian foodstuffs and the growing
relationship with Japan created a basis for future trade and
regional economic integration. But, in general, in the
poorest nations of Asia there was simply no appreciable
increase in purchasing power to sustain fresh imports.
Perhaps because of Australia’s negligible trade ties
with the region, the Department of Trade and Industry
exerted a powerful influence over the aid review
committee. While defence and political considerations
were important, its officials wanted aid to be given in a
form that contributed ‘most towards Australia’s trade
policies and through them towards Australia’s economic
objectives’. The national mantra of sustainable growth and
full employment meant that Australia had to look towards
Asia for fresh export markets. ‘If Australia is to obtain her
share of the markets in the Less Developed Countries,
particularly in South East Asia, aid must become recognised
as a technique of export expansion’, the departmental
report stated.66 The Department of Trade’s interest in
commercial benefits and the Department of Treasury’s
continuing reluctance to embrace the program soon
brought them into conflict with the DEA.
While no one could accuse Tange of being an
uncritical supporter of the Colombo Plan, to some extent
he took over Casey’s battle with those who sought to
hobble the already tightly-funded program. In the midst of
the review, he declared to his senior officers that the
preoccupation with fostering trade advantages, the
persistent ‘gamesmanship’ from the Treasury department,
and general ‘inadequacy’ of the Colombo Plan added ‘up to
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a rather negative commercial interest in our external aid’
policy. Tange disagreed with the passive and ambiguous
nature of the Colombo Plan. Australia’s aid program, he
reasoned, should be determined by the specific needs of
particular Asian economies and ‘specific Australian policy
objectives’, and not ‘flow from some general preconceived
idea as what level and kind of aid … we ought to give the
outside world’.67 Even those outside the inner sanctum of
inter-departmental policy-making could see the bureaucratic
strictures at play. Heinz Arndt, one of Australia’s leading
economists, wrote that the ‘trickle’ of aid to Indonesia was
‘pushed along by a handful of Australian officials in the face
of heart-breaking frustrations arising from conditions in
both countries’. Australia’s aid program, he continued,
suffered from inadequate administrative support and
relentless pressure from a Department of Trade ‘interested
only in export promotion and the pulls from a Treasury
jealous of the taxpayers’ money and sceptical about the
value of foreign aid’.68 No doubt Tange would have
appreciated Arndt’s analysis.
By insisting that the chance of trade promotion
‘should not be allowed to divert [Australia] from the basic
aims of our aid policy’, Tange did manage to temper the
Trade Department’s forceful presence. But it was not his
intention to emphasise the humanitarian dimensions of the
Colombo Plan. Rather he sought to embed hard-headed
political and strategic imperatives within the broader thrust
of Australian aid policy — of which humanitarian concern
was only one facet. After 15 years, the essence of that policy
remained largely unchanged. The inter-departmental
committee concluded that Australian assistance was
intended to help develop the nations in areas of political
and strategic importance to Australia, lessen the attractions
of communism, stimulate additional markets for Australian
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goods, and foster circumstances to dispose of surplus
commodities. Importantly, the committee believed that the
Colombo Plan continued to demonstrate to the United
States that Australia was prepared to assist the Western
effort to resist regional aggression and subversion, reinforce
the collegial spirit inherent in Colombo Plan dealings, and
give substance to the ‘Commonwealth concept’.69 Cabinet
approved the review’s broad direction. However, it scotched
recommendations to restrict involvement with the soon-to-
be-opened Asian Development Bank, an institution the
DEA considered of ‘doubtful utility’.70 Japan and the
United States strongly supported this UN-managed
organisation, which provided loans and technical assistance
and brought together 30 regional governments and 14 nations
from Europe and North America. Fearing regional ostracism,
Australia soon fell into line.
The DEA had learnt valuable lessons from 15 years
of giving aid. Drawing on this experience, the review spelt
out the attributes essential to the successful and efficient
completion of an aid project. This basic framework, while
elementary stuff for aid managers today, was not obvious to
a department with such limited experience in supplying
overseas aid. Where aid was accompanied by training and
carefully targeted to ‘break a bottleneck in the local
economy’, it was more likely to meet its objectives. Projects
without diplomatic support, local involvement, and
continuing financial backing would inevitably falter,
languish, or fail altogether. The absence of a forward-
planning provision in the annual budget restricted the
ability of developing nations to predict the amount of funds
likely to come from Australia and so allow them to initiate
large-scale projects. The restriction on supplying equipment
when the imported content exceeded 33 per cent or if the
US dollar content exceeded 10 per cent meant that very
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few manufactured goods could be donated. Australia could
not contribute to the hydro-electricity schemes in India
because the generators were not made in Australia.
Significantly, the DEA realised ‘the same limitation applies
to most “prestige” projects or industrial ventures’. The
restriction also stopped Australia undertaking many
‘complete projects’ if there was an item of equipment
required from overseas. For example, Australian aid workers
could not complete the construction of a school in Khulna,
Pakistan, because some steel rods were only available
outside Australia. The DEA’s review also acknowledged
that the failure to provide flexible loans or credits, which
allowed recipients to buy in the cheapest markets, meant
that the department was unable to initiate major projects
and ‘very few worthwhile development projects cost less
than £1 million’. Not only did this hamper attempts to
promote the importation of Australian goods, it denied
Australia the opportunity to create ‘interest and capital
repayment obligations [which] could act as a stimulus to
ensure the optimum economic use of the resources
provided’.71 In other words, by encouraging poor countries
to repay loans, Australian authorities could argue that they
were building economic incentives into the aid projects
themselves. These incentives would then ensure that the
projects worked efficiently and generated income. Yet the
economic situation in developing Asia was not this simple.
The Consultative Committee reported in its final
communiqué in 1966 that already a ‘substantial proportion
of the assistance obtained by developing countries is being
repaid in the form of interest and installment payments on
debts contracted earlier’. By the 1970s, many developing
countries were trapped in a vicious cycle of producing cash
crops to satisfy loan requirements that restricted their
capacity to sustain their own development programs. In
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turn, this process kept industrial powers supplied with
cheap primary commodities. Political economists labelled
the intractable problem ‘dependency theory’.72
By the mid-1960s, Australia spent a greater portion of
national income on aid than at any time in its history,
supporting a growing array of multilateral aid agencies in
addition to a further £A1 million a year for the Colombo
Plan. Australians, too, had grown accustomed to giving aid
to the region. Opinion polls reflected this attitude, with the
proportion of respondents supporting the provision of
humanitarian and educational assistance hovering between
50 and 60 per cent throughout the decade. More
significantly, the proportion of those who thought the
government should reduce or cease giving aid altogether fell
from 40 to 24 per cent. The student program was by far the
most popular feature of Australian aid. In 1960, around 90
per cent of respondents were aware of the program, and 80
per cent were in favour of it. Seventy per cent thought that
Australia should extend the invitation to African students.73
Support for expanding government assistance also came from
unlikely quarters, such as the Victorian Country Party, which
passed a resolution in support of giving one per cent of
national income as foreign aid. The government now sought
to appease those among them who sought to open the
national coffers, in contrast to the succession of foreign
ministers who had spent years haggling and cajoling their
uninterested colleagues. In 1967, Holt pacified Country
Party whip Winton Turnbull by telling him that Australia
already supplied 0.65 per cent of national income as foreign
aid, second only to France and Belgium. It made more sense,
he wrote, to examine what was being done with Australian
money rather than simply spending more.74
The proliferation of non-government aid agencies
also reflected community interest in assisting the developing
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world. In 1965, non-government aid organisations in
Australia formed the Australian Council for Overseas Aid
(ACFOA). The ACFOA functioned as an interface
between the government, the UN, and a growing number
of community and religious groups that had organised
voluntary aid programs since the Second World War.
Among its members were Apex, Lions Clubs, the YMCA,
the YWCA, the Australian–Asian Association of Victoria,
the Australian Council of Churches, the Australian
Council of Aid to Refugees, the Australian Red Cross
Society, Community Aid Abroad, the Society for Relief in
India and South–East Asia, and the Freedom from Hunger
Campaign. Non-government organisations conspicuously
picked up the humanitarian shortfall of the government’s
aid policy, and by the 1980s the ACFOA’s original
membership of around 20 groups had tripled.
In the early 1960s, a group of Melbourne academics,
including the economists Anthony Clunies-Ross and
Richard I. Downing, formed a lobby group advocating the
spending of one per cent of national income on foreign aid.
Taking an idea already espoused by Community Aid
Abroad, the ‘One per cent’ group employed a more
detailed, and, it might be said, more coherent application of
the government’s own argument for assisting the region.
Although driven by a strong humanitarian impulse, they
stressed the political, strategic, and economic benefits likely
to come from economic expansion in Asia. ‘Imagine the
changes that would come about if the major low income
areas of the world attain appreciably better living standards
by 1980’, the writers enthused. ‘The people of these areas
will be more numerous, and will consume more per head of
industrial materials … [and] much of the extra food and
agrarian raw materials they consume will have to come
from imports’. And they also knew that in order to embrace
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this new age of economic expansion Australians would
have to relinquish their fears of Asian population growth
and start to see ‘our neighbours as real people rather than as
vast (and necessarily predatory) hordes’. However, it was
over trade policy that Clunies-Ross and his co-authors
departed from government policy. The ‘cautious
liberalization’ of the tariff and import restrictions they
recommended, structures which had hitherto hindered
Asia’s industrial growth, were still decades away.75
Government leaders pushed the idea that Australia herself
was a ‘developing’ country and refused to offer loans as part
of aid because of her own large-scale borrowing from
overseas: an idea that academic economists such as Heinz
Arndt dismissed publicly as ‘sheer humbug’. Yet, the
powerful sentiment struck a deep cord with how
Australians perceived their own role as developers of a vast,
underpopulated land, and it was successful in restraining
the Colombo Plan and other aid initiatives. John McEwen
made Australia’s special status official at the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development meeting in
1964, when he lobbied for Australia (and other net
importers of capital) to be excluded from a resolution
asking wealthy nations to offer one per cent of their
national income as foreign aid.76
For Australia, the failure to imagine Asia as anything
other than a homogenous collection of buffer states
obscured the specific economic and cultural factors that
determined the effectiveness of each aid project. Although
a believer in the Colombo Plan, Osmar White was among
those who challenged the prevailing faith in the ability of
aid projects to fit seamlessly into existing development
programs and benignly launch Asia’s economic growth.
The DEA ‘failed to understand that effective aid-giving
poses a different set of problems in every country’, he told
Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan254
his boss at the Melbourne Herald. The ‘Paks, Indians,
Nepalese, Burmans and the rest have different
temperaments, skills, prejudices and reactions. Except in
the broadest sense you can’t have a Colombo Plan policy;
you’ve got to have 17 separate policies guided by a unifying
set of principles’. In parliament, some members were
beginning to sense that issues of regional development were
becoming more complex and the policy options less
assured. As one member said in September 1959: ‘Take a
country like Malaya … It is an under-developed and under-
populated country. But it is a wealthy country. It produces
rubber and tin … I think we use this term far too broadly
when we say that there are starving millions in the near
north’. At the very least, public debate exhibited a more
inquiring approach to Asian–Australian affairs and marked
a departure from the formulaic conventions that had
shaped earlier Australian perceptions of the region.77
How did Australia’s aid program respond to these
subtle cultural and attitudinal shifts? Behind the DEA’s
application of the universal logic of ‘take-off’ theory, there
appeared to be an emerging appreciation of the complexity
of giving aid to an economically, politically, and culturally
diffuse region. Improving the effectiveness of aid delivery
required more than improving accounting, auditing, and
the supervision of public expenditure, the review said.
Policy-makers also needed to consider the ‘susceptibilities
of sovereign states and the complex psychological reactions
that former colonial non-European peoples have towards
richer Western nations’.78 Significant as this change was, it
is important to remember that the DEA couched these
sensitivities less in terms of meaningfully addressing
developmental issues and more in terms of easing the
passage of Australian economic and foreign policy
objectives. The government based its expanded aid
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commitments of the mid- to late-1960s on the assumption
that communist China (and north Vietnam) would
maintain expansionist pressure against the 18 non-
communist countries in the region. In the face of
overwhelming problems associated with development
assistance, the DEA in general, and aid policy-makers in
particular, retreated behind the glib maxim that had
governed aid-giving over the last 15 years: the idea that,
given time, development and peaceful prosperity would
take care of themselves. The primary objective of
international assistance revolved around generating
economic and political dividends for the donor
government. The major goals for Australia remained
the cultivation of political contacts, minimising the impact
on Australia’s balance of payments, and maximising
the ‘opportunity to introduce Australian goods to new
markets’.79 So too, when Australia’s diplomatic representatives
met in 1964 to discuss aid policy administration, they
agreed that increased pressure to contribute to multilateral
agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank, would
reduce bilateral spending. The Colombo Plan’s annual
meeting, they said, risked losing its ‘pride of place amongst
regional economic meetings’.80 And with it, they might
have added, Australia’s conspicuous reputation as an aid-
giving regional power.
Australia’s attempts to generate political influence
through aid worked against a growing raft of difficult
international issues likely to alienate Asian leaders. The
major issues included support for US defence policy, support
for Dutch control of West New Guinea, endorsement of
British action at Suez, maintenance of a protective tariff
system, and the failure to condemn the South African
government’s apartheid policy. But while the 1965 review
warned against over-estimating the extent to which
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Australian policy had been accepted, it also reiterated the
view that aid could ‘demonstrate our good intentions’ and
alleviate the handicaps imposed by what had become the
pillars of Australian foreign policy.81 The government’s
predominately realist approach to international affairs
continued to be girded by an optimistic faith in the
Colombo Plan’s ability to convince the world of Australia’s
probity.
Since 1950 Australia policymakers subordinated the
selection, monitoring, and evaluation of foreign aid to a
narrower quest for political and strategic advantage and
regional status. The tendency to spread aid projects thinly
over a wide array of small-scale undertakings was based on a
preference for maximum exposure over substance. In turn,
this reduced the impact of Colombo Plan projects in Asia,
both in terms of their capacity to foster economic change
and, ironically, in terms of their ability to generate positive
publicity for Australia. The inexperience and indifference
displayed by diplomats and high-level policy-makers,
combined with widespread waste and mismanagement of
Colombo Plan resources, also severely limited the potential
of the program to effect economic growth in the region’s
poorest countries.82 For the most part, Casey and the DEA
worked in full knowledge of these limitations. Experts,
independent observers, and academics suggested ways to
release the Colombo Plan from the constraints through
which it operated, but the government’s unwillingness to
divorce aid from foreign policy entrenched an inflexible
and doctrinaire approach. In thinking about the Colombo
Plan’s capacity to initiate substantive economic change in
Asia, we might take a broad interpretation of what
irrigation expert D. Muller said when he returned after
completing his assignment: ‘we in Australia’ have
developed a distinct capacity to ‘mislead ourselves’.83
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8. CROSSING 
THE FRONTIER
Since the Second World War a pervasive uncertaintyabout Australia’s regional presence has spread across the
political landscape. True, that anxiety had been there since
settlement, but the experience of war and its aftermath
intensified national ambivalence towards the region.
A monolithic ‘Asia’ emerged as Australia’s northern
frontier, a place whence future enemies might come, but a
place most knew needed to be more deeply understood.
Paul Carter, in his history of Australian settlement, The
road to Botany Bay, argued that the notion of the frontier as
a barrier, a ‘one-sided, unified line of defence or attack’, was
of limited value in explaining the settlers’ relationships to
each other, the land and the indigenous people. It was
better, he argued, to look at the frontier not as a barrier, but
as a place of communication and exchange: ‘It enables the
settler to establish who and where he is. This is my clearing,
that beyond is not’. We can understand the settler’s
presence, not in exclusive opposition to those around him,
but only in relation to his surrounding. ‘The settler himself
takes advantage of his distinction to make his own position
clear. The boundary is not a barrier to communication.
Quite the opposite: it gives the settler something to talk
about’.1
Carter’s interpretation is particularly useful for
understanding the nature of Australia’s relationship to Asia
since the end of the Second World War. In 1950, when
Spender told parliament of the immutable limitations and
responsibilities of Australia’s geography, it was as much an
admission of territorial and cultural vulnerability, as it was a
call to recast the outmoded concept of the frontier which
had retarded Australia’s engagement with the region. The
fluidity of political and social change in the region, the
uncertainty of decolonisation and the mounting tension of
the Cold War moved Australia to question where the
boundary with Asia lay. The frontier could not be a ‘unified
line of defence’ — the nature of communism (as defined by
Percy Spender and others) would not allow it. Australia’s
conception of — and approach to — the Cold War meant
that two frontiers were in operation. One, a tangible
strategically defined boundary measured by borders and
armed encounters, and the other, an indeterminate and
vague mental frontier requiring a sustained propaganda
battle. The frontier had become amorphous and Australia’s
security and prosperity would not come from isolation, but
only through helping others to develop and resist. The
cornerstone of this policy, Spender declared, was
engagement via a ‘sustained and determined effort in every
field of human activity, including the political, economic
and spiritual fields’.2
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If the intangible nature of ideological conflict helped
bring the Colombo Plan into existence, the outbreak of war
in Vietnam cast the merits of the aid program into much
sharper — and starker — relief. On 13 August 1964, the
first full debate on the regional and global implications of
conflict in Vietnam took place in the House of
Representatives. Although the debate was ostensibly over
the merits of the Menzies Government’s decision to issue a
statement wholeheartedly supporting the US decision to
increase its involvement in Vietnam in the wake of the
Gulf of Tonkin incident,3 it was quickly transformed into a
much wider debate about the use of foreign aid versus
military might in the struggle against communism. The
faithful continued to use foreign aid to attack the
government’s claim that there was ‘no current alternative’
to military intervention. Labor leader Arthur Calwell spoke
of the need for an ‘expanded programme of economic and
social aid’ which would help to ‘ensure that the inevitable
economic and social revolution in South East Asia is not a
Communist revolution’. To back his claim, he stated that
the Labor Party pledged one per cent of national income for
overseas aid, roughly twice the Menzies Government’s
allocation. Another member, drawing inspiration from
Colombo Plan initiatives and the personal contacts they
fostered, protested vainly: ‘We must convince both the
South and North Vietnamese that we have a better way of
life than the Communists have. That is the only answer.
We must live amongst them, talk to them and work with
them as the Communists are doing’.4
Yet fifteen years of giving aid to the Asian region had
failed to ‘draw the teeth of Communist imperialism’ and
remove popular sympathy for revolution.5 In the mid-1960s,
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on the crest of Asia’s most bitter and divisive conflict, rarely
had the commitment to Asian economic development
seemed so marginal to Australia’s approach to containing
the spread of communist ideology. Evatt’s idealistic vision of
first securing ‘freedom from want’ and thus removing the
systemic basis of instability had been turned on its head.6
The Minister for the Navy, Fred Chaney (Snr), unwittingly
reversed Evatt’s rhetorical hook when he said that ‘people
should first be given freedom from attack and freedom from
the fear of attack’ before experts could offer advice on health
and social welfare. More colourfully, Henry Turner, Member
for Bradfield (NSW), asked: ‘How can the man who fears,
when he leaves his village, that, while he is away his child
may be kidnapped, his wife may be murdered, or his village
burnt down, give attention to instruction from an
agricultural expert on how to tend his rice paddy?’7
Opposition protests were in vain and with the outbreak of
war, it became clear to all that the plan to create a model
Western-style democracy, and thus forestall regional
disquiet, was little more than a fantasy of the post-war
imagination. The technical and financial aid Australia gave
to political trouble spots in Asia did little to allay feelings of
insecurity and the need for a military alliance. Armed
resistance was part of Australia’s strategy to check the
advance of communism, Paul Hasluck told Parliament:
‘behind the shelter provided by regional security
arrangements the countries of South and South–East Asia
wish to pursue their objectives of social and economic
progress. To help them to do that is the purpose of the
Colombo Plan’.8 In the official rhetoric, the success of the
Colombo Plan now depended on the military intervention it
was nominally supposed to have precluded.
The apparent failure of aid to prevent conflict,
however, did not stop Hasluck from generating greater
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interest in the Colombo Plan, in large measure because of
his strong Cabinet performance. Between 1964 and 1967,
Hasluck increased the bilateral aid budget (excluding Papua
New Guinea) from $14.1 million to over $34 million.9
Indeed, from retirement, Hasluck wrote that the expansion
of Australia’s aid program gave him the greatest sense of
achievement while foreign minister.10 He also took an
interest in the administration and organisation of aid
programs, and he confronted the tendency to tie bilateral
assistance to Australian produce and the crippling effect
this had on the real value of foreign assistance.
Most welcomed the Colombo Plan as a valuable
contribution to regional relations, but open, generous, and
responsive engagement with Asia did not always command
broad endorsement. Although giving aid to Asia became a
consistent and important facet of Australian foreign policy,
it was not central to the government’s political agenda and
was often overlooked when more important and immediate
issues were raised. To suggest that Australian policy-makers
worked towards a clear set of policy objectives for the
Colombo Plan would be to attribute, somewhat artificially,
a coherence and direction to Australia’s foreign aid policy
that did not exist. The imprecise and largely unquantifiable
nature of many of the Colombo Plan’s objectives frustrated
those eager for a more concrete basis on which to base their
aid policies. The administration of aid projects involved
many bureaucrats and diplomats in detailed and difficult
work, associated them with corruption and failure, and
strained the resources of their posts. Many were dismayed
and angry at the lack of gratitude displayed by Asian
leaders, and preferred to get on with tasks which they saw as
central to diplomacy. Casey’s obsession with publicity
and propaganda was as much an attempt to overcome
bureaucratic resistance and enlist the support of those who
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were otherwise indifferent, as it was to burnish Australia’s
national image in the fight for the hearts and minds of Asia.
A successful public relations campaign offered an
alternative way to assess the Colombo Plan other than by
using quantitative economic measures.
The equivocal attitude of Australian diplomats
toward the Colombo Plan stemmed as much from
inexperience and uncertainty about Australia’s relationship
with Asia as it did from a diminished faith in foreign aid to
secure Australian interests. The ambivalent attitude of
Australian officials towards the broader impact of the aid
scheme is one measure of the anxiety the program caused,
rather than allayed. Throughout the 1950s, Australian
officials greeted the Colombo Plan with a range of
emotions, from cautious approval to outright hostility.
Sometimes, they held both views simultaneously. No one
had more experience with the high-level administration
and policy direction of the Colombo Plan than Arthur
Tange, Secretary of the DEA from 1954 to 1965. ‘We count
too much on the Colombo Plan’, he told Casey, the
program’s patron saint, in 1955:
Australia’s contributions can be of no major
significance in the eyes of the political leaders of
India, Burma, Indonesia or Thailand … It has no
effect upon their assessment of where Australia
stands in international political issues because it is
a thing apart, except in so far as it demonstrates a
willingness to offer a small amount of friendly help
… I also fear that, by overemphasis in our
publicity, we may arouse a counter reaction, not
always indulgent, against patronage and what may
be regarded as an effort to compensate for lack
of Australian support on more fundamental
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questions such as ‘American intervention’ or
‘colonialism’.
Yet he claimed with equal conviction that Australia’s
‘standing is certainly better than if we contributed nothing.
We pick up the goodwill disseminated by students, and
technical ministries with whom we co-operate. We take the
edge off our immigration policy … It is a most valuable arm
in our foreign policy’.11
Politicians and policy-makers felt that after fighting
in two world wars Australia had earned a right to act in
concert with the great powers. Liberal parliamentarian
Kent Hughes captured this sentiment candidly in 1954,
when he remarked that Australia deserved to have its ‘voice
heard in the councils of the world’ but ‘must avoid the two
extremes of making too much noise and of sitting silent on
the sidelines’.12 As Australia juggled its commitment to
alliance politics and regional engagement, the Colombo
Plan offered a gentle means of building rapport with Asia.
Even a cursory survey of inward correspondence from Asian
posts shows how frequently the Colombo Plan formed the
basis of diplomatic contact, being often used as an
icebreaker before broaching weightier issues. Neighbourly
goodwill, although built on shaky foundations, still had the
capacity to determine the mood of the next diplomatic
meeting, the next regional conference, or, at worst, the
next confrontation. It was crucial to building relations,
especially where previous dealings had been limited or even
hostile. The establishing of closer economic relations with
Japan and the maintenance of diplomatic contact during
Indonesia’s policy of ‘confrontation’ form but two examples.
While the Colombo Plan was a step towards
engagement and mutual understanding, it did little to
challenge the geo-political precepts that shaped the official
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imagination. The basic premise from which Australian
policy-makers approached the region in the decades after
the end of the Second World War (namely, that South and
South–East Asia were keystones in Soviet and Chinese
plans to dominate Asia) remained largely unchanged. Asia,
as it existed in the shadow of the Cold War, was both
threatened and threatening. The looming threat of
communist expansionism and Australia’s proximity to a
people they perceived as desperately poor, weak, and
vulnerable struck at the centre of Western ideas about
progress and stability and formed a powerfully unsettling
image. The military and strategic objectives — and their
associated cultural and economic objectives — that drew
Australian policy-makers into Asia defined and limited the
terms on which Asia was represented and understood.
Trapped by the seemingly inescapable polarities of the Cold
War, this reductive view gave the Colombo Plan much of
its momentum. Of course, the simplistic and fearful
interpretation militated against the recognition and
acceptance of differences between Asian countries and
their peoples. In time this would change, but it would take a
bitter, divisive, and ultimately futile war to convince them
that Asia was more than a collection of politically
malleable and culturally homogenous buffer states.
And yet, on university campuses and in homes and
hostels across the country, interactions between Australians
and Asian students enriched and challenged Australia’s
knowledge of the region. Partly because these exchanges
brought about by the scheme precluded overt control, they
were able to circumvent the distortions imposed by the Cold
War agenda. The government had no way of predicting how
Australians would respond to Asian students, or how
students would interpret and tell of their experiences once
they returned home. For many Australians, the exposure to
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Asia that the Colombo Plan facilitated came in a
remarkably contradictory form. The devious and ruthless
communist insurgents penetrating vulnerable minds
throughout Asia and beyond, as described in parliament, the
popular press, and official appraisals, must have seemed a
world apart from the urbane, middle-class Asians seen in
ever increasing numbers in Australian universities. The
experience for the thousands of experts sent to Asia on their
first assignments was similarly challenging.
Cultural exchange proved to be the most enduring
aspect of the program. In Australia, some welcomed the
exchange, others were apprehensive, but few could deny
the growing awareness of Asia taking place in Australian
society. Under the Colombo Plan those Asians perceived as
poor, numerous, diseased, different, and threatening stayed
at home, and those who were young, clean, English-
speaking, and not seen as competitors for Australian jobs
journeyed to Australia — and they came temporarily.
Generally, they were welcomed. They were Australia’s
guests and Australians thought themselves good and
generous neighbours by having them. Suspicion of
inferiority, racial pollution, political disruption, and moral
contamination — long associated with Asian people —
began to fade. Instead, the presence of Asian students
stimulated a desire for genuine social pluralism and a
distaste for the hollow trappings of government and media
propaganda. One student, writing in the University of
Sydney newspaper Honi Soit, asked earnestly, ‘How long
will it be before they notice that each time they are invited
to a social function they meet the same small group of
people — those thoughtful few to whom “international
friendship” is something more than a phrase occasionally
heard in overseas news items, something in fact personal
and relevant to our own daily lives’.13 The acceptance of
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Colombo Plan scholars and the arrival of more students,
who were seen in a similar light, resulted in a significant
weakening of the basic arguments that bolstered the white
Australia policy. People who were manifestly different were
not necessarily a threat. Colombo Plan scholars did not
provoke racist incidents or endanger social and economic
stability, and they paved the way for the acceptance of
thousands of private Asian students, who have become an
important element of today’s tertiary education system.
The Colombo Plan also exposed the ambiguities of
Australian loyalty to Britain and America. In June 1961,
the heads of Australia’s diplomatic posts across Asia met in
Bangkok. They agreed that while the flow of Colombo Plan
students afforded Australia a distinctive regional presence,
they wanted an identity that would help them avoid the
undercurrent of ‘envious resentment’ directed against the
United States and the automatic assumption that Australia
was the same as Britain. The process could be accelerated
if they could ‘discard some of the constitutional forms
and terminology which to unsophisticated minds suggest
dependence on the UK’. For a start, they wondered whether
‘the Queen might be described more often simply as the
Queen of Australia and that Australian representatives
might perhaps be “Her Australian Majesty’s Representatives”
rather than “Her Majesty’s Australian Representatives”’.
While not the cry of a rabid republican, such gentle
resistance to the trappings of empire signalled that those
representing the country to the outside world thought
Australian interests would be better served by an ‘independent
country with its own identity’.14 And foreign aid had
proved a valuable and relatively inexpensive tool for the
assertion of that distinctiveness.
This argument is not a case of ‘leaching the “empire”
out of Menzies’, to borrow Greg Pemberton’s colourful
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phrase. Nor is it to imply that political leaders always
exuded strongly nationalist sentiments, as opposed to
imperialist inclinations. Instead, the point is to suggest that
the Colombo Plan was part of a realisation that Australia
would have to establish intimate bilateral relations with
Asia on a myriad of economic, political, and defence issues,
irrespective of its military connections to the United States.
Again, this is not to argue that Australia did not agree with
and support the approach of Western powers. Rather, that
loyalty did not denote servility or pliable dependence. In
relation to the Colombo Plan, Pemberton’s argument that
‘Menzies and his close associates admitted to themselves
that their policies meant the denial of national sovereignty
in foreign policy’ is clearly overstated.15 Australia capitalised
on the inflexibility or absence of US aid as a means of
creating a distinctively Australian connection with Asia.
Australia took a leading role in actively drawing as many
non-Commonwealth Asian nations as possible into the
Colombo Plan, partially as a means of enhancing the
Australian flavour the scheme came to possess. Indeed, the
independent nature of the approach irritated officials in
Washington and London. Australian diplomats and policy-
makers alike quickly seized upon the unprecedented and
unexpected success of the student program as an ideal way
of projecting Australian values into the region and
conferring a uniquely Australian influence upon Asian
scholars. The aid program also helped to create a dialogue
between Asians and Australians, on an official and personal
level, that had hitherto scarcely existed. Through the
Colombo Plan, Australia came to see the virtue, if not the
necessity, of sustaining an identity that was at arm’s length
from the United States and outside the old bonds of empire.
The Colombo Plan’s bilateral aid structure gave the
program its particular salience in the fractious regional
Crossing the Frontier 273
climate and allowed donor nations to secure their own
foreign policy objectives. For Australia, this feature was
particularly useful in order to build a regional identity via
its aid contributions. These congenial and non-coercive
administrative arrangements, and the Consultative
Committee’s lack of decision-making power, rendered the
Colombo Plan something of an international curio.
According to an appraisal from the UK Foreign Office, the
plan resembled ‘a building which, though constructed in
defiance of the rules of architecture, gives admirable service
only as long as no one attempts major changes liable to
overload the structure and bring about its collapse’.16
Indeed, the shallow inclusiveness of the Colombo Plan
continued to be one of its defining characteristics. Four
‘fringe members’ joined the program in the early 1960s:
Korea and Bhutan (1962), and Afghanistan and the
Maldive Islands (1963). Australia lobbied vigorously for
each inclusion, with the aid relationship ‘our only real
point of contact with these states, in none of which does
Australia have resident representation’. First Assistant
Secretary Ralph Harry told Tange that tiny states such as
Bhutan, wedged between India, China, and Tibet, needed
‘some added Western stiffening’, but he also admitted that
Australia’s aid to these new members was ‘purely of a token
character’.17 The tradition of providing small amounts of
assistance to an increasing number of geographically and
politically diffuse nations continued into the 1970s, with
the membership of Iran (1966), Singapore (1966), Fiji
(1972), Bangladesh (1972), and Papua New Guinea (1973)
bringing the total number of member nations to 27.
Despite the limitations of the Colombo Plan and the
pre-eminence of geo-strategic considerations, Australia’s
relations with Asia had become increasingly complex since
1945. In spite of the hope of the principal designers and
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advocates of the Colombo Plan, Spender and Casey, the aid
program had not rendered the complexities of Asia less
threatening and more comprehensible. Although
conceived at a time of great uncertainty, the plan embodied
the optimistic view that, with but slight encouragement,
progressive, liberal development had the capacity to solve a
panoply of international issues. Commonwealth policy-
makers genuinely believed that the plan would go some way
to building a cooperative, anti-communist regional
association under the protective wing of the United States.
Yet if Australian policy-makers hoped that the Colombo
Plan would make their lives easier, they must have been
sorely disappointed. Rather than stimulate an Asian
economic recovery, the Colombo Plan drew greater
attention to the massive task of building economic and
social infrastructure and exposed a haphazard and
piecemeal handling of complex development projects.
Australian policy-makers also found it far more difficult to
cozen Asian societies into Western modernity than they
expected. Rather than foster a grateful and supine body of
Asian political elites, the process of giving aid exposed
Australia to Asian nationalism and the practical difficulties
of building positive rapport with independent nations. 
Given that the Colombo Plan development program,
as it functioned in Asia, appeared to be riddled with
inefficiency and inconsistency, why, then, did it survive to
become an entrenched feature of the regional aid-giving
environment? A number of interrelated factors sustained
the Colombo Plan: the relatively low burden on Australian
taxpayers, the limited official analysis undertaken by the
Consultative Committee, and, irrespective of its practical
limitations as a development scheme, the fact that it
functioned symbolically as a bridge between disparate and
divergent political and economic systems, thus becoming
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a unifying force in the fractious climate of the Cold War.
It comforted Australian politicians and diplomats who
could point to the plan as concrete evidence of Australia’s
regional awareness and generosity. Any success associated
with the Colombo Plan was Australia’s success because
Australians could claim that they were responsible for the
plan’s conception and implementation. Failures could be
blamed on inefficiencies in the recipient countries and on
the vicissitudes of international markets. The critical and
moderate opinions offered by the likes of Macmahon Ball
threatened to undermine the popular rationale for
Australia’s aid program. Although some in the DEA would
have had sympathy with Macmahon Ball’s analysis,
diplomatic staff and senior policy officials were already
overworked and nervous about attaching too many strings
to foreign aid. The imposition of further conditions would
have been next to impossible. For their part, the Labor
Party began to target the government’s preoccupation with
strategic objectives at the expense of humanitarian aid.
Delegates to Labor’s 1961 national conference specifically
advocated a ‘widening of the Colombo Plan to assist Asian
nations on a basis of common need and mutual co-
operation and not in the narrow limits of so-called
“enlightened self-interest”’.18 Most importantly, the program
yielded other benefits and objectives, not necessarily
present or obvious at its creation. The conspicuous benefits
generated by the student program were incommensurate
with the relatively small outlay of government funds, which
the international affairs commentator Douglas Wilkie
claimed as one of the ‘cheapest strokes of foreign policy in
all history’.19
————
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In the volatile and uncertain aftermath of the Second
World War, Australia searched for an active remedy for the
dangers inherent in decolonisation and the beginning of
the Cold War. Australians did not seek to become part of
Asia; rather, they gradually came to see Australia’s future as
inexorably linked with the ‘near north’. Since then
Australia has sought to maintain strategic interests, express
neighbourly goodwill, fulfil humanitarian obligations, and
establish a cultural, diplomatic, and economic dialogue
with the region — all without appearing to violate Asian
sovereignty. Historian Manning Clark observed that during
the 1950s Australia faced Asia with twin offerings: with
one hand, she offered ‘welfare, and with the other, a
sword’.20 As Australia faced Asia in 1964, on the verge of
its longest and most divisive military commitment, his
observation seemed apt. But what this book has shown is
that, through the genesis of the Colombo Plan in the late-
1940s and its implementation in the 1950s, attitudes and
understandings of Australia’s place and security in the
Asian region expanded to incorporate a more organic and
flexible appreciation of economic, social, and cultural
engagement. Australian geo-strategic, economic, and
cultural security was — and is — intertwined with the
management of its relations with Asia. The decision to
create the Colombo Plan and maintain it for so long
signalled Australia’s official admission that engagement
with Asia simply had to occur and that Australia should be
among those taking the initiative. Although the financial
commitment was small, the Colombo Plan had
considerable cultural and political significance. It brought
together those who wanted Australia to be a humane and
generous neighbour, those who thought modern, liberal
values could be transplanted easily into Asia, and those
hard-nosed realists who hoped for little more than a slim
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strategic advantage in the Cold War struggle. The Colombo
Plan captured this amorphous and changing approach to
regional engagement — one that spanned a remarkable
diversity of governmental considerations of a strategic,
cultural and economic nature. 
Full of quasi-imperial intent, the Colombo Plan was
a defensive response to a particular construction of Asia
and the anxieties, threats and promises that lay within that
region. Yet its creation represented a shift away from the
often insular concerns of the Menzies Government and
actively — if with considerable ambivalence and
trepidation — breached the barriers, both geographic and
mental, of Australia’s northern frontier. This cautious and
conditional opening embodied a much broader tension of
post-war Australian life: the preservation of Australia’s
political, economic, and military sovereignty meant
engaging with the region and reconceptualising its regional
identity outside the boundaries of a defensive and insular
nationalism. That tension is with us still.
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EPILOGUE
The Colombo Plan still operates and is one of the longestrunning aid programs in the world. Yet awareness of the
Plan has diminished, largely because its main functions have
slowly been eclipsed by the multitude of cooperative forums
that have emerged since the Second World War. The United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ECAP), the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), and regional groupings such as
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) have all diverted attention, and finance, from the
Colombo Plan. Greater prosperity in some Asian countries
has also reduced the need for external technical assistance. In
the 1980s, donor nations even contemplated the end of the
historic scheme when Britain and Canada dropped out. But
salvation came from Japan, a country that had once struggled
to gain acceptance into the Colombo Plan fraternity. In fact,
Japan has been the largest donor nation since 1977, and in
1989 gave more than twice the amount provided by the
United States.
The Colombo Plan survived the Cold War and the
anti-communist objective foisted upon it by Western
donors to become a broader, more permanent international
organisation. Today, it still manages to retain a nominally
non-political agenda. Membership of the Consultative
Committee still includes nations that are geographically
diverse and politically divergent. Indeed, having begun
with seven founding Commonwealth nations, the Colombo
Plan now includes 25 countries stretching from Iran in the
west to the Fiji Islands in the east. By 1980, membership
included almost every Southeast Asian nation and the
Colombo Plan was extended indefinitely. The admission of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in November 2001 left
Brunei as the only outstanding regional country. Mongolia
attends as a provisional member. 
Throughout all these changes in membership, the
basic philosophy of the Colombo Plan has remained
essentially unchanged. The Consultative Committee serves
as a non-coercive discussion forum and member nations
negotiate bilateral cooperative programs. More recently,
Colombo Plan activities have emphasised human resource
management, intra-regional trade, public administration,
and private sector development. The drug advisory program,
initiated in 1972, continues to work with international
bodies and non-government organisations to control the
availability of drugs and provide assistance to addicts.
Technical training is still supported through the Colombo
Plan Staff College for Technical Education, established in
1973 to train management and specialist personnel.
Australia retains its Colombo Plan membership by
bearing some of the administration costs of the bureau in
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Sri Lanka. But since the mid-1970s, when the Whitlam
Government oversaw a major restructure of the aid
bureaucracy, Australian aid has been channeled through a
wider variety of multilateral and bilateral programs. Since
that time, the number of Colombo Plan scholarships has
fallen steadily from a peak of over 3,000 per year as
alternative means of sponsoring students have become
available and, more significantly, demand from Asians
prepared to pay for education in Australia has risen
markedly.
Yet the legacy of the Colombo Plan is more directly
evident in the scope and structure of Australia’s current
overseas aid program and the language used to promote it.
On the 50th anniversary of the Colombo Plan in 2001 the
Malaysian–Australian Alumni Council, with support from
the Australian government and other organisations,
launched the Malaysia–Australia Colombo Plan
Commemoration (MACC) scholarship program. Intended
to encourage the two-way exchange of students between
Australia and Malaya, the inaugural program offered 56
scholarships for undergraduate and postgraduate study. Of
the 62 places offered in 2004, 46 were offered to Australian
applicants to study at 12 Malaysian institutions. The
MACC initiative hopes to build on the sentiment and
aspirations of the Colombo Plan by strengthening the
educational and cultural links between the two countries.
In a similar vein, the Australian government and the World
Bank launched the ‘Virtual Colombo Plan’ in August 2001.
The program is intended to provide developing countries
with distance education programs and access to Australian
research via the Internet and extends as far as East Timor,
China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
the Philippines and some African countries. Here the talk
of using information and communication technology to
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‘leap frog’ ahead in the development process is reminiscent
of the overly optimistic language that characterised the
development models of the 1950s and 60s. Predictably, this
revival of the ‘Colombo Plan’ as a byword for education and
positive cross-cultural exchange ignores the scheme’s
complex history and the self-interested political and
cultural motivations that underpinned the program.
Another contemporary incarnation of the Colombo
Plan development scheme is the Australian Youth
Ambassadors for Development Program (AYAD), launched
in 1998 and organised by the Australian Agency for
International Development (AusAID). Drawing inspiration
from the Plan’s technical expert program, skilled young
Australians undertake short-term assignments of up to 12
months in developing countries, often in partnership with
Australian companies, educational institutions, government
agencies, non-government organisations and community
groups. Like the expert program of the past, the youth
ambassadors’ role as cultural representatives is just as
important as the contributions they make to specific
development projects. 
Certainly, Australian aid providers today place much
greater emphasis on cultural sensitivity and tailoring
development to the local and national needs of developing
countries. But Australia’s commitment to the provision of
modern infrastructure, the promotion of sustainable
development, and the emphasis on technical training,
distance education and institutional strengthening, all have
strong links to the Colombo Plan’s basic vision of regional
development. Indeed, the preference for economically tied
infrastructure projects, such as the My Thuan bridge in
Vietnam, which was built by Australian companies,
confirms Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Alexander
Downer’s directive that Australia’s ‘aid program will remain
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identifiably Australian — it is a reflection of Australian
values and is a projection of those values abroad’.1 The
anti-communist rhetoric that gave foreign assistance its
momentum may have gone, but the nexus between
international aid and national economic, social and
cultural imperatives is as intricate as it was 50 years ago.
Footnotes
1 A. Downer, Better aid for a better future: seventh annual report to Parliament on
Australia’s development cooperation program and the Government’s response to the
Committee of Review of Australia’s Overseas Aid Program, Canberra, Australian
Agency for International Development, 1997
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